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Combined with five research articles, this thesis aims to elaborate the ongoing 
investigations on Chinese economy in the field of its development studies with 
emphasis on its utilization of FDI including both inbound and outbound investment 
and labour market. From the 1st opium war a century ago, China was suffering from 
the un-unified sovereignty as a colonized country. Its economy and development 
were left far behind. After a century since that, the economic reform of China in 1978 
has achieved great success in the sense that it enables China to become the most 
rapidly growing country and the second largest economy in the world. This opening 
up strategy, followed by a series of polices has made China one of the most 
favourite host countries for receiving FDI. As a result, the inward FDI can bring the 
benefit of economic growth for China on the one hand, but it has long been argued 
that it can also affect the labour allocation and income inequality on the other. How 
the previous Chinese-foreign relationship matters in the relationship between inward 
FDI and Chinese labour market and whether the FDI enlarges the income inequality 
as the literature suggested will be answered in the following chapters. Also, the 
China’s outward FDI has been increasing rapidly as China has gained important 
international status and increasingly played a more crucial role in international 
economy in recent years. What determines the Chinese outward FDI from a 
Chinese-foreign relationship (the cultural aspect) is the major motivation for another 
empirical research. The external factors such as FDI are important to understand the 
Chinese Economy. Yet, the internal factor such as rural labour transfer should not be 
neglected. Therefore, we also conduct 2 research papers on labour economics by 
investigating the rural labour on-farm transfer decisions and the role of 
grandparenting-life quality-life satisfaction.  
Therefore, this thesis consists two articles to illustrate the relationship between 
inward FDI and labour market and income inequality, respectively. In the 1st article, 
we show that the relationship between inward FDI and employment is affected by 
different previous colonial powers in either positive or negative ways due to the 
different institutions they may have left.  In the 2nd paper, I revisit the relationship 
between inward FDI and vertical income inequality in China. I find that inward FDI 
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should not be blamed for the increasing of income inequality in China as it should in 
some other cases. Next, we study the Confucius Institute and the Chinese outward 
FDI, the results of which provide evidence on how cultural familiarity ties China with 
the world and boots its outward FDI as placed in the 3th paper. The 4th empirical 
study looks into the Chinese labour market more specifically with major focus on the 
rural labour transfer. We find that different capital endowments play key roles on 
rural households’ on-farm transfer decisions. The last research article investigates 
the grandparenting-life quality-life satisfaction and shows that the grandparenting 
has a favourable effect on grandparents’ life quality and life satisfaction.   
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Starting from the 1st Opium war in 1839, China was forced to cede more than 80 
concessions and treaty ports to different foreign powers. Its development and 
economy were left far behind compared to the developed countries. After the 
communist took over in 1949, China was subject to central planning, price control 
and tight regulations. This has not been changed until the economic reform initiated 
by Xiaoping Deng at the 3rd plenary of the 11th central committee in 1978. Economic 
development was highlighted as the major target of the economic reform which 
gradually reintroduced elements of capitalism to China. In 1992 during Deng’s 
southern tour, the concept of “special economic zone” (SEZ) introduced in 1980 was 
strengthened and a number of SEZs have been set up to better facilitate trade and 
attract more foreign direct investment. During this process of the China’s economic 
transition, inward FDI is considered to have been the major force contributing to 
great success on economic development in the literature. While much attention has 
been placed on the inward FDI-economic growth relationship, I explore how inward 
FDI affects the employment in the labour market in Chapter 2. I study it from a 
historical perspective by questioning how the different colonial legacies in Chinese 
modern history shape the impact of inward FDI on the labour market. Inward FDI 
was largely flowing into manufacturing sector in the early stage. Yet, the service 
sector starts to attract higher volume of inward FDI recently, which signals that the 
tertiary sector plays more and more important role in Chinese economy. Accordingly, 
the analysis utilizes a provincial panel on overall employment and employment in the 
service sector during 2006 to 2015. We find that inward FDI significantly promotes 
employment and that this relationship is stronger in regions once colonized by 
Western countries. Conversely, regions with a legacy of Japanese colonization 
display a weaker, and even negative, relationship between FDI and employment. 
These findings are robust to controlling for the length and intensity of colonization, as 
well as for endogeneity of inward FDI.  
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A few decades after the start of economic reform, China has stepped into the 
“ normal era with slowing economic growth but increasing inequality. Among several 
possible factors, inward FDI has been argued to reallocate labour, which in turn 
causes increasing income disparity. As a hidden factor for social conflict and 
institutional change for income redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006), the 
income inequality is one of the paramount issues impeding China from achieving 
balanced development. Therefore, Chapter 3 revisits the relationship between 
inward FDI and income inequality from the angle of rural-urban wage inequality, 
while accounting for the heterogeneity of inward FDI with respect to ownership types 
and sectoral distribution. On the basis of a panel dataset covering 30 provinces in 
China from 2000 to 2016, we first revisit the direct effect of inward FDI on rural urban 
wage inequality, followed by a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) to account for the spatial 
spillover effect of FDI. The results show that inward FDI in the primary (traditional) 
sector and FDI in coastal provinces taking the form of cooperative joint venture help 
reduce rural urban wage inequality. In contrast, wholly foreign owned enterprises in 
coastal provinces increase rural-urban wage inequality. This is mainly due to the 
comparative advantage of rural workers working in the traditional sector on the one 
hand and CJV in coastal area tends to hire more migrating workers on the other 
(Ouyang and Yao, 2017).  
As one of the largest FDI recipients, China also encourages Outward FDI. Followed 
by the “Going out” Policy launched in 1999, the “One Belt One Road” (also known as 
Belt Road Initiative) proposed by President Xi in 2013 aims at constructing a better 
connection with the world and promoting the trade and economic development 
worldwide. The Confucius Institute (CI), as an important channel of promoting 
Chinese culture and language abroad, has the potential to play a crucial role in 
promoting also China’s external economic and trade relations. After the first 
Confucius Institute branch established in Seoul in 2004, there are by now more than 
500 branches set up across more than 140 countries and regions. The Confucius 
Institute is also shown to have a favourable effect on the Chinese-world economy in 
terms of trade, tourism and foreign studies (Lien & Co, 2013; Lien et al., 2012; Lien 
et al., 2014). It is interesting to study how the Confucius Institute perform under the 
Belt Road Initiative as the role of CI should have strengthened after the introduction 
of the Belt-Road Initiative, which appoints strategic importance to the CI. Therefore, 
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based on a panel dataset containing Chinese enterprises’ cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (CMA) in 66 Belt-Road countries and 75 non Belt-Road countries from 
2006 to 2017, Chapter 4 investigates the impact of the CI on Chinese enterprises’ 
CMA. The findings are as follows. First, the establishment of CI has had a significant 
positive effect on the Chinese enterprises’ CMA, and on their success this effect is 
stronger in Non Belt-Road countries than Belt-Road countries. Second, the effect of 
CI on Chinese CMA activities is strengthened after the introduction of Belt Road 
Initiative and such effect is shown to be stronger in the Road countries than Belt 
countries. Third, the institutional quality and Chinese culture influence in the host 
countries also play an important role. 
Admittedly, FDI is an important external factor for driving the Chinese economy. We 
should not neglect the internal issues in China such as the rural development. There 
have been a large portion of rural-urban migrant workers as a course of unbalanced 
rural-urban development. Due to the Hukou system, an institution that has long been 
established in China with the power to restrict population mobility and prevent the 
rural labourers from working in urban area, the Chinese labour market has not yet 
reached full efficiency. As such,  there are a great number of labourers in rural area, 
it is important to study the occupational choice and allocation of these rural stayers  
While much research on China has focused on rural to urban migration and 
transitions of rural households away from agriculture, little is known about the 
changes within the rural agricultural sector. Yet, the agricultural sector continues to 
account for a large share of employment. In Chapter 5, we study the determinants of 
transitions from subsistence farming into either formal agricultural employment or 
agricultural self-employment. We pay particular attention to the role of capital 
endowments. We find that financial capital plays a relatively limited role. In contrast, 
natural, human, social and political capital are important determinants of rural 
households’ transitions to on-farm employment and self-employment.  
Introduced in 1979, the One-child policy has served the function of controlling the 
population in China for decades. While this policy has loosened to a two-child policy 
in 2015, its consequence of aggravating the trend of aging population brings 
challenges to the social and economic development. The rural area may suffer more 
from this aging population issue as the rural stayers are more likely to be older 
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people. Utilizing the 2015 wave of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal 
Study (CHARLS) that covers 7045 households, we study the effect of grandparents 
looking after grandchildren on old peoples’ quality of life and their life satisfaction in 
the last paper. We find evidence of important favourable effects of grandparents 
providing grandchild care not only allows older people have better mental health and 
receive more financial support from their (adult) children but also increases their life 
satisfaction. These favourable effects are proportionate to the amount of time spend 
caring for grandchildren and increase with the number of grandchildren looked after. 
The favourable effects on mental health seem limited to grandparents living in rural 
areas and apply especially to grandfathers. The favourable effect on life satisfaction 
is primarily directly attributable to caring for grandchildren rather than being incurred 
indirectly due to better health or financial situation of grandparents.  
Based on the case of the large emerging economy, China, this thesis contributes to 
the literature of development studies by providing evidence for both international 
economics and labour economics, especially from the empirical site. The rest of the 
thesis is organized as follows. The next chapter displays the impact of inward FDI on 
labour market in a historical perspective. Chapter 3 revisits whether the income 
inequality has been changed by the inward FDI. Chapter 4 explores what determines 
the rural labour’s on-farm transfer. In Chapter 5, we study the Confucius Institute’s 










Starting in the 16th century, European powers actively sought to colonize various 
parts of the world, including Asia. While China avoided being colonized outright, it 
ceded control of certain areas during the 19th century to various European countries, 
United States, and Japan. 1  This process of gradual encroachment on Chinese 
sovereignty, which started with Chinese defeats in the First Opium War (1839–1842) 
and the Second Opium Wars (1856-1860), resulted in the establishment of over 80 
foreign concessions and treaty ports across China.2 The concessions had their own 
legal systems and law enforcement, allowed foreign settlement and investment 
(including proselytizing), and served to facilitate trade with the colonial power and the 
rest of the world.  
Japan initially joined the Western powers in establishing concessions in ports and 
trading centers. Its involvement grew dramatically with its occupation of northeast 
China in 1931, when the nature of its involvement changed from trade facilitation to 
territorial expansion. This was followed by a full-blown Japanese invasion of China in 
1937.  
Most concessions were dissolved in the course of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-45) or in its immediate aftermath. The main exceptions were the British 
possession Hong Kong (returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997) and the 
Portuguese possessions Macau (returned in 1999).  
                                            
1 The Portuguese settlement in Macao predates this by several centuries, as it was established 
already in 1557. 
2 These concessions were held by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, 
Russia, United Kingdom and United States. 
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After the communist takeover in 1949, nearly all former concessions were integrated 
fully back into Chinese legal, political and economic systems and, as the rest of 
China, were subject to political repression, central planning and price controls. 
Consequently, their ties with the rest of the world were tightly restricted. This 
changed only after the reform and opening of the Chinese economy initiated by 
Deng Xiaoping at the 3rd Plenary Session of 11th Central Committee in 1978, when 
economic ties with the rest of the world again became possible.  
The effects of colonial status persist long after formal ties are severed. Former 
colonies often continue to trade extensively with their former colonial power and 
other former colonies that shared the same colonizer. Deterioration of these special 
relations tends to be gradual (see e.g. Head, Myer and Ries, 2010, Fidrmuc and 
Fidrmuc, 2003).  
A number of studies, including Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005), La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008), Becker et al. (2015), also show that 
former colonies inherit long-term legacies in terms of formal institutions, legal 
systems, informal values and attitudes that have profound long-term economic 
consequences.  
The legacy of the foreign influence in China has received surprisingly little attention 
from economists. The paper closest to ours is Jia (2014) who considers the long 
term legacy of the former treaty ports along the Chinese coast and the Yangtze River. 
While their demographic path of these port areas was similar to most during the 
Maoist period when China was almost entirely closed off to the world, she finds that 
they experienced higher population growth after the opening began in 1978. She 
attributes the difference in population growth predominantly to internal migration from 
other parts of China.  
Chen, Kung and Ma (2017) find evidence of even longer-term effects, concluding 
that areas with higher density of scholars as certified by the Chinese civil 
examination system (keju) during the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) eras 
have populations with higher educational attainments in present.  
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Mattingly (2017) notes that areas of northeast China once occupied by Japan have 
experienced positive effects in terms of higher wealth, better schooling, better health, 
and greater bureaucratic density. Mattingly attributes these lasting positive effects to 
state building efforts by the Japanese in northeast China. In contrast, Che et al. 
(2015) find that Chinese areas that suffered greater civilian casualties during the 
occupation have received lower investment by Japan and trade less with Japan. 
They argue that the lower intensity of bilateral economic ties with these areas is due 
to less favourable opinions and low trust in the Japanese by the residents. Similarly, 
Gao et al. (2018) analyze the performance of Japanese FDI in China and show that 
the historical legacy of conflict negatively affects the Japanese FDI performance. 
Colonization and occupation, therefore, can have long term economic effects, and 
these effects can be either positive or negative.  
Finally, Wang (2013) considers the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) after 
1978. She concludes that the SEZs have been more successful than other regions in 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), achieving higher technological progress, 
and boosting wage growth. This effect is most pronounced for the earliest SEZs.  
Here, we consider the legacies of European and Japanese colonization as a factor 
conditioning the effect of FDI on employment. While previous research is concerned 
with the lasting (and time-invariant) effect of historical legacies, we focus on the 
interaction of colonial legacy with the labour-market effect of FDI. In other words, we 
are not primarily interested in knowing whether regions with colonial legacies have 
received more FDI. That question is fraught with considerable endogeneity problems: 
geography or market access that made these regions attractive to foreigner traders 
and colonizers in the past, are likely to make them attractive to foreign investors also 
at present. Rather, our concern is whether FDI that flows into China finds more or 
less fertile ground depending on the region’s historical experience with colonization.  
There are several reasons why colonial past might have a lasting effect on the labour 
market and FDI. The former foreign concessions can benefit from continued (or re-
established) ties with the former colonial power. These ties can become rekindled 
either because the Chinese counterparts were able to maintain or re-establish them, 
or because of initiative and effort by the foreign partners who are able to capitalize 
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on the legacy of former ties and/or familiarity with specific regions of China. Another 
possibility is that the former concessions have inherited greater stocks of physical 
and human capital: colonial powers have invested into construction and 
infrastructure3 and set up schools in the concessions that they controlled. Since most 
foreign concessions were governed externally, there may be differences in 
bureaucratic efficiency or quality of public services.4 Similarly, colonial rule may have 
engendered greater (or lower) trust in foreigners, including investors, among the 
region’s inhabitants. Of course, all of these arguments are speculative and the 
preceding list is not meant to be complete and exhaustive (we hope that future work 
will shed more light on this interesting question). 
The economic impact of colonial legacies should crucially depend on the nature of 
the colonization experience. Was the colonial power primarily interested in fostering 
investment and trade, territorial conquest or extraction of wealth? In this respect, we 
expect that areas of China colonized by Western powers should have a more 
favourable colonial legacy than those controlled by Japan. Western concessions 
were primarily motivated by the desire to trade with China, whereas Japanese 
colonialization was driven by territorial expansionism. 
Following China’s gradual opening since 1978, FDI has been an important 
contributor to Chinese economic growth (Zhang, 2001; Iamsiraroj, 2016) and exports 
(Zhang and Song, 2001)5 Existing studies, however, mainly estimate the impact of 
FDI on manufacturing, ignoring FDI in other sectors. The reason for this emphasis is 
                                            
3  Examples include European style buildings in Shanghai and Tianjin and the sewer system in 
Qingdao. 
4 For this argument to work, the tradition of better bureaucracy would somehow have to survive the 30 
or more years since the dissolution of the last concessions, during which all of China was exposed to 
strict Maoist regime and the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The 
chance such traditions have survived is therefore slim, although not zero. 
5 There is an extensive literature on the impact of FDI on the labour market (e.g. Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1997; Greenaway, Hine and Wright, 1999; Wu, 2001; Brown, 2002; Fu and 
Balasubramanyam, 2005; Jenkins, 2006; Nunnenkamp, Schweickert and Wiebelt, 2007; Molnar Pain 
and Taglioni, 2008; Crinò, 2009; Karlsson Lundin, Sjöholm and He, 2009; Waldkirch, Nunnenkamp  
and Bremont, 2009). 
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obvious: manufacturing FDI provides more than capital to the host country economy: 
it comes also with technology transfer and numerous other benefits. 
As a country develops, however, the service industry increasingly becomes the 
dominant sector in the economy. FDI arguably plays a crucial role in this post-
industrial transformation. Therefore, given China’s current state of development, we 
consider the effect of FDI on employment for both the economy as a whole and the 
service sector specifically. Besides colonial legacies, we account for the role played 
by human capital, based on the theoretical models of Greenaway et al. (1999) and 
Fu and Balasubramanyam (2005).  
Our results suggest that colonial legacies shape the nature of the relationship 
between FDI and employment. This relationship is stronger in provinces with a 
legacy of Western colonization, and weaker in those colonized by Japan. We 
speculate that this may be due to the lasting effect of colonization on institutions 
(both formal and informal) left behind, although without reliable information on quality 
of institutions at the regional level, we cannot pursue this avenue further. We find 
that human capital is positively correlated with employment in the economy as a 
whole, but has little influence on employment in the service sector. This may reflect 
the fact that China’s service industry is still relatively lagging behind in terms of 
development, so the demand for skilled labour is still fairly low. These findings are 
robust to using dichotomous or continuous measures of colonial legacy, as well as to 
controlling for the possible endogeneity of FDI. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the mechanism at 
play and our hypotheses. Section 2.3 presents our methodology and the underlying 
theoretical framework. Section 2.4 describes the evolution of the Chinese service 
industry and carries out our empirical analysis. Section 2.5 offers discussions on the 
estimation results. Section 2.6 explores the robustness of our results. Section 2.7 
concludes.  
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2.2 Inward FDI and the Labour Market 
2.2.1 Short- and long-term FDI effects 
The labour-market effect of inward FDI depends on the nature of investment, and 
may differ in the short and long term. Over the short term, the magnitude and the 
sign of the effect exerted by FDI on employment is determined by the entry mode of 
FDI, ownership type of FDI and relationship between domestic capital and FDI. Local 
employment can be expected to rise as large numbers of workers are required in the 
initial phase when FDI takes the form of green-field investment. If the FDI is infused 
through acquisition or merger with an existing local firm, however, the effect on 
employment is ambiguous. Here, FDI tends to translate into productivity gains 
through transfers of advanced technology, management efficiency and the influx of 
new and sophisticated physical capital. Whether such investment leads to higher 
employment depends on whether the new physical capital and advanced 
technologies complement or replace labour. If FDI substitutes for local labour, it may 
depress employment in the host labour market. 
The labour-market impact also depends on the relationship of the FDI and domestic 
capital. If the FDI competes with domestic enterprises, it can crowd out locals and 
increase unemployment. If the FDI is complementary to local firms, job opportunities 
are created and the labour market booms. Therefore, the short-term effect on 
employment of service-sector FDI may be positive or negative.  
FDI affects employment over the long run through relationships with firms other than 
the FDI recipient. Spillover effects are particularly likely in the service sector. If the 
FDI takes the form of producer services, for example, it may promote development of 
related industries by creating a demand for more sophisticated intermediate services. 
The subsequent development of the upstream and downstream industries increases 
demand for services, creating a virtuous feedback loop that boosts the labour market 
and creates additional job opportunities. On the other hand, when FDI takes the form 
of consumer services (i.e. serving final consumers), the labour market effect exerted 
by the FDI on other firms is likely to be negligible. 
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Service FDI can play a crucial role in restructuring and upgrading the industrial 
structure of the service sector: modernization of service provision should lead to 
greater demand for skilled labour while demand for unskilled labour can fall. 
Transfers of modern technologies should lead to greater substitution of capital for 
labour, so that the net effect on employment can be again either positive or negative. 
Therefore, as with the short-term effect, the overall long-term effect of FDI on 
employment can go either way. 
2.2.2 Human capital 
A number of recent studies focus on the relationships between human capital and 
trade or human capital and employment (Bryant and Allen, 2009; Auer, 2015; Conti 
and Sulis, 2016). FDI can influence various aspects of the labour market, including 
wage rates, wage differentials, productivity growth and skill upgrading. 
Owning to productivity differences, foreign firms tend to pay higher wages than the 
industry average (Driffield, 1996; Driffield and Taylor, 2000). The technological 
advantages and the skill premium of inward FDI, however, can be transferred to 
domestic companies through the learning process (Barrell and Pain, 1997; Figini and 
Görg, 1999). To the extent that technology favors highly skilled workers, it is possible 
that FDI promotes their employment by increasing the demand for human capital. 
Salike (2016) finds that the human capital in China has been one of the most 
important factors in attracting FDI. However, the net effect on overall employment is 
ambiguous, as the greater input of skilled labour associated with FDI inflows may 
substitute for unskilled labour. Therefore, the overall effect of FDI and human capital 
on employment is ambiguous. 
2.2.3 Colonial legacy   
Historical legacies can be mainly categorized into institutional legacy and industrial 
legacy. Both may be advantageous or disadvantageous (Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2005; 
Greve and Rao, 2014; Che et al., 2015; Becker et al., 2015). Although intangible, 
institutional legacy plays a more essential role than industrial legacy. A favourable 
institutional legacy entails fair and stable polices to protect the property rights along 
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with safe and fair bureaucratic environment to encourage production and innovation. 
By the same token, adverse institutional legacy refers to the lasting effects of actions 
and policies that suppress regional development. Advantageous industrial legacy, in 
turn, refers to the construction of infrastructure such as the railways, schools and the 
health-care system. Disadvantageous industrial legacy refers to the destruction of 
such infrastructure. 
In China, many colonial targets were originally little developed areas. Hong Kong, for 
instance, was initially a remote fishing village. It became a developed region as a 
British colony created under the Treaty of Nanking. Of course, whether colonization 
leaves behind an advantageous or disadvantageous legacy does not depend only on 
the region’s level of development during its colonial period. 
What factors determine whether advantageous or disadvantageous legacy was left 
behind? Due to the different intentions and culture, the identity of the colonist matters 
as various motivations could lead to different or even opposite outcomes. 
In the Chinese context, the identity of the colonists can be categorized into Eastern 
and Western colonial rule. The Eastern influence is represented by Japan. Western 
powers are represented by the UK, US, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, 
Russia and Austria-Hungary, even though each colonized only a relatively small part 
of China and the duration of their colonization was limited.  
The motivation of the Western powers was mainly to establish trade relationships 
and promote their exports to China. Thus, they would be more likely to introduce 
inclusive institution into the regions that they colonized. In addition, Western 
colonization often left behind also an advantageous industrial legacy. For instance, 
Tsingdao (Qingdao), a German concession that existed for a relatively brief period 
(1898–1914), continues to benefit even now from well-preserved German 
infrastructure such as the railway and drainage systems. Furthermore, 
communication between countries has a positive effect on FDI flows (Kok and Ersoy, 
2009). The colonial past may strengthen such communication, making some regions 
more appealing to FDI. Lastly, good institutional heritage creates a trusting and safe 
environment conducive to economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Becker et 
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al., 2015). When people in a region have greater trust in foreign companies, we can 
expect that this increases efficiency and lowers rent-seeking behaviors. Based on 
the discussions above, we expect Western colonized experience to translate into a 
positive effect on the labour market via FDI. 
The colonization motives of Japan centered around access to resources and 
territorial conquest at the expense of China, a neighbor with vast territory and 
abundant resources. As a result, extractive policies dominated Japan’s treatment of 
colonized regions. Japan initially instituted a puppet state in Manchuria (Manchukuo) 
in 1931. This was followed in 1937 by open warfare and conquest of territory. 
Mistreatment of local populations, including the Nanking massacre and field testing 
of biological weapons in Manchuria (Che et al., 2015), likely eroded trust and 
encouraged rent-seeking. 
The legacy of this ugly past shows up in such actions as boycotts of Japanese goods, 
which have been particularly strong in regions once colonized by the Japanese army. 
Due to this legacy of mistrust, inward FDI is expected to have a less favourable 
effect on the local labour market and employment in regions with a history of 
Japanese colonization. 
Finally, the nature and intensity of colonization could matter. This should affect 
especially the legacy of Japanese colonization, where the main distinction is 
between northeast China and other Japanese possessions. Japan was present in 
Manchuria from 1931 onwards and actively engaged in state building. Its 
concessions elsewhere, however, were held only shorter periods. In contrast, the 
Western colonial presence was longer lasting. Many foreign concessions were 
established by the mid- to late 1800s, although they typically remained limited in 
geographical scope. We expect to find more profound effects in areas held for longer 
periods. 
2.3 Methodology 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model provides a framework for describing 
the interplay between trade and the labour market. Applying the HOS framework with 
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a Cobb-Douglas production function, Greenaway et al. (1999) show that trade may 
lead to a decrease in labour demand. Similarly, Hine and Wright (1998) argue that a 
defensive response of the labour market is formed as a result of trade and FDI, 
thereby supporting the conclusions of Greenaway et al. (1999).  
Fu and Balasubramanyam (2005) extend these two studies by putting FDI into total 
factor productivity and accounting for technical efficiency and knowledge spillovers 
generated by inward FDI. While growth of exports increases employment, they show 
it does not necessarily have a positive effect on labour efficiency. 
In our methodological framework, we follow Greenaway et al. (1999) and Fu and 
Balasubramanyam (2005). We start with the Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant returns to scale as follows: 






θ   (2.1) 
where Qit  denotes the real output of region i at time t. Kit, Nit and Hit  refer to the 
capital stock, labour and human capital of region i at time t, respectively. A refers to 
total factor productivity. α, β, θ and γ represent the shares of factors.6 It is assumed 
that a profit-maximizing region would choose to employ capital and labour at the 
levels where the marginal revenue product of capital is equivalent to the user cost (c) 
and the marginal revenue product of labour is equivalent to the wage (w). Eliminating 
capital stock K from equation (2.1) allows us to derive the following:7 










θ   (3.1) 
After taking logarithms, the labour demand function can be rearranged to solve for N 
as a function of Q as well as the other parameters, as follows: 
 ln Nit = ∅0 + ∅1 ln( wi/c) + ∅2 ln Qit + ∅3lnHit + γlnAit + εit (2.3) 
                                            
6 See Fu and Balasubramanyam (2005) for further details on the derivation. 
7 By taking the first difference of the equation (2.1) with respect to K and N, we get the marginal 
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where ∅0 = −(α ln α − α ln β)/(α + β) ; ∅1 =  −α/(α + β) ; ∅2 = −1/(α + β ; and ∅3 =
 −θ/(α + β). 
We assume that the total factor productivity A, incorporates the spillover effect of FDI, 
market competition due to export penetration, which can both promote technology 
and improve efficiency, and the historical legacy since the institutions of the 
colonizing power might have had a lasting influence on technology and efficiency. 
Thus, A can be replaced with the following: 
Ait = e
δ0TXSδ1FDIit
iδ2 ,   δ0, δ1, δ2 > 0 (2.4) 
where XS denotes the export penetration index measured by export-output ratio, i is 
the colonial legacy of region i and FDIit  denotes the inflows of foreign direct 
investment of region i at time t. T is time trend. Thus, the labour demand equation 
(2.4) can be re-written as: 
ln Nit = ∅0 + ∅1 ln( wi/c) + ∅2 ln Qit + ∅3lnHit + ∅2lnXSit + ∅5lni + ∅6lnFDIit +
 μ0T + εit    (2.5) 
To capture time-specific effect of FDI on the labour market as discussed above, we 
also estimate equation (2.5) with lagged FDI (up to a lag of three years). This allows 
us to capture both the short-term effects of FDI, and their longer-term effects. As a 
further extension, we also add an interaction term between FDI and human capital, 
to allow for the effect of FDI to be contingent on the stock of human capital. 
Depending on whether foreign investment and local human capital act as 
complements or substitutes, this interaction effect can be either positive or negative. 
Similarly, we also augment the model to allow for FDI and human capital to have 
non-linear effects.  
We replace the colonization indicator, i, with two dummy variables in line with the 
previous discussion on the potentially different effects depending on the nature of 
colonization. Thus, we get: 
 ln 𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∅0 + ∅1 ln( 𝑤𝑖/𝑐) + ∅2 ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡 + ∅3ln𝐻𝑖𝑡 + ∅4ln𝑋𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ∅5ln𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 ∅6 𝑊𝐶 ln 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + ∅7 𝐽𝐶 ln 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇0𝑇 + 𝑖𝑡  (2.6) 
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where WC and JC represent Western and Japanese colonization, respectively. 
2.4 FDI and China’s Labour Market 
2.4.1 Development of China’s service sector 
Driven by the economic reform in 1978, China has undergone a series of far-
reaching changes that resulted in high, sustained economic growth over recent 
decades. Cheap labour and the government’s preferential policies to welcome and 
promote inward FDI have made China a top destination for inward FDI over the past 
fifteen years. 
 
Fig. 2.1  Inward FDI of China from 2001 to 2015.  
FDI: foreign direct investment; left axis: inward FDI in service sector and inward FDI for the whole 
economy; right axis: inward FDI in service sector as percent of total. 
Source: NBSC. 
As shown in Fig. 2.1, inward FDI for the whole economy climbed swiftly from around 
$500 million in 2001 to over $1.2 billion in 2015. The time-profile of inward FDI 
flowing to the service sector was similar. Moreover, inward FDI in the service sector 
grew both in terms of amount and as a proportion of overall FDI, from 24 % in 2001 
to 64 % in 2015. As the new driver of economic growth, China’s service industry 
plays an ever-increasing role in attracting FDI. 
The growing importance of the service sector is confirmed by Fig. 2.2 The share of 
the service sector in employment and GDP has grown steadily, with services now 
accounting for the bulk of investment in physical capital in the Chinese economy. 
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This may be due in part to the fact that the service sector relies more heavily on 
highly-skilled labour than the rest of the economy. 
 
Fig. 2.2  Development of relevant indicators for China, 2001–2015.  
Left axis: employment in service sector as percent of total, GDP in service sector as percent of total, 
wage rate in service sector as percent of total and fixed investment in service sector as percent of 
total. Right axis: human resources as percent of total employment and human resources as percent of 
service sector employment. 
Source: NBSC 
2.4.2 Colonized regions in China 
Table 2.1 shows the names of the colonized regions along with the colonizing power. 
Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4 show the colonized regions in China since the 1st Opium War. 
We use blue to denote the regions which were once colonized by Western powers 
and red for the regions colonized by Japan.8 Regions in blue were colonized only 
partially, while regions in red were fully colonized. 
Table 2.1  Colonized regions 
 Colonized regions 
Japan 
Beijing, Heilongjiang*, Jilin*, Liaoning*, Hebei, Inner Mongolia*, Shaanxi, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, Hunan, Guizhou 
Western powers 
Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Shanghai Guangdong, Yunnan, Fujian, 
Guangxi, Jiangxi, Hainan 
Notes: * denotes regions that were colonized by Japan from 1931 to 1945 and were organized into a 
separate vassal state, Manchukuo. 
                                            
8 In collecting this information, we relied on two books on modern Chinese history (Fenby, 2009; 
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Several provinces with a Western colonial presence were later invaded by Japan in 
the course of the 2nd Sino-Chinese War. We only consider the first colonial influence 
as the Western presence was generally sustained for a longer period of time than 
Japanese occupation during the war. However, as a robustness check, we measure 
the extent and intensity of Western and Japanese colonization using continuous 
indexes. These results are presented in Section 2.6. 
 
Fig. 2.3  The geographic distribution of Western colonized regions in Chinese modern history.  
Sources: Fenby (2009), Dillon (2010), and Wikipedia. 
 
 
Fig. 2.4  The geographic distribution of Japanese colonized regions in Chinese modern history.  
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2.4.3 Data and variables 
The data used in this study are based on the National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NBSC) annual panel dataset, which includes all 31 mainland provinces of China, for 
the years 2006 to 2015. Data are collected for the service sector, non-service sector 
and all sectors as a comparison in the empirical analysis. Table 2.2 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the main variables.  
Table 2.2  Descriptive statistics 










Total employment in service 
sector (in tens of thousands) 
307 871.3 557.01 1067.92 1502.95 513.05 
NN 
Total employment in service 
sector (in tens of thousands) 
294 1667.84 1243.11 2687.89 3210.16 795.51 
N 
Total employment in all sectors 
(in tens of thousands) 
294 2524.32 1751.88 3224.15 4331.14 1619.75 
FDIS 
Inflow of FDI to service sector (in 
hundreds of millions of USD) 
310 29.56 36.18 40.95 46.12 12.48 
FDIN 
Inflow of FDI to non-service 
sector (in hundreds of millions of 
USD) 
306 34.25 45.42 13.31 29.56 38.67 
FDI 
Inflow of FDI in all sectors (in 
hundreds of millions of USD) 
306 63.83 72.69 87.08 111.82 19.92 
QS 
GDP contribution of service sector 
(in hundreds of millions of RMB) 
307 7057.29 8130.81 8990.68 12415.53 3134.88 
QN 
GDP contribution of non-service 
sector (in hundreds of millions of 
RMB) 
307 8490.61 7080.67 8277.57 11356.91 5530.56 
Q 
GDP for all sectors (in hundreds of 
millions of RMB) 
308 15519.9 13754.55 20628.78 27023.14 7939.87 
WS 
Average annual service sector 
wage (in tens of thousands of 
RMB) 
309 4.14 1.81 4.51 5.18 2.75 
WN 
Average annual non-service 
sector wage (in tens of 
thousands of RMB) 
281 4.09 1.76 4.93 4.29 2.36 
W 
Average annual wage in all 
sectors (in tens of thousands of 
RMB) 
281 3.81 1.58 3.89 4.93 2.56 
XS 
Export penetration index 
measured by export-output 
ratio, %) 
306 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 
H 
Human resources measured as 
fraction of people holding a 
bachelor’s degree or higher (in tens 
of thousands) 
302 18 12.31 22.38 31.89 9.1 
JC 
Regions colonized by Japanese 
power set as a dummy variable  
310 0.65 0.48 / / / 
WC 
Regions colonized by Western 
power set as a dummy variable  
310 0.29 0.45 / / / 
Notes: The service sector consists of wholesale and retail, trade, transportation, storage and post, 
hotel and catering, information, transmission, software and information technology, financial services, 
intermediation, real estate leasing and business service, scientific research and technical services, 
water management, environment and public facility service, household service, repair and other 
service, education, health and social services, culture, sports entertainment, public management, 
social security and organization services. 
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2.5 Estimation Results  
We estimate the employment functions for the service sector and the whole 
economy separately.9 The panel data regression results for the service sector are 
reported in Table 2.3. For purposes of comparison, Table 2.4 follows the same 
estimation strategy for the whole economy. 
2.5.1 Results for service sector and non-service sector 
In Table 2.3, the Chi square values from Hausman test indicate that the fixed effect 
estimation is efficient. The fixed effects also account for any time-invariant effects, 
including geography, history, culture and language/dialect. For this reason, colonial 
legacies are only included as factors shaping the effect of FDI on employment 
(interaction effects), and not as level effects. In column (1) and (2), both the 
contemporaneous inward FDI and its one-period lagged value in the service sector 
have a significantly positive short-term effect on employment, thus supporting our 
hypothesis. Columns (3) and (4) report the effects lagged by two and three periods, 
which are also positive, indicating that the inward FDI boosts employment with both 
a short-term effect and longer-term effect. Current wage affects employment 
negatively, while the growth of current output affects employment positively. Both 
effects are statistically significant. 
We find no positive correlation between the number of highly educated people and 
the employment in service sector, i.e. human capital does not significantly impact 
employment in the service sector. 
In column (5) and (6), we investigate how the effect of inward FDI in the service 
sector on employment varies with the stock of human resources by introducing an 
interaction term of human capital and FDI. The sign of the interaction is negative and 
statistically significant at 5 %, indicating that the inward FDI in the service sector 
promotes much more employment in provinces where the quality of human 
resources is comparatively low. This may reflect substitution between skilled and 
                                            
9 The result of Breusch-Godfrey test suggests there is no serial correlation in this panel. 
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unskilled labour. Provinces that receive more FDI and skilled labour have lower 
demand for unskilled workers. Therefore, the quality of region’s human capital stock 
plays a significant role and is determinative on the impact of inward FDI on service 
employment. We also allow both human capital and FDI to have a non-linear effect 
on employment in the service sector. The effect of human capital indeed appears 
hump-shaped, with intermediate values of human capita associated with higher 
levels of employment than either low or high values. Importantly, allowing for a non-
linear effect of human capital does not affect the interaction between human capital 
and FDI.  
Column (7) shows that the two colonizer groups, Japan and the Western powers, 
have different mediating effects on the impacts of inward FDI on employment in the 
service sector. As expected, the sign of the interaction with the Japanese colonized 
regions and the inward FDI in the service sector is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 %. This shows that the positive effect of current inward FDI on 
employment in the service sector is lower in the Japanese-colonized regions. In 
contrast, the effect is stronger in the Western-colonized regions. The coefficient of 
the interaction term between the Western-colonized regions and inward FDI in the 
service sector is positive and statistically significant at 5 %. This suggests that the 
Japanese colonization left an adverse historical legacy in terms of institutions, 
infrastructure or both. The opposite is the case for Western-colonized regions. 
Column (8) estimates the effect of extent and duration of colonization on 
employment in the service sector via inward FDI. Here, the main distinction is 
between the provinces in northeast China that were included in Manchukuo from 
1931 (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning and part of Inner Mongolia), and the areas 
conquered by Japan during and after 1937. In Japan saw itself remaining for the 
longer term in Manchukuo, so it engaged in building up infrastructure, schools and 
public administration. In provinces invaded during the war, the Japanese presence 
was much shorter lived and far more traumatic for the local populations.  
The results suggest that the negative interaction effect associated with Japanese 
colonization on service employment stems from the areas conquered by Japan 
during the war. This is in line with Mattingly’s (2017) finding that in northeast China, 
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which was colonized in 1931, Japan maintained a longer presence and engaged in 
state building. 
Finally, when we control for the colonial legacy, the signs and significance of the 
current inward FDI, wages, human capital and output in service sector are consistent 
with the estimations in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
Table 2.3  Effects of FDI, human capital and colonial legacies on service employment, FE 
𝐥𝐧𝐍𝐢,𝐭
𝐒  Short-run effect Medium-run effect Human capital effect Colonization effect 




















𝐒   
0.060*** 
(3.22) 
      
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟐
𝐒    
0.075*** 
(3.66) 
     
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟑
𝐒     
0.065*** 
(2.98) 
    
𝐉𝐂 ∗ 𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭





































































































No. of obs. 298 268 237 206 298 298 298 298 
Adjusted R2 0.8938 0.8942 0.8942 0.8934 0.8836 0.8520 0.8251 0.7665 
Hausman test (𝛘𝟐) 19.96 19.12 17.05 15.92 23.90 48.76 25.94 45.16 
Notes: FDI: foreign direct investment; H: human capital. JC and WC stand for Japanese and Western 
colonized regions, respectively. JCNE and JCR stand for Japanese-colonized northeast (Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Liaoning, and Inner Mongolia) and Japanese colonized rest, respectively. See Table 2.2 for 
further details. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust t-values are in parentheses. We also include 
FDI square in column 6 but it is omitted due to multi-collinearity in this case.  
 
As a comparison, table 2.4 report the estimation results for the effects of FDI on non-
service sector. Similarly, we find that the coefficients remain expected sign while the 
effects are slightly weaker than those in service sector. Both in the short run and 
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medium-run, FDI flowing in non-service sector has a positive effect as shown in 
column (1) to (4). We also observe the human capital only displays the statistical 
significance in when we interact it with the FDI. Again, the colonization effects of FDI 
are consistent with table 2.4.  
Table 2.4  Effects of FDI, human capital and colonial legacies on non-service employment, 
FE 
𝐥𝐧𝐍𝐢,𝐭
𝐍  Short-run effect Medium-run effect Human capital effect Colonization effect 




















𝐍   
0.047*** 
(2.52) 
      
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟐
𝐍    
0.069*** 
(3.12) 
     
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟑
𝐍     
0.061*** 
(2.94) 
    
𝐉𝐂 ∗ 𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭





































































































No. of obs. 298 268 237 206 298 298 298 298 
Adjusted R2 0.8938 0.8942 0.8942 0.8934 0.8836 0.8520 0.8251 0.7665 
Hausman test (𝛘𝟐) 15.43 16.42 17.89 17.84 21.90 48.87 26.76 46.79 
Notes: FDI: foreign direct investment; H: human capital. JC and WC stand for Japanese and Western 
colonized regions, respectively. JCNE and JCR stand for Japanese-colonized northeast (Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Liaoning, and Inner Mongolia) and Japanese colonized rest, respectively. See Table 2.2 for 
further details. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust t-values are in parentheses. We also include 
FDI square in column 6 but it is omitted due to multi-collinearity in this case.  
 
2.5.2 Results for the whole economy 
We investigate the role of inward FDI and the colonial impact on employment in the 
whole economy in Table 2.5 As it can be seen from columns (1), (2), (3) and (4), the 
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positive values of the coefficients of inward FDI and its lags show that inward FDI 
promotes jobs in the whole economy in both the short and medium run. This effect is 
considerably stronger than for the service sector alone.  
Table 2.5  Effects of FDI, human capital and colonial legacies on total employment, FE 
𝐥𝐧𝐍𝐢,𝐭
 Short-run effect Long-run effect Human capital effect Colonization effect 






















      
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟐   
0.041* 
(1.90) 
     
𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭−𝟑    
0.068*** 
(3.04) 
    









𝐉𝐂𝐍𝐄 ∗ 𝐥𝐧𝐅𝐃𝐈𝐢,𝐭        
0.036 
(0.93) 



















































































No. of obs. 280 249 218 187 280 280 280 280 
Adjusted R2 0.7999 0.8463 0.8891 0.8815 0.8090 0.8713 0.6237 0.7565 
Hausman test (𝛘𝟐) 43.93 31.57 15.88 17.10 41.51 24.95 54.95 44.73 
Notes: FDI = foreign direct investment; H = human capital; and JC and WC = Japanese and Western 
colonized regions. JCNE = Japanese-colonized northeast China (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and 
Inner Mongolia); and JCR = Japanese colonized rest. See Table 2.2 for details. Significance: *10%, 
**5%, ***1%. Robust t-values are in parentheses. We also include FDI square in column 6 but it is 
omitted due to multi-collinearity in this case.  
The estimated coefficients of human capital are positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 % level (unlike in our estimations for the service sector). The interaction term of 
human capital and inward FDI is positive but not significant in column (5), but 
becomes significantly positive when we allow for a non-linear relationship between 
employment and human capital (column 6). The effect of human capital is again 
hump-shaped, as in the service sector, whereas the positive effect of FDI vanishes. 
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Together, these results suggest that human capital plays a more important role in 
boosting employment in the whole economy than in the service sector, and also that 
the positive effect of FDI may in fact be driven by its correlation with human capital 
and/or their positive interaction.  
In columns (7) and (8), the colonization effect for the whole economy is similar to the 
results obtained for the service sector. In the Japanese-colonized regions, inward 
FDI has a smaller effect on employment than in regions never colonized. In contrast, 
Western colonial legacy strengthens the positive FDI effect on employment 
compared to regions that were not colonized. When considering the extent of 
colonization, the negative effect of Japanese colonization again seems to be limited 
to provinces invaded during the war.  
2.6 Robustness Check for the Colonization Effect 
2.6.1 Indices of colonial legacy  
In the above discussion, we treated Western and Japanese colonial influence as 
dichotomous, using mutually exclusive dummy variables. However, some Chinese 
areas hosted both Western and Japanese concessions. Additionally, some cities and 
provinces had multiple foreign concessions. Dummy variables fail to capture the 
intensity of exposure to colonial influence. Thus, we construct a continuous measure 
of Western and Japanese influence that allows for both types of colonial legacies to 
be present simultaneously, and considers duration and intensity as well. 
Specifically, we consider the share of the colonized area, computed by dividing the 
area of the colonized city or prefecture by the area of the entire province. This is 
combined with the duration of the occupation as a proportion of the period during 
which foreign concessions were present in China. Our starting point is 1841, the year 
when the United Kingdom occupied Hong Kong Island.10 Our end point is the formal 
dissolution of the last remaining concession, the Italian concession in Tianjin, in 1947. 
                                            
10 The UK occupied Hong Kong Island at the outset of the 1st Opium War, in January 1840. It was 
subsequently ceded to the UK in 1842 under the Treaty of Nanking. 
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In this way, the Western colonization index (WCI) and Japanese colonization index 
(JCI) are constructed as follows: 






   (2.7) 
and 






  (2.8) 
where WCIp  and JCIp  stand for indexes of Western and Japanese colonization 
influence, respectively, of province p. Apgw and Apgjand stand for the area of city g in 
province p occupied by western country (w) or Japan (j), respectively. Ap is the area 
of the province p. Dpgw and DpgJ are the duration of Western (w) and Japanese (j) 
occupation, respectively, of city g in province p. Finally, T is the length of the colonial 
period in modern Chinese history, from 1841to 1947, i.e. 107 years.11 As a result, the 
colonial influence by a single foreign power can attain the maximum value of 1, 
which would be the case if the foreign power held control over the entire province for 
the full 107 years. 
In the case of Japanese colonization index, this is indeed the maximum possible 
value. In the case of the Western colonization, we further allow for the influences by 
various foreign powers to be mutually reinforcing to allow the WCI index to exceed 1. 
Noting that in case of Japanese colonization, we consider both trading concessions 
and territories occupied through military conquest. 
The actual values of the WCI and JCI indices for the Chinese provinces with colonial 
history are reported in Table 2.6 (provinces not shown in this table have no colonial 
legacy). The provinces with strongest Western influence are Tianjin, Shanghai and 
Beijing. Japanese influence was at its strongest in Tianjin and in Chongqing (which 
                                            
11 We ignore areas outside mainland China: Macau (Portuguese from 1557 to 1999), Hong Kong 
(under British control from 1841 to 1997), and Taiwan (under Japanese occupation 1895–1945, and 
outside of PRC control after 1949. 
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features an important inland port on the Yangtze River and in which Japan held a 
trade concession from 1897). 
Table 2.6  Colonization influence indices (Western and Japanese) 
Province WCI JCI 
Beijing 0.79439 0.08411 
Tianjin 3.30841 0.51402 
Liaoning 0.00933 0.17665 
Jilin 0 0.14019 
Heilongjiang 0.06216 0.14019 
Shandong 0.03135 0.08669 
Shanghai 1.23365 0.08411 
Chongqing 0 0.43925 
Zhejiang 0 0.07161 
Hubei 0.06278 0.07740 
Jiangsu 0 0.12045 
Fujian 0.01596 0.00841 
Guangdong 0.14269 0.04673 
Jiangxi 0.07060 0.01682 
Yunnan 0.02265 0 
Inner Mongolia 0 0.03224 
Hebei 0 0.06542 
Guangxi 0 0.05608 
Hunan 0 0.01682 
Guizhou 0 0.00561 
Notes: 1. WCI = Western colonization index; JCI = Japanese colonization index; 2. Please see Table 
A2.1 and A2.2 for more detail in appendix for this chapter.  
 
Table 2.7  Colonization effect of FDI for service sector, non-service sector and whole 
economy 
𝐥𝐧𝐍𝐢,𝐭 Service Sector  Non-service Sector Whole Economy 
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 





















































































No. of obs. 298 298 298 298 280 280 
Adjusted R2 0.8013 8.1418 0.8285 8.4142 0.7294 0.7901 
F statistic 56.50 48.11 53.47 51.26 133.15 130.26 
F-statistic 1st stage / 6.16 / 12.48 / 40.28 
Notes: FDI = foreign direct investment. H = human capital. JC and WC stand for Japanese and 
Western colonization influence parameters, respectively. Significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Robust t (z) 
values are in parentheses. 
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The results of this exercise are reported in columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 2.7 for 
the service sector , non-service sector and the whole economy, respectively. The 
regressions paint a similar picture as the previous analysis with dichotomous 
measures of colonization. The effect of FDI on employment is positive and further 
reinforced by the legacy of Western colonization or weakened by a Japanese 
colonial legacy (the latter is not significant in the case of the service sector). 
2.6.2 Controlling for endogeneity of FDI 
The previous results could suffer from endogeneity of FDI due to possible reverse 
causality between FDI and employment, or because both are caused by a third 
unknown factor (Greenaway et al., 1999; Fu and Balasubramanyam, 2005). To 
check for this, we adopt the two stage least squares (2SLS) methodology (Greene, 
1997), and use foreign trade of provinces and distance from the provincial capital to 
the nearest of the four main ports (Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Shenzhen) 
interacted with trade to construct the instruments for FDI. The 2SLS results are given 
in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 2.7. Note that since we only have one instrument, 
we only instrument FDI; the interaction terms containing FDI are left in their original 
form. The endogeneity bias, if present, is likely to affect the original endogenous 
variable the most, relative to interaction terms that contain it. Importantly, the colonial 
legacy variables (which also enter the interaction terms) should be exogenous, as 
they reflect historical developments that predate the period covered by our analysis. 
The F statistics in the first stage confirm the validity of these instruments. The results 
are broadly consistent with those previously obtained, but inward FDI does not show 
any significant effect on employment in the absence of colonial history. It is positive 
in provinces with a Western colonial legacy and negative (insignificant in the case of 
the service sector) in those with a history of Japanese colonization. 
2.7 Conclusions 
Given its high and steady growth rate in the recent decades, China has long been 
one of the most favored destinations for FDI. Applying the framework introduced by 
Greenaway et al. (1999) and Fu and Balasubramanyam (2005), this study 
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investigated whether different colonization experiences of Chinese provinces left 
lasting historical legacies that are determinative as to the effect of inward FDI on 
employment. 
We show that the inward FDI has a significantly positive effect on employment in the 
China’s service sector, non-service sector and the economy as a whole. Furthermore, 
our findings show that the significantly positive impact of FDI on employment is 
stronger in the regions once colonized by the Western countries but lower (and even 
negative) in regions subject to Japanese colonization. We believe this finding reflects 
the objectives of two types of colonial powers. Western countries primarily pursued 
economic cooperation with China by means of investment and trade. Japan sought 
to annex territory and extract wealth.  
We also distinguish the nature of Japanese colonization, differentiating between the 
areas of China that were colonized for a longer time (northeast China, which was 
under Japanese control from 1931) and areas controlled by Japan for a relatively 
short period (the regions invaded during the 2nd Sino-Chinese War, 1937–1945). 
After making this distinction, we find that the negative effect shows up mainly in 
regions invaded by Japan during the war and not in the north-eastern regions. The 
nature of colonization therefore matters as well, with military conquest leaving a 
more negative legacy than state-building. These findings are robust to the potential 
endogeneity of FDI, and are obtained both with dichotomous and continuous 
measures of colonial legacy (based on dummy variables and measures reflecting 
both duration and extent of colonial presence, respectively). 
Interestingly, we find that human capital is significantly related to employment in the 
economy as a whole, but has little influence on employment in the service sector. 
This difference seems to be explained by the fact that China’s service industry is still 
relatively underdeveloped and can therefore rely on fairly unskilled labour. 
Our hope is that this study serves as a first step toward better understanding of the 
relationship between FDI, institutions and the labour market in China, as well as 
economic development in general. Future studies could use the framework to collect 
additional evidence from other countries to investigate the impact of colonization on 
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FDI inflows and outflows across countries. Further research could also be fruitful in 
examining the influence of other potential factors, especially those related to various 




Table A2.1  Western colonies in China, 19th and 20th centuries 
Western colonization Foreign enclave Location (modern name) Province Established Dissolved Duration Area share AS*D/L 
International Beijing legation quarter  Beijing Beijing 1861 1945 85 100% 0.794393 
United Kingdom British concession in Dalian Dalian Liaoning 1858 1860 3 9.07% 0.002544 
Russia Russian Dalian  Dalian Liaoning 1898 1905 8 9.07% 0.006783 
Soviet Union Soviet concession in Dalian  Dalian Liaoning 1945 1955 11 9.07% 0.009327 
France French concession in Shamian island, Guangzhou Guangzhou  Guangdong 1861 1946 86 4.13% 0.033233 
France French concession in Kouang-Tchéou-Wan Port of Zhanjiang/ Zhanjiang Guangdong 1898 1946 49 6.94% 0.031812 
United Kingdom British concession in Shamian island, Guangzhou Guangzhou  Guangdong 1861 1945 85 4.13% 0.032847 
United Kingdom British concession in Zhanjiang Zhanjiang Guangdong 1861 1929 69 6.94% 0.044796 
United Kingdom British concession in Hankou  Hankou/Wuhan Hubei 1861 1927 67 4.56% 0.028612 
Germany German concession in Hankou Hankou/Wuhan Hubei 1895 1917 23 4.56% 0.009914 
France French concession in Hankou Hankou/Wuhan Hubei 1896 1946 51 4.56% 0.021779 
Russia Russian concession in Hankou Hankou/Wuhan Hubei 1896 1924 29 4.56% 0.012384 
Russia Chinese eastern railway, Harbin Harbin  Heilongjiang 1896 1952 57 11.66% 0.062159 
France French railway, Kunming Kunming Yunnan 1904 1940 37 5.33% 0.018444 
United Kingdom Trading warehouses at Tengchong  Tengchong Yunnan Late 19th 1935 30 1.50% 0.004208 
Germany Kiautschou bay leased territory Qingdao Shandong 1898 1914 17 7.04% 0.011192 
United Kingdom Weihaiwei leased territory Weihai Shandong 1898 1930 33 3.46% 0.010672 
United Kingdom Liugong island Weihai Shandong 1930 1940 11 3.46% 0.003557 
United Kingdom British concession in Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 1846 1863 18 100% 0.168224 
United States American concession in Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 1848 1863 16 100% 0.149533 
France French concession in Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai 1849 1946 98 100% 0.915888 
International Shanghai international settlement Shanghai Shanghai 1863 1945 83 100% 0.775701 
United Kingdom British concession in Jiujiang Jiujiang Jiangxi 1861 1927 67 11.27% 0.070611 
United Kingdom British concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1860 1943 84 100% 0.785047 
United States American concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1860 1902 43 100% 0.401869 
France French concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1861 1946 86 100% 0.803738 
Germany German concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1895 1917 23 100% 0.214953 
Japan Japanese concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1898 1943 46 100% 0.429907 
Russia Russian concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1900 1924 25 100% 0.233645 
Italy Italian concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1901 1947 47 100% 0.439252 
Austria-Hungary Austro-Hungarian concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1902 1917 16 100% 0.149533 
Belgium Belgian concession in Tianjin Tianjin Tianjin 1902 1931 30 100% 0.280374 
United Kingdom British concession in Amoy Xiamen Fujian 1852 1930 79 13.99% 0.010335 
International Gulangyu island Xiamen Fujian 1903 1945 43 13.99% 0.005625 
Notes: AS is short for Area Share, D for Duration, and L for length of time from the 1st Opium War to end of all concession dissolutions. 
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Table A2.2  Japanese colonies in China, 19th and 20th centuries 
Foreign Enclave Location (modern name) Province Established Dissolved Duration 
Area 
Share 
AS * D/L 
Japanese concession in Chongqing  Chongqing  Chongqing 1897 1943 47 100% 0.439252 
Kwantung Leased Territory/South 
Manchuria Railway Zone 
Dalian Liaoning 1905 1945 41 9.07% 0.034764 
Liaodong Peninsula Dalian Liaoning 1894 1895 2 9.07% 0.001696 
Japanese concession in Hangzhou  Hangzhou  Zhejiang 1897 1943 47 16.3% 0.071609 
Japanese concession in Hankou  Hankou/Wuhan Hubei 1898 1943 46 4.56% 0.019644 
Kiautschou Bay leased territory Qingdao Shandong 1914 1922 9 7.04% 0.005925 
Japanese concession in Weihai Weihai Shandong 1895 1898 4 3.46% 0.001294 
Japanese concession in Shashi  Shashi/Jingzhou Hubei 1898 1943 46 7.56% 0.032535 
Japanese concession in Suzhou Suzhou  Jiangsu 1897 1943 47 8.27% 0.036341 
Japanese-controlled Manchukuo  Liaoning (full control)  Liaoning 1931 1945 15 100% 0.140187 
Japanese-controlled Manchukuo Jilin (full control)  Jilin 1931 1945 15 100% 0.140187 
Japanese-controlled Manchukuo Heilongjiang (full control)  Heilongjiang 1931 1945 15 100% 0.140187 
Japanese-controlled Manchukuo East Inner Mongolia  Inner Mongolia 1931 1945 15 23% 0.032243 
Japanese occupation of Beijing Beijing (full control from 2nd Sino-Japanese War)  Beijing 1937 1945 9 100% 0.084112 
Japanese occupation of Tianjin Tianjin (full control from 2nd Sino-Japanese War)  Tianjin 1937 1945 9 100% 0.084112 
Japanese occupation of Shandong  
Shandong (full control at early stage of 2nd Sino-
Japanese War; partial control in later stage)  
Shandong 1937 1940 4 100% 0.037383 
  Shandong 1940 1945 6 50% 0.028037 
Japanese occupation of Guangdong 
Guangdong (partial control in early stage of 2nd Sino-
Japanese War; more control in late stage) 
Guangdong 1937 1940 4 20% 0.007477 
  Guangdong 1940 1945 6 70% 0.039252 
Japanese occupation of Hubei Hubei (partial control in 2nd Sino-Japanese War) Hubei 1937 1945 9 30% 0.025234 
Japanese occupation of Jiangsu Jiangsu (full controlled in 2nd Sino-Japanese War)  Jiangsu 1937 1945 9 100% 0.084112 
Japanese occupation of Fujian Fujian (partial control in 2nd Sino-Japanese War) Fujian 1937 1945 9 10% 0.008411 
Japanese occupation of Hunan 
Hunan (partial control at later stage of 2nd Sino-Japanese 
War) 
Hunan 1940 1945 6 30% 0.016822 
Japanese occupation of Jiangxi  Jiangxi 1940 1945 6 30% 0.016822 
Japanese occupation of Guangxi Guangxi (full control in later stage of 2nd Sino-Japanese War) Guangxi 1940 1945 6 100% 0.056075 
Japanese occupation of Hebei  Hebei 1940 1945 6 100% 0.056075 
Japanese occupation of Guizhou Guizhou (partial control in later stage of 2nd Sino-Japanese War) Guizhou 1940 1945 6 10% 0.005607 
Notes: AS is short for Area Share, D for Duration, and L for length of time from the Opium War to end of all concession dissolutions. 
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Chapter 3 
A spatial analysis of inward FDI and urban-
rural wage inequality: Evidence from China 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The ongoing globalization has ensured that foreign direct investment (FDI) and its 
effects remain one of the most heated topics in academic and popular discussions 
alike. There is by now an extensive body of literature devoted to the interplay of FDI 
with economic development and inequality. Most studies argue that attracting inward 
FDI is one of the most efficient ways to boost the economy of the host countries. A 
related issue is the potential influence of FDI inflows on inequality. However, due to 
the complexity of measuring inequality, heterogeneity of inward FDI and sample 
diversity, the literature on this topic remains far from having reached a consensus.  
Tsai (1995) uses data for 33 developed and less developed countries, showing that 
less developed countries report increases in income inequality in the wake of inflows 
of FDI. Choi (2006) supports this argument, finding that FDI increases income 
inequality in developing countries but not in developed countries. Basu and Guariglia 
(2007) obtain similar findings based on 119 developing countries and show that the 
inward FDI can exacerbate inequality. Taylor and Driffield (2005) investigate the 
case in the U.K. and find that the increase of wage inequality can be explained by 
the inflows of FDI. Figini and Görg (2011) provide similar result by comparing OECD 
and non-OECD countries. Their result suggests that income inequality first increases 
with inward FDI but decreases once a turning point has been reached. Herzer and 
Nunnenkamp (2013) show that FDI negatively affects the income inequality in most 
European countries whereas Asteriou et al.(2014) hold a completely opposite view, 
arguing that the highest contribution to inequality stems from FDI on the basis of an 
EU-27 analysis. Mah (2003), in contrast, reports that the inequality is unaffected by 
FDI inflows in Korea. Similarly, Sylwester (2005) does not find any significant 
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relationship between inward FDI and income inequality in a sample of 29 less 
developed countries.  
As one of the largest FDI recipients, China, with its increasing inequality, has drawn 
considerable attention. An early attempt by Zhang and Zhang (2003) ascribes the 
growing regional disparities to the effects of inward FDI and trade openness. Wan et 
al. (2007) argue that globalization substantially aggravates regional inequality and 
that this is largely due to the dramatic increase of inward FDI. Lessmann (2013), 
comparing China with other 54 countries, argues that inward FDI tends to raise 
income inequality in poorer regions. Mah (2013) adopts dynamic ordinary least 
squares from 1985 to 2007 to show that trade globalization and trade openness have 
strong and positive effects on income inequality while the impact of inward FDI is 
mixed. Similarly, Jalil (2012) shows that the relationship between openness and 
income inequality in China displays a pattern similar to the Kuznets curve: income 
inequality increases when openness grows but decreases later. From firm level 
perspective, Chen et al. (2011) show that inward FDI raises wage inequality because 
foreign invested enterprises report higher wage growth rate and discourage wage 
growth in domestic firms.  
On the other hand, Yu et al. (2011) use simultaneous equation model and Shapley 
value regression-based decomposition approach and argue that FDI has no impact 
on income inequality in China. Wei et al. (2009) separate the regional data into three 
groups: east, west and central. They find that although income inequality climbs in 
the period they analyze, there is no consistent evidence that FDI should be blamed 
for this since the western regions receive far less FDI but still suffer from rising 
income inequality.  
FDI can affect inequality not only in the regional dimension, but also across sectors. 
Studies that do not differentiate sectoral FDI may result in biased and ambiguous 
results (Wang, 2009; Doytch & Uctum, 2011). Yu et al. (2011) point out that the 
inward FDI has been unevenly distributed across sectors in China. In addition, recent 
studies have indicated that the importance of ownership patterns of FDI should be 
considered. The loosening of restrictions on establishing wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises has led to changes in the structure of FDI (Girma et al., 2015). Ouyang 
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and Yao (2017) argue that FDI in equity joint ventures (EJV) has a positive impact on 
economic growth, whereas the impact of FDI in cooperative joint venture (CJV) is 
negative.  
The main aspect of income inequality in China has been the increasing rural-urban 
income differential (Yang, 1999, 2002; Yao, 1999; Xie & Zhou, 2014). Based on a 
sample of 100 cities in China from 1988 to 1993, Wei and Wu (2001) find that the 
urban to rural income ratio is negatively affected by trade openness. Kanbur and 
Zhang (2005) confirm this finding with a longer provincial level panel dataset from 
1952 to 2000. They suggest that overall regional inequality, urban-rural income 
inequality and costal-inland inequality stem from the Great Famine in the 1950s, 
Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, and the global integration afterwards. Using 
provincial level data from 1999 to 2013, Greaney and Li (2017) find that the entry of 
multinationals does not have significant effect on urban-rural wage inequality in 
general.  
Finally, a major concern is that inward FDI may not only affect inequality in the 
region where it is located, but also may have spatial spillovers effects on other 
regions. To take this into account requires proper spatial econometric techniques. 
This article aims to close this gap by investigating the spatial effect of inward FDI on 
rural-urban wage inequality in China. While doing so, we account for the different 
ownership types and sectoral distribution of FDI. Specifically, we divide ownership 
types of FDI into equity joint venture (EJV), cooperative joint venture (CJV) and 
wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFE). We also account for the distribution of FDI 
into the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a literature 
review on why spatial spillovers matter in this context and background of different 
types of inward FDI in China. Section 3.3 describes the methodology and data in use. 
Section 3.4 includes the empirics and discussions. Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 The Theoretical Framework 
3.2.1 The explanation for inward FDI’s direct effect on inequality  
As in one of the earliest international trade theorem (Stopler & Samuelson, 1941), on 
the background of trade liberalization, a labor-intensive developing country will 
display higher returns to laborers with lower returns to capitalists, thereby leading to 
lower income inequality. Conversely, higher income inequality will arise in a capital-
abundant developing country.  
However, the returns differ in a model with two types of labor: skilled and unskilled. 
The demand for skilled workers increases in a developing country with the entry of 
inward FDI, which leads to a higher wage for skilled workers. Consequently, income 
gap is widened. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) make this point in a theoretical 
analysis and offer empirical evidence on the case of Mexico which contrasts the 
predictions of Stoper and Samuelson (1941).  
Based on the framework of Aghion and Howitt (1998) who consider FDI as an 
important tool for general purpose of technology, Figini and Görg (2011) propose a 
two-stage model: both skilled and unskilled workers are employed when the 
technology starts to improve at stage 1. The wage inequality (led by high wage for 
skilled workers and low wage for unskilled workers) starts to expand as a result. 
From stage 1 to stage 2, this wage inequality keeps increasing but with a diminishing 
marginal rate since the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled labor is 
gradually narrowed and the remaining unskilled workers will be obsolete at stage 2.  
The framework developed by Basu and Guarglia (2007) is also inspiring. In a dual 
economy, FDI enlarges the disparity between agricultural (rural) sector and the 
urban (modern) sector. Precluded from the FDI-based technology in the modern 
sector, the low productive rural workers remain lower paid. As such, the rural-urban 
inequality is exacerbated, which eventually leads to a deterioration of income 
inequality.  
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In the case of China, scholars also provide several theoretical frameworks to explain 
the skill-unskilled wage inequality from different dimensions including foreign capital 
(Pi & Zhou, 2014). They construct a four-sector general equilibrium model to 
investigate how an inflow of foreign capital influences the skilled–unskilled wage 
inequality in the presence of the endogenous public infrastructure provision. Given 
the special characteristics of China’s Hukou system, they stand from   rural-urban 
migration perspective to further explore such inequality (Pi & Zhang, 2016; Pi & 
Zhang, 2017).  Following these frameworks, we discuss how rural-urban inequality 
and skill-unskilled wage inequality are interlinked in section 3.2. 
3.2.2 Spatial spillovers of FDI on rural-urban wage inequality via 
migration 
Rooted in the model of rural-urban dual economy (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 
1970), the literature has explicitly recognized that the rural-urban inequality is 
crucially affected by rural-urban migration. In evidence, the rural-urban migration 
plays a significant role in determining the rural-urban inequality (Kanbur & Zhang, 
1999; Yang, 1999; Yang & Zhou, 1999; Pi & Zhang, 2016). This effect is in general 
shown to reduce the rural-urban inequality as the migration improves the rural 
income level and reduces rural poverty (Du et al., 2005; Zhu & Luo, 2010) via higher 
level of remittances from migrant workers (Howell, 2017). These studies imply that 
the rural-urban migration serves as a major channel accounting for the relationship 
between inward FDI and rural-urban wage inequality.  
In China, the bulk of rural-urban migration occurs between different provinces, 
primarily with workers moving from inland and less developed regions to developed 
provinces on the coast. The large cities with more job opportunities such as Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are all on the coast. 
However, most previous research only focuses on rural-urban migration at the intra-
provincial level and does not consider this labor mobility at the interprovincial level, 
except a few studies that recognize the importance of inland-coastal interplay 
(Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Ouyang & Yao, 2017). Nonetheless, they do not account for 
the overall interplay between regions. In this article, we adopt a proper spatial model 
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to capture the not only the inland-coastal interaction but also a general interprovincial 
interaction between regions.  
In the previous section, we discuss several FDI-inequality explanations with more 
focus on the skilled-unskilled wage inequality. However, these explanations still 
principally apply to the rural-urban wage inequality in China based on two major 
reasons. First, Chinese rural workers are largely unskilled. Compared to the urban 
education system, the rural education remains at a much lower level (see de Brauw 
& Rozelle, 2008; Yi et al., 2012 and many others). This rural-urban gap in the quality 
of education and the lack of modern industrial-skill training means also that the rural 
migrants struggle to get fully integrated in the industrial sector in urban areas.  
Second, even if rural-urban migrants are mostly skilled workers, they are often 
treated as unskilled workers in the urban areas because of the household 
registration system (Hukou). Although the reform in 1984 liberalizes rural labor 
mobility, the essence of the Hukou system has not been changed. The rural migrants 
suffer severe discriminations in the urban job market: they are excluded from a 
certain jobs (Chan & Buckingham, 2008), face employment barriers (Shi et al, 2011) 
and receive far less social welfare such as health insurance and pensions (Yang, 
1999; Ha et al., 2016). The Hukou system has segmented the urban laborers into 
two different groups (Shi et al., 2011): without the urban Hukou, the rural migrants 
are less likely to be employed as skilled-workers even if they are skilled. 
3.2.3 The effects of different types of FDI in China 
(1) Sectoral distribution of inward FDI 
Most of the literature focuses on the impact of FDI on the manufacturing sector. 
Secondary (manufacturing) sector FDI contributes to productivity improvement 
mainly by technology transfers (Wang, 2009; Newman et al. 2015; Lu et al. 2017). In 
China, manufacturing FDI takes the form of both high-tech FDI and low-tech FDI; yet 
they have different direct and spillover effects on productivity, with some studies 
arguing that the effect is U-shaped (Liu et al., 2014; Anwar & Sun, 2014). Another 
major benefit the host countries can obtain from manufacturing FDI is the promotion 
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of exports, given that manufacturing FDI is the most export oriented among sectoral 
FDI (Zhu & Fu, 2013; Tang & Zhang, 2016; Latorre et al. 2018).  
As one of the few studies focusing on the tertiary sector (service) FDI, Fernandes 
and Paunov, (2012) find that service FDI fosters innovation and promotes 
productivity in the manufacturing industry. Similarly, Latorre et al. (2018) analyze the 
link between sectoral FDI and Chinese economy by adopting computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model. They suggest that service FDI benefits the host country 
welfare. Doytch (2015) applies system GMM to examine the effects of FDI in 
different sectors on business cycle in several Asian countries. She shows that the 
financial service FDI can play a significantly positive role with respect to the host 
country business cycle while FDI in other sectors do not seem to be influential. This 
influence can extend to inequality since the service industries in China are still 
under-developed and rely heavily on low-cost migrant workers. Therefore, the 
inequality gap can be reduced as the tertiary FDI pulls up the lower quantile income. 
There is limited research so far on the impact of FDI on the primary sector. 
Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2010) have developed a three-sector general equilibrium 
model to show that flow of FDI into agriculture improves the social welfare by 
mitigating unemployment. Agricultural production and food security have been 
promoted via the direct effect of agricultural FDI and its favorable externalities such 
as know-how, R&D and technology transfer (Slimane et al., 2016). They emphasize 
the importance of primary FDI and ascribe China’s success in both economic growth 
and poverty mitigation to improvements in agriculture. Santangelo (2018) finds that 
agricultural FDI from developed countries has positive effect on host countries while 
the effect of FDI from developing countries is negative. As for its effect on income 
inequality, it can be expected that there should be a negative relationship between 
income inequality and the primary FDI as the rural workers can benefit from higher 
wages that the multinationals offer, thus helping them catch up with the better paid 
urban workers.  
As shown in Fig. 3.1a. and Fig. 3.1b., sectoral FDI in China displays a noticeably 
uneven distribution. As a traditionally agricultural country, China has achieved 
remarkable agricultural growth since the rural reforms in 1978. However, primary-
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sector FDI into China has remained the lowest among the three sectors. It reached 
its highest point in 2002 at close to 2% of the total. The secondary-sector FDI has 
grown gradually from 34.79 billion USD in 2001 to 53.26 billion USD in 2008, only to 
fall again to 40.21 billion USD in 2016. As a share of the total, it has fallen steadily, 
from 74.23% to less than 32% over the same period. However, the service FDI has 
increased rapidly both in terms of volume and share. It was 24% of total FDI in 2001 
and has risen to more than 65% in 2016. 
 
Fig. 3.1a  The trend of inward sectoral FDI flows as volume from 2001 to 2016. 
Source: The authors’ calculations according to NBSC. 
 
 
Fig. 3.1b  The trend of inward sectoral FDI flows as percentage from 2001 to 2016. 
































































































































































Primary FDI Secondary FDI  Tertiary FDI
Year
53 
(2) Ownership patterns of inward FDI 
There are three types of FDI in China with respect to ownership types, namely 
cooperative joint ventures (CJV), equity joint ventures (EJV), and wholly foreign 
owned enterprises (WFE). The main differences between these three ownership 
types are as follows: WFE is FDI that is fully owned by the foreign investor. CJV and 
EJV are both Sino-foreign co-operations, with the former based on a cooperation 
contract and the latter based on a joint investment. The CJV accounts for the 
smallest portion among the three forms, and its importance has been falling over 
time. In Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2b, CJV can be seen going from 6.21 billion USD and 13% 
of all FDI in 2001 to 0.83 billion USD, less than 1%, by the end of 2016. Unlike CJV, 
the amount of EJV has increased from 15.74 billion USD in 2001 to 30.20 billion 
USD in 2016, while its share has fallen from 33.57% to 23.97% as presented in Fig. 
3.1a and Fig. 3.1b. As the most popular format of FDI, WFE has grown from 23.87 
billion USD and 53.17% of the total in 2001 to 86.13 billion USD or 75.37% in 2016 
as shown in Fig.3.2a and Fig.3.2b.  
The association between wage inequality and inward FDI regarding to ownership 
types starts from the General Purpose Technology (GPT) model introduced by 
Aghion and Howitt (1998). The higher capacity of technology innovation the foreign 
invested enterprise has, the more likely the wage inequality will increase in the short 
run (Figini & Görg, 2011) as more skilled workers are used to implement the new 
technology (Ucal et al., 2016). As they argue, in the long run the when the domestic 
firms follow up the inequality can be reduced.  
Therefore, it is of essential importance to control for the ownership forms of FDI as 
they are associated with diverse R&D capabilities and different level of technology 
innovations. In contrast to Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) and Javorick and Saggi (2010) 
who show that WFE is with the highest level technology rather than the joint ventures 
(CJV and EJV), Girma et al. (2015) find that foreign invested enterprises with 
minority (with more than 25% but less than 50% foreign capital) experience higher 
likelihood of R&D and conclude the joint ventures can positively contribute to the 
technology innovation. In line with this finding, Ouyang and Yao (2017) further argue 
that the joint ventures mentioned in Girma et al. (2015) as the EJV employs political 
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elites while the CJV is lower cost labor driven, more open to the rural migrant 
workers without Hukou. Building on these studies, we examine how the rural-urban 
wage inequality responds to joint ventures and wholly foreign owed enterprises both 
in the short run and long run. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2a  The trend of inward FDI flows by ownership type as volume from 2001 to 2016. 
Source: The authors’ calculations according to NBSC. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2b  The trend of inward FDI by ownerships type as percentage from 2001 to 2016. 
































































































































































 (3) Regional distribution of inward FDI in China 
The regional disparities in economic development and inequality are caused by the 
uneven distribution of inward FDI (see Madariaga & Poncet, 2007; Ouyang & Yao, 
2017).  The regions that have higher level of international trade, lower wages, more 
favorable environment for R&D, higher GDP growth rates, better infrastructure, 
higher returns on physical and human capitals, larger market size, better labor force 
and more beneficial policies have higher absorptive capacity for FDI (Wei et al., 1999; 
Cheng & Kwan, 2000; Sun et al., 2002; Cassidy & Andreosso, 2006; Salike, 2016). 
Moreover, the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) program has played a significant role 
in attracting foreign capital and shaping the relationship between the FDI and the 
local economies (Wang, 2013). As shown in Fig. 3.3, regional distribution of FDI in 
China has not changed much until 2016. The coastal regions still receive the largest 
portion of inward FDI, whereas the western regions receive the smallest share. This 
uneven distribution of inward FDI can lead to spatial spillovers, especially from the 
coastal regions to inland areas (Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Ouyang & Yao, 2017). Our 
consideration not only covers inland-coastal spillovers but also the overall picture of 
inter-regional interactions. 
 
Fig. 3.3  Regional distribution of inward FDI in China in 2016. 
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3.3 Methodology and Data  
3.3.1 The empirical model  
We construct the general nesting spatial (GNS) model as follows subject to the 
spatial correlation tests:   
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1 ∑ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝑖 +
𝜇𝑡  + 𝑖𝑡      (3.1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is rural-urban wage inequality in region 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑋 is a vector of control 
variables; 𝐹𝐷𝐼 is a vector of different types of FDI intensity measured by FDI to GDP 
ratio in region 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝑗 represents the another region (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) which can be the 
source of the spillover; 𝛼 is the spatial autocorrelation. 𝛽 and 𝜃 are coefficients to be 
estimated; 𝑤𝑖𝑗 are elements in the spatial weight matrix; 𝜎𝑖 is the unobserved region 
fixed effect that is constant over time, 𝜇𝑡 is the unobserved time effect, and 𝑖𝑡 an 
error term. We break down FDI in two ways: according to ownership types into CJV, 
EJV and WFE, and by sector into primary, secondary and tertiary FDI. The control 
variables include the overall provincial per capita GDP and its square term to 
account for the relationship between economic development and income equality 
(Kuznets, 1955; Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000; Rubin & Segal, 2015); proxy for 
human capital (Figini & Görg, 2011; Yang & Qiu, 2016; Campos et al., 2016); and 
the rural-urban capital and labor ratios (Zhang & Zhang, 2003; Molero-Simarro, 
2017). 
3.3.2 Data  
The data set we use in this study comprises 30 provinces in mainland China from 
2000 to 2016. The data sources include the national and provincial statistical 
yearbooks of the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The descriptive 
statistics of the variables in use are presented in Table 3.1. The trend of rural-urban 
wage inequality, Gini index and FDI in different sectors and ownership types are 
presented in Fig. 3.4. 
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𝑊𝐼 Rural-urban annual average wage ratio 510 1.44 0.730 
𝐶𝐽𝑉  Inward FDI as CJV to GDP ratio (%) 510 0.15 0.003 
𝐸𝐽𝑉   Inward FDI as EJV to GDP ratio (%) 510 0.75 0.007 
𝑊𝐹𝐸   Inward FDI as WFE to GDP ratio (%) 510 1.81 0.023 
𝑃𝑅𝐼   Inward FDI in primary sector to GDP (%) 510 0.08 0.001 
𝑆𝐸𝐶  Inward FDI in secondary sector to GDP (%) 510 1.62 0.014 
𝑇𝐸𝑅 Inward FDI in tertiary sector to GDP ratio (%) 510 1.07 0.012 
𝐴𝐺𝐺 Aggregate level inward FDI to GDP (%) 510 2.77 0.023 
𝐿𝑅  Urban rural labor ratio  510 72.42 142.85 
𝐾𝑅 Urban rural domestic investment ratio  510 2.74 4.51 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 Per capita GDP (yuan /person) 510 29312.14 23124.4 
𝐸𝐷𝑈  University level graduates to total population (%) 510 0.35 0.0021 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 Trade to GDP ratio (%) 510 5.89 7.15 
Notes: The primary sector consists of farming, forestry and fishing; the secondary sector consists of 
manufacturing, mining, production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, and construction; the 
tertiary sector consists of wholesale and retail, trade, transportation, storage and post, hotel and 
catering, information, transmission, software and information technology, financial services, 
intermediation, real estate leasing and business service, scientific research and technical services, 
water management, environment and public facility service, household service, repair and other 
service, education, health and social services, culture, sports entertainment, public management, 
social security and organization services. 
Source: The authors’ calculation based on NBSC.  
 
 
Fig. 3.4  Rural-urban wage inequality, Gini index and inward FDI intensity according to 
different ownership types and sectors for 30 provinces, 2000-2016.  
Note: Gini index at provincial level suffers severe missing data issue, which cannot be used in spatial 
econometrics that requires strongly balance data. 
Source: The authors’ calculations according to NBSC. 
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3.3.3 Spatial econometric model selection  
As for the spatial spillover effect of FDI on income inequality, the spatial dependence 
of FDI should be first identified by the Moran’s I test (Moran, 1950), which is the most 
widely used test for the spatial interdependence. If the outcome of Moran’s I test 
rejects the null hypothesis that there is no spatial dependence, the Lagrange 
multiplier (LM) test developed by Anselin et al. (1996) for the spatial autoregressive 
pattern is applied. The LM test provides suggestions for spatial model selections. If 
the test results reject the null hypothesis that there is neither spatial nor error 
dependence, spatial Durbin model (SDM) is superior to other spatial models. Then, 
Wald spatial lagged test and Wald spatial error test should be conducted for the 
proper form of SDM since it is the general form of spatial autoregressive model 
(SAR), Spatial Lagged variables (SLX) and Spatial Error Model (SEM) (Vega & 
Elhorst, 2015) (see Fig. 3.5). If the Wald spatial lagged statistic rejects the null 
hypothesis, 𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0 and the Wald error statistic rejects the null hypothesis, 𝐻0: 𝜃 =
−𝜌𝛽 at the same time, the original form of SDM most properly captures the spatial 
issue in terms of data (Elhorst, 2014). 
 
Fig. 3.5  Comparison of different spatial econometric model specifications originated from SDM. 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Spatial correlation test 
Both the results of the Moran’s I test and Geary’s C test (Geary, 1954) shown in 
Table 2 reject the null hypotheses that the inward FDI and rural-urban wage 
SDM 
𝒀 = 𝜌𝑾𝒀 + 𝛼ȴ𝑁 + 𝛽𝑿 + 𝜃𝑾𝑿 + ɛ 
SAR 
𝒀 = 𝜌𝑾𝒀 + 𝛼ȴ𝑁 + 𝛽𝑿 + ɛ 
SLX 
𝒀 = 𝛼ȴ𝑁 + 𝛽𝑿 + 𝜃𝑾𝑿 + ɛ 
SEM 
𝒀 = 𝛼ȴ𝑁 + 𝜃𝑿 + 𝒖 
𝒖 = 𝜆𝑾𝝁 +  ɛ 
(if 𝜃 = −𝜌𝛽 then 𝜆 = 𝜌) 
𝜃 = −𝜌𝛽  
 
𝜌 = 0 
 
𝜃 = 0 
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inequality in different regions are spatially independent at the 1% statistical 
significance level. Therefore, a spatial econometric model is required to capture the 
inward FDI spillovers on rural-urban wage inequality. Further, the results of the LM 
and robust LM tests both reject the null hypotheses, which support the adoption of 
the SDM model.12 Besides, both the results of the Wald spatial error test and Wald 
spatial lag test reject the null hypothesis at the 1% statistical significance level 
suggesting that the original form of SDM should be selected as we previously 
discussed in section 3.3.3. 
Table 3.2  Tests for spatial issues. 
 
Inward FDI in different sectors  
Inward FDI in different ownership 
types  
Statistic P-value Statistic P-value 
Spatial 
dependence 
Moran’s I 0.2885 0.0000 0.3702 0.0000 
Geary’s C 0.7314 0.0000 0.6410 0.0000 
Spatial error 
Wald 787.6164 0.0000 1006.9035 0.0000 
LM (B) 278.7285 0.0000 458.8209 0.0000 
Robust LM 353.2603 0.0000 512.7190 0.0000 
Spatial lag 
LM (A) 22.4012 0.0000 8.8928 0.0029 
Robust LM 96.9330 0.0000 62.7909 0.0000 
Notes: 1. LM, Lagrange multiplier test; 2. LM (A), Lagrange multiplier test (Anselin); 3.LM(B), 
Lagrange multiplier test (Burridge).  
The prerequisite for spatial models is that the elements in the spatial weight matrix 
have to be exogenous, or the validity of the empirical models cannot be guaranteed 
(Anselin and Bera, 1998; Keller, 2002). The spatial weight matrix used for the spatial 
tests and the SDM model relies uniquely on the geographic distance between 
provinces. We use the actual geographic distance for the construction of the matrix 
as proposed by Madariaga and Poncet (2007) instead of contiguity (Lesage, 1999; 
Kelejian et al., 2013; Huang & Chand, 2015. The spatial weight matrix is constructed 
as 𝑊𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝐷𝑖𝑗  where  𝐷𝑖𝑗  is the geographic distance between province 𝑖  and 
province 𝑗. 
                                            
12 See detailed explanations in both theoretical and practical ways in Elhorst (2014), Huang and 
Chand (2015).  
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3.4.2 Rural-urban wage inequality and inward FDI in different 
sectors 
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results for the effect of inward FDI in different 
sectors on rural-urban wage inequality. Model 1 includes three different types of 
inward FDI with respect to sectors in one regression while model 2, 3, and 4 
separate them into different regressions. 13  In model 5, we introduce total FDI 
aggregated across all three sectors. The coefficients of FDI are mostly insignificant 
except that the FDI in primary sector is negative at 10% significance level in model 1 
and 5% significance level in model 2. In terms of spatially lagged FDI, only FDI in 
aggregate level has a weakly significant and negative effect on the rural-urban wage 
inequality. Table 3.3 provides us with an overview of interaction among regions for 
the FDI’s impact on rural-urban wage inequality. However, solely reliance on these 
spatial estimators can lead to incomplete and even biased conclusions due to two 
reasons. First, the spatial estimators do not present the marginal effect of variations 
in independent variables. Second, the spatial estimators may cause divergences in 
different specifications of spatial regression models (Lesage & Pace, 2009; Huang & 
Chand, 2015; Huang et al., 2017). Therefore, in Table 3.4, we also report the partial 
derivative summary indicators introduced by Lesage & Pace (2009), distinguishing 
the direct14, indirect and total effect of the explanatory variables. Note that the direct 
effect refers to the feedback effects to the neighboring regions and back to the host 
region, the indirect effect is the difference between total effect and direct effect to 
capture the spillover effect. 
Table 3.3  SDM: Impact of inward FDI in different sectors on rural-urban wage inequality. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
𝑃𝑅𝐼 -0.007** (-2.38) -0.006** (-2.38)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶 0.008 (0.90)   -0.001 (-0.12)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅 -0.007 (-0.96)     -0.006 (-1.03)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         0.011 (1.13) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 -0.027 (-0.93) -0.027 (-0.91) -0.026 (-0.89) -0.024 (-0.82) -0.034 (-1.15) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 -0.017 (-1.00) -0.019 (-1.19) -0.017 (-1.04) -0.016 (-0.97) -0.019 (-1.15) 
𝐿𝑅 0.014 (0.39) 0.009 (0.25) -0.001 (-0.05) 0.010 (0.29) -0.001 (0.25) 
                                            
13 Some studies include all types of FDI in one regression (for example, see Girma et al., 2015; 
Ouyang & Yao, 2017) while some others separate them in different regressions (for example, see 
Huang et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2018). Here, we include both as a comparison.   
14 The direct effect captures the endogenous interplay between the host regions and its neighbour regions that 
triggers feedback effects.  
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𝐾𝑅 0.027*** (2.76) 0.026*** (2.69) 0.025** (2.56) 0.024** (2.53) 0.026*** (2.66) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.052 (-0.26) 0.008 (0.04) -0.097 (-0.48) -0.067 (-0.35) -0.159 (-0.38) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.005 (-0.48) -0.008 (-0.82) -0.003 (-0.27) -0.004 (-0.45) 0.001 (0.08) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼 -0.020 (-1.60) -0.022* (-1.79)       
𝑊 × 𝑆𝐸𝐶 -0.004 (-0.05)   -0.055 (-0.94)     
𝑊 × 𝑇𝐸𝑅 -0.001 (-0.04)     -0.020 (-1.03)   
𝑊 × 𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.110* (-1.74) 
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.358*** (4.21) 0.367*** (4.68) 0.418*** (5.10) 0.402*** (4.97) 0.414*** (5.26) 
𝑊 × 𝑇𝑅𝐷 0.057 (0.61) 0.017 (0.29) 0.058 (1.06) 0.064 (1.19) 0.055 (1.00) 
𝑊 × 𝐿𝑅 -0.446** (-2.53) -0.477*** (-2.87) -0.545*** (-3.21) -0.477*** (-2.81) -0.483*** (-2.83) 
𝑊 × 𝐾𝑅 0.051 (1.13) 0.053 (1.20) 0.051 (1.11) 0.047 (1.04) 0.045 (1.01) 
W × PGDP -1.361 (-1.53) -1.531* (-1.76) -1.864** (-0.90) -1.899** (-2.21) -1.575* (-1.80) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2 0.070 (1.60) 0.078* (1.84) 0.946** (2.20) 0.096** (2.28) 0.079* (1.85) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 
R-squared 0.2527 0.2093 0.2000 0.2137 0.2054 
Notes: 1. Independent variable is urban rural wage ratio; 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses; 4. W is 
the distance weight matrix. 
Table 3.4 shows that the total effect of FDI in the primary sector is negative at 5% 
significance level. This indicates that 1% increase in primary sector FDI reduces 
rural-urban wage inequality by 2.1%. Out of this, 1.5% is due to the spatial spillover 
effect. Although such effect is small given the small share of the primary sector in 
overall FDI, this confirms our finding that the inward FDI in the traditional sector such 
as agriculture and forestry is beneficial for the rural workers in terms of offering 
higher wage and better opportunities. However, there is no significant relationship 
between inward FDI in other sectors and the rural-urban wage inequality. This is in 
line with Yu et al. (2011) and Greaney and Li (2017) who find no evidence that rural-
urban wage gap links to the activities multinationals. 
Table 3.4  Direct, indirect and total effect: Impact of inward FDI in different sectors on rural-
urban wage inequality. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Panel A: Direct effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼 -0.006** (-2.16) -0.006** (-2.14)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶 0.008 (0.89)   0.000 (0.01)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅 -0.006 (-0.88)     -0.006 (-0.91)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         0.013 (1.27) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 -0.034 (-1.17) -0.034 (-1.21) -0.033 (-1.19) -0.031 (-1.11) -0.042 (-1.46) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 -0.017 (-1.05) -0.018 (-1.13) -0.016 (-1.00) -0.015 (-0.95) -0.018 (-1.12) 
𝐿𝑅 0.023 (0.63) 0.016 (0.48) 0.006 (0.17) 0.016 (0.48) 0.006 (0.17) 
𝐾𝑅 0.026*** (2.60) 0.025*** (2.73) 0.024** (2.59) 0.023** (2.57) 0.025*** (2.70) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.032 (-0.15) 0.041 (0.22) -0.066 (-0.34) -0.032 (-0.18) -0.131 (-0.68) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2 -0.006 (-0.55) -0.010 (-1.00) -0.004 (-0.42) -0.006 (-0.64) -0.001 (-0.18) 
Panel B: Indirect effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼 -0.014 (-1.43) -0.015* (-1.71)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶 -0.008 (-0.17)   -0.045 (-1.00)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅 0.002 (0.06)     -0.015 (-0.66)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.091* (-1.87) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.279*** (5.11) 0.292*** (5.76) 0.342*** (5.99) 0.328*** (5.98) 0.338*** (6.33) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 0.018 (0.40) 0.017 (0.37) 0.049 (1.08) 0.054 (1.21) 0.047 (1.04) 
𝐿𝑅 -0.354*** (-2.71) -0.376*** (-3.09) -0.440*** (-3.35) -0.387*** (-3.07) -0.387*** (-3.08) 
𝐾𝑅 0.032 (0.90) 0.035 (1.03) 0.035 (0.99) 0.032 (0.92) 0.031 (0.87) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.973 (-1.58) -1.239* (-1.92) -1.518** (-2.29) -1.558** (-2.41) -1.261* (-1.92) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2 0.052* (1.71) 0.065** (2.06) 0.078** (2.38) 0.081** (2.51) 0.065** (2.00) 
Panel C: Total effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼 -0.020** (-2.03) -0.021** (-2.32)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶 -0.001 (-0.01)   -0.046 (-1.01)     
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𝑇𝐸𝑅 -0.004 (-0.15)     -0.021 (-0.97)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.078 (-1.59) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.245*** (4.39) 0.257*** (4.98) 0.308*** (5.44) 0.296*** (5.47) 0.295*** (5.61) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 0.001 (0.03) -0.001 (-0.02) 0.033 (0.78) 0.039 (0.94) 0.028 (0.69) 
𝐿𝑅 -0.331*** (-2.63) -0.360*** (-3.13) -0.434*** (-3.50) -0.371*** (-3.06) -0.382*** (-3.19) 
𝐾𝑅 0.058 (1.56) 0.061 (1.05) 0.060 (1.57) 0.056 (1.50) 0.056 (1.50) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -1.005* (-1.67) -1.199* (-1.88) -1.584** (-2.46) -1.591** (-2.49) -1.391*** (-2.17) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2 0.046 (1.56) 0.056* (1.78) 0.074** (2.34) 0.074** (2.36) 0.064** (2.04) 
Notes: 1. All variables are in logarithms; 2. Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 3. 
Robust z-values are in parentheses.  
 
Similarly, in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 we report and interpret the effect of inward FDI 
according to different ownership formats on the rural-urban wage inequality. There is 
no significant relationship between CJV and rural-urban wage inequality. EJV has a 
positive direct effect on the rural-urban wage inequality. This indicates that the EJV 
causes a significant interplay between the host region and nearby regions. 1% 
increase in the EJV increases rural-urban wage inequality by 2.3%. This is in line 
with Girma et al. (2015) and Ouyang and Yao (2017) who argue that EJV has the 
highest capability for technology innovation and increases the rural-urban wage 
inequality in the short run. Yet, the indirect effect and total effect are insignificant. 
Among the three ownership types of inward FDI, WFE is found to have a negative 
indirect effect and total effect on the rural-urban wage inequality at 5% significance 
level. Note that the total effect is mainly driven by the spatial spillover effect, which 
indicates that the WFE help reduce the rural-urban wage inequality. A possible 
explanation is that the wholly foreign owned enterprises are to some extent lower 
labor cost driven. They create more job opportunities with less restriction on Hukou 
than the Chinese owned joint ventures. As they are located primarily in the coastal 
developed provinces, they cause the spatial spillover effects via the rural migrant 
workers from inland regions. 
Table 3.5  SDM: Impact of inward FDI by ownership type on rural-urban wage inequality. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
𝐶𝐽𝑉  0.003 (1.37) 0.003 (1.38)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉  0.023*** (2.78)   0.017** (2.20)     
𝑊𝐹𝑂𝐸 -0.014 (-1.51)     -0.002 (-0.24)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         0.011 (1.13) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 -0.025 (-0.87) -0.021 (-0.73) -0.028 (-0.95) -0.028 (-0.97) -0.034 (-1.15) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷 -0.009 (-0.52) -0.016 (-0.96) -0.017 (-1.01) -0.016 (-0.98) -0.019 (-1.15) 
𝐿𝑅 0.013 (0.37) 0.001 (0.03) 0.003 (0.09) 0.003 (0.10) -0.001 (0.25) 
𝐾𝑅 0.023** (2.43) 0.023** (2.36) 0.027*** (2.78) 0.022** (2.30) 0.026*** (2.66) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -0.199 (-0.99) -0.109 (-0.57) -0.142 (-0.74) -0.124 (-0.62) -0.159 (-0.38) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 0.003 (0.27) -0.002 (-0.23) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.001 (-0.09) 0.001 (0.08) 
𝑊 × 𝐶𝐽𝑉 0.019 (1.57) 0.010 (0.84)       
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐽𝑉 -0.019 (-0.42)   -0.041 (-0.94)     
𝑊 × 𝑊𝐹𝐸 -0.134*** (-2.69)     -0.110** (-2.30)   
𝑊 × 𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.110* (-1.74) 
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.556*** (5.96) 0.434*** (5.16) 0.396*** (5.09) 0.472*** (5.56) 0.414*** (5.26) 
𝑊 × 𝑇𝑅𝐷 0.064 (1.16) 0.069 (1.29) 0.062 (1.13) 0.064 (1.17) 0.055 (1.00) 
𝑊 × 𝐿𝑅 -0.491*** (-2.83) -0.479*** (-2.78) -0.542*** (-3.25) -0.529*** (-3.80) -0.483*** (-2.83) 
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𝑊 × 𝐾𝑅 0.013 (0.30) 0.039 (0.86) 0.039 (0.87) 0.032 (0.72) 0.045 (1.01) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃 -2.248** (-2.48) -2.322** (-2.54) -1.820** (-2.12) -1.789** (-2.08) -1.575* (-1.80) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2 0.108** (2.46) 0.116*** (2.61) 0.093** (2.21) 0.089** (2.10) 0.079* (1.85) 
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 510 510 510 510 510 
R-squared 0.2194 0.2110 0.2075 0.2047 0.2054 
Notes: 1. Independent variable is urban rural wage ratio; 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses. 4. W is 
the distance weight matrix. 
 
Table 3.6  Direct, indirect and total effect: Impact of inward FDI by ownership type on rural-
urban wage inequality. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Panel A: Direct effect  
𝐶𝐽𝑉  0.003 (1.22) 0.003 (1.31)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉  0.023*** (2.84)   0.017** (2.22)     
𝑊𝐹𝑂𝐸  -0.012 (-1.21)     -0.001 (-0.01)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         0.013 (1.27) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 -0.036 (-1.28) -0.029 (-1.05) -0.035 (-1.24) -0.037 (-1.32) -0.042 (-1.46) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷  -0.010 (-0.61) -0.016 (-0.94) -0.016 (-0.98) -0.016 (-0.96) -0.018 (-1.12) 
𝐿𝑅 0.023 (0.66) 0.008 (0.24) 0.011 (0.32) 0.011 (0.33) 0.006 (0.17) 
𝐾𝑅 0.024** (2.32) 0.023** (2.40) 0.027*** (2.81) 0.022** (2.34) 0.025*** (2.70) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃  -0.169 (-0.81) -0.066 (-0.36) -0.109 (-0.59) -0.091 (-0.48) -0.131 (-0.68) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2  0.002 (0.11) -0.004 (-0.45) -0.002 (-0.23) -0.003 (-0.25) -0.001 (-0.16) 
Panel B: Indirect effect 
𝐶𝐽𝑉  0.013 (1.45) 0.006 (0.72)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉  -0.022 (-0.66)   -0.034 (-1.13)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸  -0.094** (-2.30)     -0.087** (-2.38)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.091* (-1.87) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.414*** (7.19) 0.344*** (6.36) 0.322*** (6.15) 0.378*** (6.57) 0.338*** (6.33) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷  0.049 (1.18) 0.057 (1.31) 0.052 (1.15) 0.053 (1.20) 0.047 (1.04) 
𝐿𝑅 -0.367*** (-2.90) -0.379*** (-2.85) -0.435*** (-3.43) -0.421*** (-3.36) -0.387*** (-3.08) 
𝐾𝑅 0.003 (0.08) 0.025 (0.72) 0.025 (0.71) 0.021 (0.59) 0.031 (0.87) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃  -1.549** (-2.58) -1.892*** (-2.76) -1.464** (-2.27) -1.423** (-2.22) -1.261* (-1.92) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2  0.076** (2.59) 0.093*** (2.87) 0.077** 2.39) 0.073** (2.27) 0.065** (2.00) 
Panel C: Total effect 
𝐶𝐽𝑉  0.016* (1.87) 0.009 (1.12)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉  0.002 (0.06)   -0.021 (-0.63)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸  -0.105** (-2.51)     -0.087** (-2.00)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺         -0.078 (-1.59) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈 0.378*** (6.50) 0.314*** (5.80) 0.287*** (5.50) 0.341 *** (5.99) 0.295*** (5.61) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷  0.039 (1.00) 0.042 (1.04) 0.036 (0.86) 0.037 (0.91) 0.028 (0.69) 
𝐿𝑅 -0.343*** (-2.89) -0.371*** (-2.99) -0.424*** (-3.35) -0.409*** (-3.48) -0.382*** (-3.19) 
𝐾𝑅 0.008 (0.17) 0.047 (1.29) 0.052 (1.39) 0.043 (1.15) 0.056 (1.15) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃  -1.718*** (-2.99) -1.892*** (-2.91) -1.573** (-2.48) -1.515** (-2.43) -1.391*** (-2.17) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2  0.078*** (2.78) 0.088*** (2.78) 0.075** (2.37) 0.070** (2.27) 0.064** (2.04) 
Notes: 1. All variables are in logarithms; 2. Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 3. 
Robust z-values are in parentheses. 
 
3.4.3 Robustness check: the impact of inward FDI over longer 
periods 
So far, we presented results obtained with annual data. This has the advantage of 
capturing the short-term fluctuations in the data as well as having a large number of 
degrees of freedom. However, the downside is that while FDI flows can fluctuate 
considerably from one year to another, wage inequality tends to be rather persistent 
64 
and changes only slowly. Therefore, as a robustness check, we re-estimate the 
analysis also with longer periods. It is common in the literature to work with average 
values over five-year periods. Since our data covers the period from 2000 to 2016, 
we construct three sub-periods, namely, 2000 to 2005 (six years), 2006 to 2011 (six 
years) and 2012 to 2016 (five years). The purpose of this analysis is to confirm 
whether the pattern obtained with annual data holds also in longer term.  
Table 3.7 shows that in the estimation with period averages, the coefficient of inward 
FDI in the primary sector and tertiary sector is statistically negative while the 
coefficient of inward FDI in the secondary sector is statistically significant and 
positive. Yet, in terms of spatially lagged inward FDI, there is no significant 
relationship. The results in Table 3.8 further confirms that there is neither significant 
total effect nor spillover effect, which is broadly consistent with the previous results in 
the short term.   
The results in table 3.9 and 3.10 show that in the longer period the WFE also has a 
negative total and indirect effect on the rural-urban wage inequality (mainly from the 
spatial spillover effect), consistent with the previous results. 1% increases of WFE 
decreases the rural-urban wage inequality by 17.5%/20.9% in model 1 and 
17.5%/18.2% in model 3 from the spillover/total effect. Comparatively, this effect is 
stronger when estimated with period averages than in the short run estimation in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6. In addition, EJV, which does not have any significant effects in 
the short run, turns to be negatively related to the rural-urban wage inequality in the 
longer period. These results in the longer period are theoretically and empirically 
consistent with (Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Figini & Görg, 2011; Ucal et al., 2016) in the 
sense that in a longer period when domestic firms manage to mitigate and learn the 
know-how via the technology spillovers of multinationals, the wage inequality 
decreases. These results are also in line with Wei and Wu (2001) who argue that the 
globalization has helped reduce, rather than increase the rural-urban wage income 
inequality and with Jalil (2012) who finds that income inequality rises with the 
increase of openness and falls after a certain point, which suggests that China has 
passed the early stage of hosting inward FDI. 
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Table 3.7 SDM: Impact of inward FDI in different sectors on rural-urban wage inequality: 
averages. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.021*** (-4.72) -0.011*** (-2.75)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.078*** (7.25)   0.013* (1.77)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.065*** (-6.63)     
-
0.026*** 
(-3.42)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         0.012 (1.36) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.017 0.027) 0.037 (1.32) 0.017 (0.62) 0.028 (1.09) 0.011 (0.41) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.051*** (7.59) 0.033*** (5.12) 0.037*** (6.04) 0.042*** (6.48) 0.036*** (5.98) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.027 (-0.88) -0.090*** (-3.21) -0.099*** (-3.57) -0.065** (-2.23) -0.086*** (0.25) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.004 (0.34) -0.004 (-0.31) -0.003 (-0.28) -0.006 (-0.44) -0.009 (-0.64) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.664*** (-3.95) -0.418*** (-2.67) -0.681*** (-4.26) -0.402*** (-2.69) -0.643*** (-4.15) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.021** (2.49) 0.008 (0.007) 0.023* (2.84) 0.008 (1.16) 0.022*** (2.82) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.028 (-1.04) -0.015 (-0.66)       
𝑊 × 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.051 (0.51)   -0.215*** (-2.88)     
𝑊 × 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.029 (0.54)     -0.029 (-0.55)   
𝑊 × 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         -0.321*** (-4.07) 
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.509*** (3.80) 0.754*** (7.83) 0.951*** (8.76) 0.814*** (7.20) 0.988*** (9.53) 
𝑊 × 𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.448*** (6.77) 0.462*** (6.61) 0.473*** (7.48) 0.482*** (7.85) 0.496*** (8.15) 
𝑊 × 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.363* (1.81) -0.217 (-1.36) -0.332* (-2.07) 0.041 (0.22) -0.160 (-0.99) 
𝑊 × 𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.037 (-0.42) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.041 (-0.91) -0.001 (0.01) -0.088 (-0.95) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -2.230** (-2.37) -4.573*** (-5.38) -4.801*** (-5.63) -4.769*** (-5.40) -4.935*** (-5.87) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.092* (2.10) 0.211*** (5.22) 0.215*** (5.34) 0.213*** (5.16) 0.217*** (5.47) 
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.3613 0.2549 0.2495 0.2589 0.2550 
Notes: 1. All variables are measured as period averages. 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.8  Direct, indirect and total effect: Impact of inward FDI by sector on rural-urban 
wage inequality: averages. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Panel A: Direct effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.020*** (-4.60) -0.010** (-2.59)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.079*** (7.28)   0.025*** (2.69)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.068*** (-6.35)     -0.025*** (-2.65)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         0.016 (0.69) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.004 (-0.15) 0.003 (0.11) -0.031 (-1.15) -0.009 (-0.35) -0.038 (-1.45) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.034*** (5.10) 0.015** (2.19) 0.017*** (2.62) 0.023*** (3.18) 0.015** (2.30) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.042 (-1.31) -0.085*** (-2.74) -0.089*** (-2.86) -0.071** (-2.30) -0.084*** (-2.73) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.006 (0.52) -0.005 (-0.39) -0.002 (-0.19) 0.023** (2.57) -0.005 (-0.43) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.603*** (-3.38) -0.219 (-1.37) -0.477*** (-2.85) -0.189 (-0.154) -0.430*** (-2.66) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.018** (2.05) -0.001 (-0.17) 0.013 (0.008) -0.001 (-0.18) 0.012 (1.49) 
Panel B: Indirect effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.002 (-0.18) -0.001 (-0.15)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.022 (-0.47)   -0.113 (-3.26)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.052* (1.75)     0.001 (0.01)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         -0.209** (-2.28) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.255*** (4.73) 0.361*** (10.00) 0.456*** (10.63) 0.393*** (9.28) 0.478*** (11.61) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.206*** (5.57) 0.215*** (6.04) 0.208*** (6.75) 0.217*** (6.86) 0.221*** (7.27) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.196* (1.81) -0.056 (-0.68) -0.100 (-1.23) 0.059 (0.68) -0.024 (-0.30) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.021 (-0.52) 0.004 (0.11) -0.153 (-0.41) 0.006 (0.14) -0.036 (-0.90) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.757* (-1.80) -2.099*** (-5.43) -1.955*** (-5.01) -2.188*** (-5.64) -2.040*** (-7.57) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.035* (1.72) 0.103*** (5.49) 0.092*** (4.88) 0.103*** (5.53) 0.093*** (5.08) 
Panel C: Total effect 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 --0.022* (-1.67) -0.012 (-1.14)       
𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.057 (1.23)   -0.089*** (-2.84)     
𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.015 (-0.64)     -0.025 (-1.13)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         -0.193** (-2.22) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.251*** (4.43) 0.364*** (10.06) 0.426*** (10.47) 0.384*** (9.63) 0.439*** (11.38) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.240*** (6.36) 0.229*** (6.42) 0.226*** (7.36) 0.240*** (7.43) 0.236*** (0.69) 
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𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.154 (1.50) -0.142** (-2.07) -0.189*** (-2.91) -0.011 (-0.14) -0.108* (-1.65) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.015 (-0.32) -0.001 (-0.01) -0.018 (-0.41) -0.001 (-0.02) -0.041 (-0.91) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -1.360*** (-3.39) -2.318*** (-6.59) -2.431*** (-7.32) -2.377*** (-6.97) -2.471*** (-7.57) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.053*** (2.79) 0.102*** (6.02) 0.159*** (6.67) 0.102*** (6.27) 0.064** (2.04) 
Notes: 1. All variables are measured as period averages. 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.9 SDM: Impact of inward FDI by ownership type on rural-urban wage inequality: 
averages. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
𝐶𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  0.005 (0.76) 0.005 (0.31)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  0.048** (2.13)   0.025*** (3.34)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.058** (-2.32)     -0.023 (-1.44)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         0.012 (1.36) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.027 (-1.00) 0.012 (0.43) 0.022 (0.83) 0.008 (0.30) 0.011 (0.41) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.019*** (2.96) 0.036*** (5.34) 0.032*** (5.09) 0.036*** (5.96) 0.036*** (5.98) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.022 (0.73) -0.069** (-2.36) -0.076*** (-2.73) -0.076*** (-2.71) -0.086*** (0.25) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.020 (1.43) 0.007 (0.51) -0.002 (-0.16) -0.009 (-0.66) -0.009 (-0.64) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.402** (-2.50) -0.461*** (-3.06) -0.669*** (-4.45) -0.472*** (-2.97) -0.643*** (-4.15) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.107 (1.30) 0.011 (1.41) 0.023*** (2.97) 0.014* (1.70) 0.022*** (2.82) 
𝑊 × 𝐶𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.042 (-1.57) -0.078 (-1.31)       
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.097 (-1.46)   -0.231*** (-3.87)     
𝑊 × 𝑊𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.409** (-2.28)     -0.369*** (-2.45)   
𝑊 × 𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         -0.321*** (-4.07) 
𝑊 × 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 1.036*** (9.47) 0.750*** (7.60) 0.943*** (9.24) 0.978*** (9.51) 0.988*** (9.53) 
𝑊 × 𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.451*** (6.94) 0.531*** (7.88) 0.504*** (8.27) 0.492*** (8.04) 0.496*** (8.15) 
𝑊 × 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.288 (-1.55) -0.425** (-2.54) -0.474*** (-2.88) -0.045 (-0.27) -0.160 (-0.99) 
𝑊 × 𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.040 (-0.41) 0.062 (0.68) -0.128 (-1.31) -0.025 (-0.28) -0.088 (-0.95) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -3.589*** (-3.68) -4.306*** (-4.99) -5.682*** (-6.28) -4.483*** (-5.33) -4.935*** (-5.87) 
𝑊 × 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.154*** (3.30) 0.201*** (4.95) 0.261*** (6.12) 0.195*** (4.84) 0.217*** (5.47) 
Year fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions fixed  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.3145 0.2403 0.2666 0.2844 0.2550 
Notes: 1. All variables are measured as period averages. 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses. 
 
Table 3.10 Direct, indirect and total effect: Impact of inward FDI by ownership type on rural-
urban wage inequality: averages. 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Panel A: Direct effect  
𝐶𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  0.009 (1.01) 0.006 (0.76)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  0.057** (2.24)   0.022 (1.07)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.035 (-1.56)     -0.007 (-0.36)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         0.016 (0.69) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.065 (-1.06) -0.027 (-1.00) -0.023 (-0.88) -0.041 (-1.50) -0.038 (-1.45) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.001 (-0.22) 0.012* (1.75) 0.011* (1.66) 0.015** (2.35) 0.015** (2.30) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.039 (1.10) -0.051 (-1.53) -0.058* (-1.86) -0.079** (-2.53) -0.084*** (-2.73) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.024* (1.83) 0.005 (0.39) 0.004 (0.31) -0.008 (-0.74) -0.005 (-0.43) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.258 (-1.57) -0.262* (-1.67) -0.428*** (-2.77) -0.271* (-1.65) -0.430*** (-2.66) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.004 (0.52) 0.001 (0.08) 0.011 (1.39) 0.004 (0.54) 0.012 (1.49) 
Panel B: Indirect effect 
𝐶𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  -0.026 (-0.90) -0.043 (-1.36)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  -0.089 (-1.23)   -0.156** (-1.97)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.175* (-1.73)     -0.175** (-2.34)   













𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.204*** (7.07) 0.235*** (7.18) 0.231*** (7.45) 0.219*** (7.20) 0.221*** (7.27) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.157 (-1.62) -0.164* (-1.90) -0.190** (-2.21) 0.025 (0.31) -0.024 (-0.30) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.032 (-0.81) 0.027 (0.72) -0.061 (-1.40) 0.021 (0.59) -0.036 (-0.90) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -1.457** (-3.50) -1.821*** (-4.79) -2.455*** (-5.87) -1.935*** (-5.09) -2.040*** (-7.57) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.066*** (3.26) 0.092*** (5.07) 0.118*** (5.86) 0.088*** (4.72) 0.093*** (5.08) 
Panel C: Total effect 
𝐶𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  -0.013 (-1.17) -0.036 (-1.25)       
𝐸𝐽𝑉𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  -0.015 (-0.55)   -0.134* (-1.87)     
𝑊𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.209** (-1.99)     -0.182** (-2.41)   
𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒         -0.193** (-2.22) 
𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.433*** (9.65) 0.330*** (8.78) 0.435*** (10.75) 0.435*** (11.57) 0.439*** (11.38) 
𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.203*** (6.98) 0.247*** (7.41) 0.242*** (7.72) 0.235*** (7.71) 0.236*** (0.69) 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.117 (-1.51) -0.215*** (-3.27) -0.248*** (3.62) -0.054 (-0.78) -0.108* (-1.65) 
𝐾𝑅𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -0.009 (-0.19) 0.032 (0.74) -0.057 (-1.19) -0.013 (-0.30) -0.041 (-0.91) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 -1.715*** (-4.34) -2.083** (-6.11) -2.883*** (-7.59) -2.206*** (-6.79) -2.471*** (-7.57) 
𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃2𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 0.071*** (3.72) 0.093*** (5.73) 0.129*** (7.13) 0.093*** (5.93) 0.064** (2.04) 
Notes: 1. All variables are measured as period averages. 2. All variables are in logarithms; 3. 
Significant at *10 percent, **5 percent, ***1 percent; 4. Robust z-values are in parentheses. 
It is noteworthy that among the control variables, education increases the wage 
inequality between rural and urban areas through the spatial spillover effect. This 
probably reflects the fact that most college graduates are located in urban areas. 
This result also underscores the role of education as a determinant factor in regional 
rural-urban disparities in China. In addition, the per capita GDP has a negative 
spatial effect on the rural-urban wage inequality while its square term has positive 
spatial effect on the rural wage inequality, displaying an adverse Kuznets effect. Our 
understanding is that the rural-urban wage inequality first decreases as the 
economic development in the neighboring regions provides more job opportunities 
with higher wages and then increases when the job market is in saturation. 
3.5 Conclusions  
When investigating the relationship between inward FDI and income inequality, 
especially from the angle of rural-urban inequality, the literature overlooks the 
potential spatial spillover effects of FDI and fails to control for the heterogeneity of 
inward FDI. On the basis of a panel data set covering 30 provinces from 2000 to 
2016 in China, this paper studies the interplay between the spatial spillover effect of 
inward FDI and rural-urban wage inequality. Besides explicitly allowing FDI to have a 
spatial spillover effect, we also consider the possibility that the effect of inward FDI 
on rural-urban disparity may depend on sectoral distribution and ownership types of 
inward FDI.   
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Results show that while there is no significant relationship between rural-urban wage 
inequality and inward FDI in secondary and tertiary sector in both short run and long 
run, the inward FDI in primary sector has a negative spillover effect on rural-urban 
wage inequality in the short run although this effect is relatively small when we 
account for the sectoral distribution. In another important category with respect to 
ownerships, we find that WFE has a negative spillover effect on rural-urban wage 
inequality in the short run while this effect is more pronounced in the long run. Also, 
the equity joint ventures reduce the rural-urban wage inequality in the long run, 
indicating that China has gone beyond the early stage of openness and demonstrate 
well-developed leaning and innovation ability. Our findings corroborate studies such 
as Wang (2009) and Doytch and Uctum (2011) from a macro level in the sense that 
the heterogeneity of different types of inward FDI accounts largely for the mixed 
findings in the previous literature. These findings of our study also contribute to the 
literature with further understanding on the heterogeneity of inward FDI at an 
aggregate level based on different ownership types and sectoral distribution.  
Several policy implications may be obtained from our findings. Based on the 
suggestions from previous studies that more inward FDI should be allocated to 
inland provinces to address the uneven development in China (Zhang & Zhang, 
2003; Wan et al., 2007), more inward FDI in traditional sector such as agricultural 
technology-advanced FIEs should be introduced and allocated to the central and 
west regions to provide more opportunities for rural workers and foster rural 
development. Equally importantly, the policy makers may focus on the establishment 
of an improved and developed rural education system so as to enable the rural labor 





Cultural Institute and Home Institution: A 
Comparative Study for the Impact of the 
Confucius Institute in Belt-Road and Non Belt-
Road Countries 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Home institution is of crucial importance for one home country’s globalization 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Estrin, Meyer, Nielsen & Nielsen, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Luo, Ramamurti, & Ang, 2018; Yan, Zhu, Fan, & Kalfadellis, 2018; Li et al., 2019). 
The economic impact of culture familiarity during this process of home 
internationalization has been widely investigated (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 
2006; Lee, Shenkar & Li, 2008; Lee & Peterson, 2000; Xu & Shenkar, 2002), 
especially for a major form of capital outflows in recent years (Morosini, Shane & 
Shign, 1998; Lee & Peterson, 2000; Teerikangas & Very, 2006; Lim, Makhija & 
Shenkar, 2016) This is followed by a small but growing number of research focusing 
on the role of cultural institute (Lien, Oh & Selmier, 2012; Lien and Co, 2013; 
Akhtaruzzaman, Berg & Lien, 2017). While both home institution and cultural 
compatibility are considered as two key determinants on home country’s 
globalization, little effort has been provided to connect these two strands of the 
literature and even fewer attempts are found from the perspective of cultural 
institutes. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to probe into the role of cultural institute 
on the impact of home global institution by studying the interactive effect of the Belt 
Road Initiative and Confucius Institute (CI) on cross border mergers and acquisitions, 
an prevailing form of internationalization.  
As the largest emerging economy, China has been one of the major outward 
investors in the past years. In the wake of China’s economic reform initiated in 1978 
and its overwhelming success, the Chinese government has successively initiated 
several global institutions such as “Going Out” policy and Belt Road Initiative, 
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encouraging investment abroad. Committing funding for massive investments in the 
infrastructure and the transportation network along the belt (overland) and road 
(maritime routes), the Belt Road Initiative launched in 2013 is argued as a new home 
global institution (Li et al., 2019), substantially driving the volume of Chinese outward 
FDI (Du & Zhang, 2018). This has helped propel the wave of Chinese cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (CMA), an increasingly popular form of outward FDI. 
Nevertheless, Chinese enterprises’ CMA activities are certainly subject to the 
potential influence of the home-host culture difference, a major type of informal 
institutional difference (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Such national cultural difference is 
negative to the CMA as they can lead to raised worker turnover rate, low job 
satisfaction, employee resistance (Lee, Kim & Park., 2015), higher cross-border 
management cost (Du, Lu & Tao, 2012), shallow corporate social responsibility, 
weak organizational commitment and higher cross-border management cost (Ahern, 
Daminelli & Fracassi, 2015).  
That is to say, although the Belt-Road Initiative can potentially bring sizable benefits 
to the world economy, its progress has so far been limited by major challenges such 
as misunderstanding and inefficient interplay caused by institutional distance and 
cultural distance (Zhai, 2018; Liu, Lu & Wang, 2018). Therefore, popularizing the 
Chinese culture overseas in the member countries and shortening the cultural 
distances vis-à-vis the targeted countries should have been attached importance (Liu, 
Lu & Wang, 2018). This naturally leads us to the prior research on the economic and 
cultural impacts of the global cultural institutes.  
Cultural institute such as British Council and Goethe-Insitut can bridge the home 
culture and host countries’ cultures by facilitating cultural exchanges (Lien & Lo, 
2017). Serving similar functions, Confucius Institute, a non-profit public educational 
organization set up by the Ministry of Education of China has the potential to mitigate 
the cultural incompatibility that the Belt Road Initiative experiences. Since the 
establishment of the first CI branch in South Korea in 2004, the CI’s influence has 
not only shortened cultural distance but also created significant win-win benefits in 
the areas of education, trade and foreign direct investments (FDI) according to the 
following studies. Lien, Oh and Selmier (2012) use the gravity model on over 100 
countries from 1996 to 2008 and show that the CI has a positive effect on both trade 
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and outward FDI. The effect is especially strong for FDI because the cultural and 
linguistic familiarity generated by the CI enhances the trust. Trust, in turn, is an 
important determinant of FDI, because of their long-term-nature. In contrast, trade 
intensity mainly depends on transaction cost. Lien and Co (2013) find that the 
volume of exports from US to China is positively associated with the number of CI. 
They detect that approximately 5% increase of in state exports for each branch of CI 
set up in a given state from 2006 to 2010. In a recent study of the CI and Chinese 
foreign aid flows in Africa, however, it has been shown that the CI presence is not 
positively related to Chinese aid flows and, likewise, that Chinese aid flows do not 
explain the variation in the number of CI (Akhtaruzzaman, Berg & Lien, 2017). 
China’s soft power cannot be motivated simply by resource seeking although CI is 
doubtlessly a potent instrument for enhancing such power as they suggest.  
However, the literature has thus far left a huge gap for understanding the relationship 
between cultural institute and home global institutions. To bridge this gap, we 
conduct a comparative study on the basis of a panel data set covering 66 Belt-Road 
countries and 75 non Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 2017. Besides confirming the 
positive effect of home institutions on internalization, our results suggest that the 
interaction between cultural institute and home institutions can strengthen the impact 
of culture institute, and further promote the internalization of the home country. Two 
main contributions are offered in our paper. First, we contribute to the ongoing 
studies in broader literature on home country’s institutions on its internalization 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Meyer et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra et al, 
2018; Yan et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019) from the culture perspective (Guiso et al., 
2006; Lim et al., 2016; Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc; 2003; Xu & Shenkar, 2002) by 
investigating the role of cultural institute (Lien et al., 2012; Lien & Oh, 2013; Lien & 
Co, 2013; Lien et al., 2014; Lien et al., 2017). Second, we join the growing literature 
on the influence of the Belt Road Initiative by examining the function of CI, speaking 
to the recent evidence that underscores the importance of bilateral compatibility 
(Cheng, 2016; Huang, 2016; Du & Zhang, 2018; Lu et al., 2018; Zhai, 2018).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides the literature 
review. Section 4.3 summarizes the data and describes the methodology. Section 
4.4 discusses the results. Section 4.5 concludes.  
72 
4.2 Literature Review 
With the advancement of trade liberalization and globalization, the intensity of CMA 
activities has increased from the mid-1990s onwards and has continued at a 
remarkable pace among not only developed economies but also developing 
countries. This has helped generate considerable interest in CMA in the literature, 
not only in the field of economics and finance, but also in international business, 
marketing and strategic management. Among all the research in this field, one main 
stream of the literature has been focused on these questions: What drives the waves 
of CMA? And what are the determinants of CMA?  
CMA is generally considered as a micro level decision or behavior while Harford 
(2005) ascribes the waves of CMA to the macro-level capital liquidity. He argues that 
the assemblage of industrial level liquidity finalizes the aggregate-level mergers 
wave by examining and comparing both neoclassical and behavioral models. Still, 
not only the liquidity matters, but also the structure in terms of capital does. 
Companies with higher leverage and poorer accounting quality are less likely to 
undertake acquisitions but more likely to be the targets (Rossi & Volpin, 2004; Erel, 
Liao & Weisbach, 2012; Hu & Yang, 2016). In the context of China, Wu and Xie 
(2010) show that the pre-acquisition experience and state-owned share has positive 
effect on the CMA performance while their results do not provide evidence that either 
the corporate age or the cash flow is influential in this sense.     
Admittedly, there are numerous answers from the financial economics studies. 
Besides, a number of researchers have also reported some other CMA determinants 
in different perspectives. Lebedev, Peng, Xie and Stevens (2015) provide an 
elaborate review on the M&A literature for both developed economies and emerging 
economies based on more than 100 papers lately published in management, 
economics, finance, accounting and sociology journals. Several key factors that are 
perceived as the main driving forces behind the M&A are listed, namely, the mode of 
entry, market power, previous M&A experience, firms’ real options and network 
characteristics, country characteristics, institutional factors and other minor yet 
interesting factor such as nationalistic sentiments and national implications. Xie, 
Reddy and Liang (2017) review over 250 articles in international business, strategic 
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management, finance and economics journals in the past three decades. 
Macroeconomic and financial market environment, institutional and regulatory 
environment, political environment and corruption, tax and taxation environment, 
accounting standards and valuation guidelines, cultural and geographical 
environment (in the host countries) are shown to be decisive towards the CMA 
activities as this systematic review suggests.  
Among these factors, institutional environment in host countries is considered to be 
of essentially importance. For example, a large and growing body of literature has 
investigated how protection of investments in the target countries affects the CMA 
activities. An essential aspect of protection of CMA is shareholder protection. It has 
been argued that the countries with high-level shareholder protection polices attract 
more M&A activities (Rossi & Volpin, 2004).  Using a sample of 49 major countries 
from 1990 to 2002, they find that the investments on M&A are from regions with 
poorer protection to ones with greater protection and argue that the CMA helps 
improve the cross-country corporate governance regimes. Stronger protection in 
host countries encourages the CMA, while policy uncertainty deters it. However, the 
causality between the CMA and shareholder protection is yet to be determined. 
Following Katelouzou and Siems (2015), Ahiabor, James, Kwabi and Siems (2018) 
suggest that the CMA positively affect the shareholder protection.  
In line with these studies, Bonaime, Gulen and Ion (2018) demonstrate that policy 
uncertainty can affect the CMA activity in a negative way. Following the uncertainty 
policy index developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), they examine four 
conceivable channels through which policy uncertainty could affect CMA, including 
real options, interim risk, empire-building and risk management. Their findings also 
suggest that the influences of different types of policy uncertainty differ as the 
uncertainties from the monetary policy, fiscal policy and financial regulation have the 
worst impact on CMA.  
As a watershed in forming inclusive and extractive nation’s institutions, protection for 
property right has been considered as the fundamental factor to sustain (long-term) 
economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001; 2005). Similarly, 
Alimov and Officer (2017) set up a sample of over 67,375 CMA in 50 countries from 
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1985 to 2012 and find that the host countries with higher intellectual property rights 
(IPR) protection experience more CMA. Interestingly still, this effect is larger for the 
less developed countries that tend to have poor property right protection.  
The arguments above have been supported by Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo 
(2011) who analyze the legal and institutional environment’s impact on the 
shareholders’ valuation of CMA. Their finding rests on 469 M&A of listed firms in 40 
countries over the period of 2002 to 2006 and shows that the countries with better 
legal and institutional protection create higher value on CMA announcements 
whereas the countries with poorer protection have lower value.  
Formal protection, enshrined in countries’ legal systems and constitutions, is a key 
factor of CMA. Nevertheless, informal and “softer” protection, based on cultural 
differences, has also drawn sufficient attention in the literature. Among various 
studies, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) ascribe the international investment allocation 
bias to cultural differences. Their evidence is based on more than 20,000 mutual 
funds across 26 countries in 1999 and 2000 and shows that the cultural distance 
affects the amount of investment but it does not affect the decision to invest 
overseas. In a recent study with longer panel from 1991 to 2008, Ahern et al. (2015) 
report a negative effect between the cross-country difference (in terms of the value 
of trust, hierarchy and the individualism) and the volume of CMA. In particular, the 
larger (or smaller) volume of CMA is caused by the smaller (or greater) cultural 
distance. This argument is supported by Lim, Makhija and Shenkar (2016) who study 
the relationship between cultural distance and the target premiums in a sample of 
1690 CMA deals from 1990 to 2009 involving 45 countries as deal counterparties to 
the United States. They point out that the effect of cultural distance on the CMA is 
asymmetric with emphasis on the importance of cultural familiarity. Furthermore, Li, 
Li and Wang (2016) assess 367 overseas acquisitions by Chinese firms from 2000 to 
2011. They find that the firms with greater absorptive capacity are better able to 
overcome the difficulties driven by the cultural differences and argue that cultural 
familiarity is the foremost issues that should be stressed to ensure the success of 
CMA.  
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From a different perspective, according to the liability of foreignness (LOF) theory, 
historical ties between countries that have extensive influence on economic 
development, trade, FDI and even on the labor market of the host countries 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001; Head, Mayer & Ries, 2010; Kedia & Bilgili, 2015; Wang, 
Fidrmuc & Tian, 2018). The potential impacts of the historical legacy are not only on 
the changes of legal and institutional system, but also on the individual behavior 
aspects such cultural familiarity, trust towards different cultures and the personal 
emotions or attitudes towards foreigners. The investigation on the relationship 
between historical ties and the CMA has been motivated as a result. For instance, 
Chowdhury and Maung (2018) conceive a sample of 29,496 completed CMA in 177 
host countries from 2001 to 2015. As suggested by their results, CMA between 
countries that once were colonies and colonizers is affected by their historical 
relationship. Particularly, the number of CMA is either positively affected by the 
affable relationship or negatively affected by the hostile relationship.  
Yet, the importance of cultural familiarity is derived by a major unsettled question in 
the literature: Is the cultural difference15 beneficial or detrimental? (Slangen, 2006; 
Lee, Shenkar & Li, 2008; Stahl & Voigt, 2008; Beugelsdijk, Slangen, Masland & 
Onrust, 2014). This inconclusive debate thus far is basically the essence of the 
national cultural difference that allows the coexistence for both the positive and the 
negative sides. The main perception of the negative effect of the cultural difference is 
the culture clash that leads to certain levels of stress, anxiety, hostility and 
annoyance16 in the process of CMA (Lee, Kim & Park, 2015) whereas the positive 
aspect of cultural differences can be primarily attributed to learning17. Vermeulen and 
Barkema (2001), for example, argue that cross-cultural differences can be 
                                            
15 There are mainly two cultural differences in the literature indeed, namely, the national cultural 
difference and the organizational cultural differences. However, in the context of CMA, the cultural 
difference mainly refers to the former one as national cultural differences more affect the CMA while 
the organizational cultural differences more affect the DMA (domestic mergers & acquisitions) (see 
Morosini et al., 1998; Larrson & Lubatkin, 2001; Lee, Kim & Park, 2015 for detail explanations).  
16  These culturally driven sentimental issues further cause negative working attitudes, internal 
turbulences and employment resistance. (Lee et al., 2015)  
17  Here, the learning includes at least skill learning and cultural learning, which is a prominent 
activator for the internationalization (Violet & Ang, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). 
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constructive as they trigger the inter-organizational learning, enlarge the firms’ 
knowledge bases and keep the firms vigorous in the process of CMA. Besides, 
cultural learning opportunity generated in the CMA creates cultural familiarity and 
expands the firms’ absorptive capacity, which in turn positively affects back the CMA 
(Li et al., 2017). 
Further, the greater cultural difference between the home and host countries, the 
more valuable the cultural learning is. The process of learning is more important but 
more arduous when CMA takes place between two culturally-distant countries. 
However, such CMA can generate higher abnormal returns once the cultural learning 
succeeds (Xu, 2017). In a similar vein, Meyer & Thaijongrak (2013) propose the 
important signification of learning in the evolution of MNEs and the process of CMA. 
By using the internationalization process model to assess its usefulness, they 
illustrate this idea with analysis on 6 Thai MNEs case studies.  
      As an official cultural institute bridging the cultural gap, CI can affect the Chinese 
CMA activities based on following ways. First, the CMA activities are negatively 
associated with home-host countries’ cultural difference and shortening the cultural 
distance helps increase CMA (Lee at al., 2008); Besides, learning is beneficial to the 
CMA inasmuch as it not only creates skill learning but also cultural learning (Volet & 
Ang, 1998; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). These two lessons tally with the purpose 
of the CI as its primary objective is to promote Chinese language and culture globally 
and establish better international relationships (Lien, Oh & Selmier, 2013; 
Akhtaruzzaman et al. 2017).  
       Second, as a non-profit educational institution, the CI promotes the spread and 
sharing of knowledge (Li, Mirmirani & Ilacqua, 2009; Lien & Co, 2013). It attracts 
distinguished scholars and professors from different countries. Local media’s 
reporting on such events helps build up trust towards the Chinese and deepen the 
recognition of Chinese enterprises. The CI, therefore, not only provides important 
communicative platform and opportunities for strengthening the mutual cooperation 
in business, but also elevates the image of China. Accordingly, the presence of CI in 
a country has a positive direct effect on the Chinese firms’ CMA activities by lowering 
the level of information asymmetry that impedes the business cooperation.  
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Third, as a major carrier of culture, language is important for cultural learning 
because different cultures can only be better understood by learning their languages 
(Lazear 1999). Numerous studies have shown that the language has a certain 
impact on various economic aspects including trade, FDI and CMA (Metliz, 2008; 
Lien et al., 2012; Chen, 2013; Fidrmuc & Fidrmuc, 2016). The main purpose of the 
CI’s establishment is to provide Chinese language (Hanyu) courses. In recent years, 
Hanyu learning has become more and more popular since China’s fast-growing 
development has created so many business opportunities that mastering Chinese 
language skills becomes necessarily important for business facilitation. The CI 
presence lowers the cost of Hanyu learning and further popularizes it. Before the 
process of CMA, cultural frictions in interactions may generate misunderstanding or 
misevaluation of the targets or the potential synergies (Joshi & Lahiri, 2014; Li, Duan, 
He & Chan, 2018), which could potentially cause the CMA to fail. Hanyu learning 
lowers the language barrier which in turn can reduce the cultural frictions during the 
negotiation of the mergers and acquirers. Besides, in the process of Hanyu learning, 
potential mergers will imperceptibly be affected by the Chinese culture and a close 
culture affinity will be developed. Therefore, The CI can have a positive direct effect 
on the Chinese firms’ CMA activities by shortening the linguistic distance that 
hampers business communications.  
In addition, as a comprehensive platform of Sino-foreign cultural exchange, the CI 
has been shown to have culture spillover effects to strengthen the international 
relationships between China and other countries (Li et al, 2009). These spillovers 
effects are not only limited to boosting the trade and Chinese OFDI towards the host 
countries where the CI locates (Lien et al., 2012), but also on other aspects. For 
example, Lien and Miao (2018) find a positive relationship between the CI presence 
and the number of foreign students studying in China. They explain this effect via the 
culture spillover channels such as CIs’ presenting Chinese elements to local 
communities and accustoming them to Chinese culture, providing consultation 
service to the local communities and organizing regular activities which attract the 
local communities. These cultural spillovers also apply to the CIs’ influence on the 
booming international tourism to China (Lien, Ghosh & Yamari, 2014; Lien, Yao & 
Zhang, 2017). As a corollary, we believe the CMA can benefit from this affirmative 
atmosphere as suggested by Chowdhury and Maung (2018).  
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More importantly, under a home global institution, Belt Road Initiative, the role of CI 
should be strengthened after the Belt Road Initiative as one of main objectives of this 
global institution is to promote the bilateral cultural compatibility in member countries 
(Huang, 2016; Liu et al., 2018; Du & Zhang, 2018). Popularizing Chinese culture to 
shorten the cultural gap, CI can in turn serve as a pioneer towards the success of the 
Belt Road Initiative. For simplicity, therefore, we transfer this discussion to three 
basic hypotheses. First, the influence of CI is stronger in Belt-Road countries than 
non Belt-Road countries. Second, the impact of CI is more pronounced in Belt Road 
countries and it can be also be stronger in non Belt-Road countries depending on the 
policy externalities after the Belt Road Initiative. Third, the interactive effect of CI and 
Belt Road Initiative is positive and the longer the Belt Road membership a country 
holds, the stronger is such an effect.  
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data and sample 
To test these hypotheses, we conduct a panel data set for the Belt-Road and non 
Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 2017. The data are mainly from three sources, 
namely, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Belt-Road countries, the 
WIND database for the Chinese overseas CMA events, and the CI data from 
Hanban official website. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affair, there 
are 66 Belt-Road countries in total. Table 4.1 lists the Belt-Road countries 
categorized by continents. Fig. 4.1 depicts the distribution of CI under the Belt-Road 
network and the complementary information is placed in the appendix where Table A 
4.1 shows the number of CI and the number of Chinese CMA activities in both Belt-
Road countries and non Belt-Road countries.  
The Chinese firms’ CMA transaction data including both the announced CMA data 
and accomplished CMA data are sampled from the WIND. It is a database that has a 
collection of extensive data covering 15 macro concepts such as national accounts, 
foreign trade, banking, securities markets, employment and wages, mergers and 
acquisitions, and fixed-asset investment, etc. from both macro and firm level, which 
has been widely used in academia and industry In particular, we extract the sample 
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in accordance with the following rules: 1, the headquarters of the acquirer companies 
that have been selected are located solely in mainland China; 2, the companies in 
the financial industry have been excluded due to their higher heterogeneity 
compared to other industries; 3, the CMA with “rumor” transaction status have been 
excluded; 4, the tax haven target countries18 have been excluded; and 5, the missing 
values have been excluded. 
Table 4.1  The list of Belt-Road countries by continents up to 2017.  
Region Country 
Asia Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Palestine, Bhutan, East 
Timor, Philippines, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Cyprus, Cambodia, 
Qatar, Laos,  Lebanon, Maldives, Malaysia, Burma, Mongolia, Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Brunei, Uzbekistan, 
Singapore, Armenia, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Indonesia, Vietnam 
Europe Albania, Estonia, Belarus, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Russia, Montenegro, Czech Republic, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Greece, Hungary 
Africa Egypt, Madagascar, Morocco, South Africa 
North America Panama 
Oceania New Zealand 
Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1  The distribution of CI (2006-2017) under the Belt-Road network (up to 2017).  
Fig. 4.2a shows the trend of Chinese CMA including the number of announced CMA 
and accomplished CMA in the Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 2017. Starting in 
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2006, there were only 2 CMA that took place and the numbers have been slightly 
increasing and fluctuating after that. This has not changed until 2013 when the Belt-
Road Initiative started. Since then, the number has been growing dramatically until 
2016 with an average growth rate of 31.9%. As a comparison, the trend of Chinese 
CMA in non Belt-Road countries is shown in Fig. 4.2b. 
 
Fig. 4.2a  The Chinese firms’ overseas CMA events in Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 
2017.  
Source: The authors’ calculation based on WIND. 
 
 
Fig. 4.2b  The Chinese firms’ overseas CMA events in non Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 
2017. 
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Table 4.2a and Fig. 4.3a summarize the Chinese firms’ overseas CMA activities in 
different regions and list the top ten target countries in Belt-Road countries from 
2006 to 2017. As shown in Fig. 4.3a, the main target countries are located in South-
east Asia, East Asia, East Europe and Africa. The CMA events have mostly taken 
place in South-east Asia during this period, with 41.61% of the total announced CMA 
and 23.83% of the accomplished CMA. However, there is no CMA event in North 
America, which contains only one potential target country, Panama. The case in non 
Belt-Road countries is shown in Table 4.2b and Fig. 4.3b as a comparison. The 
number of announced CMA and accomplished CMA in United States has taken the 
largest portion, with 32.97% and 29.58% respectively.  
Table 4.2a  Top ten targets for Chinese firms’ overseas CMA in Belt-Road countries from 








Singapore 65 21.81% 38 12.75% 
South Korea 52 17.45% 25 8.39% 
Russia 26 8.72% 13 4.36% 
South Africa 19 6.38% 9 3.02% 
Thailand 16 5.37% 12 4.03% 
Indonesia 16 5.37% 9 3.02% 
New Zealand 13 4.36% 5 1.68% 
India 10 3.36% 8 2.68% 
Vietnam 10 3.36% 5 1.68% 
Cambodia 8 2.68% 3 1.01% 
Source: The authors’ calculation based on WIND. 
 
Table 4.2b  Top ten targets for Chinese firms’ overseas CMA in non Belt-Road countries 








United States 365 32.97% 176 29.58% 
Australia 121 10.93% 70 11.76% 
Germany 94 8.49% 57 9.58% 
United Kingdom 89 8.04% 44 7.39% 
Canada 85 7.68% 50 8.40% 
Italy 69 6.23% 46 7.73% 
Japan 52 4.70% 28 4.71% 
France 34 3.07% 20 3.36% 
Netherland 28 2.53% 13 2.18% 
Brazil 27 2.44% 15 2.52% 




Fig. 4.3a  The percentages of Chinese firms’ overseas CMA events in total in Belt-Road 
countries from 2006 to 2017. 
Source: The authors’ calculation based on WIND. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3b  The percentages of Chinese firms’ overseas CMA events in total in non Belt-Road 
countries from 2006 to 2017. 
Source: The authors’ calculation based on WIND. 
4.3.2 The model  
After Anderson (1979) first employed the gravity model to international trade study, 
the gravity model has been used and developed in many subsequent studies, 
especially in international trade, overseas investment and international tourism 
(Cheung & Qian, 2009; Lien et al, 2012; Lien et al, 2014). The gravity model has 
been widely used also in the CI research (Xu, Yao & Zhang, 2015; Lien et al., 2017; 
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We adopt a modified version of the gravity model. Note that we deal with the zero 
number issue for CMA in two ways. First, we follow studies that adopt gravity model 
(Lien et al., 2012; Lien & Lo, 2017; Lien et al., 2017; Lien & Miao, 2018) and take log 
after adding 1 to the number of CMA. The specific econometric framework is as 
follows: 
 ln (𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 1) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
   (4.1) 
Second, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose a Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PPML) estimator that is consistent with the presence of heteroscedasticity 
and also in the presence of zero values of the dependent variable. Therefore, we 
also adopt the PPML estimation, which estimates the following form: 
 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝[𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖]𝜃𝑖𝑡   (4.2) 
where 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the number of CMA in target country 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 is the number 
of CI which lags one year. It takes up to 18 months on average for a CI to be 
officially functional. Taking one year helps lag therefore, mitigating the reverse 
causality and endogeneity (Lien et al., 2012; Lien et al., 2017). 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the 
institutional quality index in host country 𝑖19; 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the host country 𝑖  – Chinese 
nominal currency exchange rate; 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the inflation rate in host country 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 
𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the population in host country 𝑖 in year 𝑡; 𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the per capita GDP in 
host country  𝑖  in year 𝑡 ; 𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the economic distance between China and the 
target country 𝑖  at year 𝑡  measured by the difference of GDP gap; 𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡  is the 
geographic distance between China and the target country 𝑖 . Also, we include 
dummies for whether Chinese culture is the one of the major cultures in the target 
country, whether the target country is a developed country and whether the China 
                                            
19 The institutional quality index is calculated by taking weighted mean of 6 indicators from the World 
Bank including regime stability, government efficiency, regulatory quality, corruption control ability, 
legal system and government accountability.  
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and the target country are neighbors. That is, 𝐶𝐶𝑖 equals 1 if the target country has 
Chinese culture as one of its major cultures to measure the previous Chinese 
cultural influence20. 𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑖 equals 1 if the target country is a developed country. Finally, 
𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖 equals to 1 if the target country shares borders with China
21. Table 4.3a, 
Table 4.3b and Table 4.3c are the descriptive statistics in the Belt-Road countries, 
non Belt-Road countries and full sample, respectively. 
Table 4.3a  Summary for the descriptive statistics in the Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 
2017.  
Variables Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Number of announced CMA 792 0.376 1.309 0 23 
Number of accomplished CMA 792 0.202 0.737 0 14 
Number of CI branches 792 1.868 3.274 0 23 
Institutional quality 792 -0.147 0.757 -1.895 1.861 
Exchange rate 792 2.149 3.065 0.001 11.090 
Inflation rate 792 5.756 6.109 0.001 59.219 
Population  792 4 965 378.071 5.093 152 970.442 520 343 641.332 
Per capita GDP  792 5 177.091 3.560 272.593 88 521.434 
Economic distance  792 4 259.895 3.448 10.464 82 207.350 
Geographic distance  792 5 426.230 1.629 809.162 14 357.101 
Chinese culture majority (dummy) 792 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Neighbourhood (dummy) 792 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Developed country (dummy) 792 0.242 0.429 0 1 
 
Table 4.3b  Summary for the descriptive statistics in the non Belt-Road countries from 2006 
to 2017.  
Variables Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Number of announced CMA  900 1.230 4.851 0 70 
Number of accomplished CMA 900 0.661 2.384 0 25 
Number of CI branches  900 3.178 10.218 0 110 
Institutions quality   900 0.178 0.982 -1.660 1.889 
Exchange rate 900 2.967 3.992 0.000 20.968 
Inflation rate 900 5.254 5.633 0.000 55.484 
Population  900 3 587 621.478 6.137 36 062.18 163 447 108.409 
Per capita GDP  900 5 658.985 5.697 165.836 119 252.694 
Economic distance  900 5 591.480 5.640 165.836 119 210.333 
Geographic distance 900 10 467.180 1.385 2 098.540 19 302.694 
Developed country (dummy) 900 0.280 0.449 0 1 
 
                                            
20  East Timor, Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Mongolia are counted as having Chinese culture as one of the major cultures. 
21 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bhutan, Laos, Nepal, India, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Mongolia are counted as China’s neighbors. 
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Table 4.3c  Summary for the descriptive statistics in full sample from 2006 to 2017. 
Variables Obs. Mean S. D. Min Max 
Number of announced CMA  1692 0.830 3.674 0 70 
Number of accomplished CMA 1692 0.446 1.824 0 25 
Number of CI branches 1692 2.564 7.807 0 110 
Institutional quality 1692 0.026 0.898 -1.895 1.889 
Exchange rate 1692 2.584 3.610 0.000 20.968 
Inflation rate 1692 5.489 5.864 0.000 59.220 
Population  1692 4 176 566.268 5.629 36 062.181 520 343 641.336 
Per capita GDP  1692 5 426.230 4.655 165.836 119 252.694 
Economic distance  1692 4 924.608 4.595 10.464 119 210.333 
Geographic distance  1692 7 692.491 1.690 809.162 19 302.694 
Developed country (dummy) 1692 0.262 0.440 0 1 
4.4 Empirical Results   
4.4.1 The baseline estimations 
Table 4.4 shows the pooled OLS estimation results as in model (1) for the CI’s effect 
on the Chinese firms’ overseas CMA activities. Starting with the control variables, 
our results show that the all the coefficients of host country’s institutional quality are 
significantly positive, which indicates that the institutional quality is key factor for 
CMA and this applies to China as suggested by literature. Still, the population and 
the per capita GDP all have positive impacts on the CMA activities in most cases. 
However, we do not find consistent evidence on that the host country-Chinese 
currency exchange rate has any effect on the number of CMA, whereas the previous 
studies that argue the increase of CMA activities resulted from the declining currency 
in the target country and appreciating currency in the acquirer countries (Erel et al., 
2012; Hu & Yang, 2017). The negative sign of economic distance shows that the 
economic distance between China and the host countries impedes Chinese CMA 
activities, especially for non Belt-Road countries. Yet, there is no significant 
relationship between the CMA and the geographic distance as all the coefficients of 
the geographic distance and the dummy for whether host countries and China are 
neighbors are insignificant, which supports the “distance death” theory (Couclelis, 
1996; Lin & Sim, 2012) as the “flaw” of the distance can be easily covered by the 
rapid development of the transportation and logistics. Besides, the significantly 
positive of Chinese cultural majority indicates that the countries where the Chinese 
culture has been rooted for a certain period are more attractive to the Chinese 
investments. 
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Table 4.4  OLS Estimations for the impact of CI. 
Variables 
Total Belt Road  Non Belt Road  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 































































































































Observations 1551 1551 726 726 825 825 
Number of 
countries  
141 141 66 66 75 75 
R-square 0.5158 0.5913 0.3141 0.3543 0.5980 0.5070 
Time Period 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
As expected, all the coefficients of CI are statistically significant at 1% and suggest 
that one additional CI leads to an increase in the number of announced CMA by 
approximately 3.3% (exp(0.033) = 1.033) in full sample, 4.2% (exp(0.041)=1.042) in 
Belt Road countries and 3.1% (exp(0.031)=1.031) for non Belt Road countries, 
ceteris paribus, respectively. This positive effect is slightly weaker in terms of 
accomplished CMA. One additional CI relates to 2.1% (exp(0.021)=1.021 increase in 
the number of accomplished CMA in full sample and 1.9% (exp(0.019)=1.019) in 
both Belt Road countries and non Belt-Road countries, ceteris paribus, respectively.  
Table 4.5 summarizes the PPML estimates as in model (2). The results are broadly 
consistent with the OLS estimations except that the coefficient of exchange rate 
turns to be positive. All other coefficients of the control variables maintain expected 
signs and are all statistically significant. Compared with OLS estimation, the 
influence of CI is stronger in the sample of Belt Road while such effect declines in 
total sample and the sample of non Belt-Road countries on both announced and 
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accomplished CMA. One additional CI promotes the announced and accomplished 
CMA by 12.9% (exp(0.122)=1.129) and 10.3% (exp(0.098)=1.103) in Belt-Road 
countries while the effect shrinks to by 1.1% (exp(0.011)=1.011) regards to the 
announced CMA in non Belt-Road countries.  
Table 4.5  PPML Estimations for the impact of CI. 
Variables 
Total Belt Road  Non Belt Road  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 










































































































































Observations 1551 1551 726 726 825 825 
Number of 
countries 
141 141 66 66 75 75 
Pseudo log-
likelihood 
-1169.059 -807.6633 -431.924 -279.392 -645.968 -480.862 
R-square 0.7958 0.7043 0.5013 0.4137 0.8321 0.7504 
Time Period 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 2006 -2017 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
More importantly, we observe that the positive influence of CI is more pronounced in 
Belt-Road countries than in non Belt-Road countries although larger number of 
Chinese CMA activities and CI branches are in non Belt-Road countries in both 
estimation methodologies. That seems to say, Belt Road Initiative in terms of regions 
from the estimations above indicates that such home global institution strengthens 
the impact of CI. 
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4.4.2 Before and after the Belt Road Initiative 
To confirm this relationship, we compare the Belt-Road countries and non Belt-Road 
countries before and after this Chinese global institution commences. Note that Belt 
Road Initiative was launched in 2013 and our sample data covers a longer period 
from 2006 to 2007, which can be classified as before the Belt Road Initiative from 
2006 to 2012 and after the Belt Road Initiative from 2013 to 2017. As shown in Table 
4.6 and Table 4.7, the control variables remain expected signs. The coefficients of 
institutional quality, population, GDP per capita and Chinese culture are positive and 
statistically significant in general. As for the impact of CI from OLS estimation, all the 
coefficients are still statistically positive before and after the Belt Road Initiative. The 
effect is stronger after the Belt Road Initiative for the Belt Road countries. One 
additional CI increases the number of announced CMA and accomplished CMA by 
2.1% (exp(0.021)=1.021) and 1.5% (exp(0.015)=1.015), respectively before the Belt  
Variables 
Belt Road  Non Belt Road  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 














































































































































































Observations 396 396 330 330 450 450 300 300 
Number of 
countries 
66 66 66 66 75 75 75 75 
R-square 0.3046 0.2735 0.4297 0.3622 0.5846 0.5447 0.7496 0.8821 
Time Period 2006-2012 2006 -2012 2013-2017 2013 -2017 2006-2012 2006 -2012 2013-2017 2013 -2017 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Road Initiative whereas these effects grow to 5.9% and 3.2%, respectively. Yet, we 
do not spot any externalities from this global policy for the non Belt-Road countries 
as the effect of CI remains unchanged before and after the Belt Road Initiative. The 
results from PPML, however, show that the impact of CI for Belt-Road countries is 
significant only after the initiative in the sense that one additional CI leads to 
increase in announced CMA and accomplished CMA by 14.7% (exp(0.138)=1.147) 
and 11.7% (exp(0.111)=1.117), respectively. In spite of the discrepancy, both results 
support that the impact of CI is strengthened in Belt Road countries after the Belt 
Road Initiative. 
Table 4.6  OLS Estimations for the impact of CI before and after the Belt Road Initiative. 
Variables 
Belt Road  Non Belt Road  






























































































































































































Observations 396 396 330 330 450 450 300 300 
Number of countries 66 66 66 66 75 75 75 75 


















Country fixed effects No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 4.7  PPML Estimations for the impact of CI before and after the Belt Road Initiative. 
Variables 
Belt Road  Non Belt-Road  































































































































































































Observations 396 396 330 330 450 450 300 300 
Number of 
countries 
66 66 66 66 75 75 75 75 
R-square 0.3760 0.3442 0.5785 0.4859 0.5980 0.5070 0.9451 0.8866 
Pseudo log-
likelihood 
-193.6949 -143.5840 -224.7839 -129.0700 -275.9541 -247.9432 -231.8339 -166.3877 
Time Period 2006-2012 2006-2012 2013-2017 2013-2017 2006-2012 2006-2012 2013-2017 2013-2017 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
4.4.3 Belt countries and road countries 
The impact of CI can be different due to the difference of regional distribution of belt 
countries and the road countries. Therefore, we separate the samples into two 
different groups: the belt countries and the road countries and estimate the impact of 
CI before and after the Belt Road Initiative. In the OLS estimation results shown in 
Table 4.8, CI exerts positive effect on both the announced and accomplished CMA in 
belt countries and this effect is strengthened after the Belt Road Initiative, from 30% 
(exp(0.030)= 1.030) to 59% (exp(0.058)=1.059) on announced CMA and from 19 % 
to 32% on accomplished CMA,  respectively. Yet, the impact of CI is statistically 
insignificant in road countries while it turns to be statistically significant and positive 
after the Belt Road Initiative. The PPML estimation results in Table 4.9, however, 
shows that the impact of CI is statistically significant only after the Belt Road Initiative 
and it remains insignificant in the road countries. Both estimations suggest that the 
CI’s influence in belt countries is more responsive to the Belt Road Initiative, which is 
in line with Du and Zhang (2018). They find that the Belt-Road Initiative increases 
the outflow investment in land belt countries only. In general, cultural distance is 
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negatively associated with economic cooperation. This also applies to China in the 
way that culturally remote countries display higher aversion towards the foreign 
investments. Therefore, a possible explanation for these results is that the belt 
countries rather than the road countries are mostly located in East Asia and South-
east Asia where the Chinese culture has been rooted for longer period. The belt 
countries are relatively more familiar with the Chinese culture and therefore benefit 
more from the CI in the short run. 
Table 4.8  OLS Estimations for the impact of CI before and after the Belt Road Initiative.  
Variables 
Belt  Road 














































































































































































































240 240 200 200 156 156 130 130 
Number of 
countries 
40 40 40 40 26 26 26 26 
R-square 0.1912 0.2735 0.3917 0.3262 0.3955 0.3971 0.5088 0.4319 
Time Period 2006-2012 2006 -2012 2013 -2017 2013 -2017 2006 -2012 2006 -2012 2013 -2017 2013 -2017 
Country 
fixed effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 4.9  PPML Estimations for the impact of CI before and after the Belt Road Initiative.  
Variables 
Belt Road 

















CI -0.078 -0.138 0.218*** 0.404** 0.066 0.074 0.043 0.089 
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Observations 240 240 200 200 156 156 130 130 
Number of 
countries 
40 40 40 40 26 26 26 26 
R-square 0.4726 0.5461 0.4436 0.4031 0.5820 0.4703 0.6341 0.5255 
Pseudo log-
likelihood 
-84.1995 -53.5586 -73.0417 -32.5273 -92.5093 -76.2502 -136.3066 -82.4546 
Time Period 2006-2012 2006 -2012 2013 -2017 2013 -2017 2006 -2012 2006 -2012 2013 -2017 2013 -2017 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively. 
4.4.4 The interactive effect of Belt Road Initiative and CI 
So far, we estimate the impact of CI based on different samples in terms of regions 
and time line. To further investigate the interactive effect of CI and Belt Road 
Initiative, we conduct two types of difference in difference (DID) analyses. In the first 
type of DID estimation in a standard format from column (1) to (4), the coefficients of 
CI in both OLS and PPML are mostly positive and significant at 1%, which again 
confirms the favorable effect of CI. The coefficients of Post, 2013-2017 are mostly 
positive, indicating that the Chinese CMA in these most recent years increases still. 
Yet, we observe that the BRI and the interaction term of post and BRI are negatively 
associated with Chinese CMA. It is not surprising that the early assessment of Belt 
Road Initiative can be negative due to high barriers the Initiative faces such as 
potential clash of religion and culture (Huang, 2016). The interaction term between 
CI and BRI is positive from PPML results whereas it is negative under OLS results. 
This discrepancy between OLS and PPML is caused by heteroscedasticity (Silva & 
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Tenreyro, 2006). The insignificance of the interaction term between Post and CI and 
the positive coefficient of the interaction term among CI, Post and BRI from OLS 
estimation suggest that the interactive effect of Belt Road Initiative and CI is 
statistically positive only in the Belt Road countries after the Initiative. This also 
suggests that the Belt Road Initiative has positive externalities thus far. Although the 
Belt Road Initiative was introduced in 2013, countries have been joining the 
membership in succession. Standard DID estimation may lead to bias as a result. In 
the second type from column (5) to (8) in Table 4.10, therefore, we account for the 
membership length of so as to measure the progression of Belt Road Initiative and 
its interactive effect with CI. Still, the impact of CI is positive in all models. While the 
coefficient of Membership length is insignificant, the coefficient of interaction 
between Membership length and CI is positive in most models except for the OLS 
estimation for announced CMA. Longer Belt Road membership ensures greater 
interactive effect between CI and Belt Road Initiative. The coefficients of main control 
variables such as population, institutional quality, GDP per capita and Chinese 
culture majority in the host country are statistically positive while others maintain 
insignificant or expected signs in most cases with variations due to sample 
differences.   
Table 4.10  Estimations for the interactive effect of CI and Belt Road Initiative. 
Variables 
Announced Accomplished Announced Accomplished 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
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Observations 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 1551 
Number of 
countries  
141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
R-square 0.5720 0.8234 0.5206 0.7164 0.5551 0.7972 0.5059 0.7062 
Pseudo log-
likelihood 
/ -1089.2163 / -789.0948 / -1159.1394 / -804.76806 
Time Period 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 2006-2017 
Country 
fixed effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; 2. *, ** and *** represents the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
4.5 Conclusions    
When investigating a home country’s internalization, extant studies have explicitly 
recognized the importance of the cultural compatibility (Guiso et al., 2006; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Lee et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2016; Ahern et al., 2015) and home 
country institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011; Estrin et al., 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2018; Wan & Hosikisson, 2003). Rooted on these studies, our paper is one of the 
first to bridge these two strands of literature by assessing the role of cultural institute 
on home country’s internalization under a home global institution from the case of 
the world’s largest emerging economy, China. On the basis of a panel dataset 
containing 66 Belt-Road countries and 75 non Belt-Road countries from 2006 to 
2017, we conduct a comparative analysis to study the impact of CI on the Chinese 
CMA activities in both Belt-Road countries and non Belt-Road countries with 
emphasis on the interactive effect of Belt Road Initiative and CI. 
Admittedly, our empirical strategy is in dilemma and raises two main concerns from 
our measurement of CMA. First, CMA has been mostly considered as a firm level 
behavior in the literature. Second, Chinese outflow investments are largely from big 
companies. The big companies, mostly the SOEs, sometimes make several tiny 
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M&A in host countries and to ensure the major M&A to be done successfully. In this 
sense, firm level empirics seemingly work better to address these two issues from 
CMA measurements as it controls firm level characteristics. However, the availability 
of firm level data for most Belt-Road countries and non Belt-Road countries is 
unachievable and small sample estimation fails to offer a comprehensive 
understanding on the Belt Road Initiative and the role of CI in this context. Worse still, 
firm level data cannot control the country level heterogeneity and leads to bias. 
Therefore, we have no option but choose to negotiate with our intention and focus on 
a full frame of the Belt Road Initiative, thereby explaining CMA from a macro 
perspective, a country level estimation.  
Beyond the limitations of CMA measurements, our results show that the effect of CI 
on Chinese CMA is positive in general and this effect is more pronounced in Belt 
Road countries rather than in non Belt-Road countries, especially in Belt countries 
after 2013, the year from when this global initiative was introduced. We also find that 
the influence of CI is strengthened by the positive interactive effect between Belt 
Road Initiative and CI. In particular, we observe that the earlier the host country joins 
the Initiative, the stronger is the interactive effect when we control for the intensity of 
Belt Road Initiative. Our understanding is straight forward. As one important 
objectives of the Belt Road Initiative is to shorten the cultural gap, the Initiative 
enhances the role of CI and intensifies the impact of CI.  Or vise versa, the Initiative, 
at its preliminary stage, does not yet have significant impacts subject to cultural 
incompatibility. CI, as an irreplaceable platform, starts from the people-to-people 
cultural exchange and facilitate the Belt Road Initiative.  
We hope that our study can serve as a first step to understand the interplay of 
cultural institute and home institution on the rapid developing globalization nowadays 
and shed lights on ongoing study and progress of the Belt Road Initiative. Future 
research can focus on the specific channels via which the cultural institute and home 
institution strengthen each other not only in terms of CMA but also of some other 
aspects such as export and innovation.  
Our findings also lead to policy considerations. On the one hand, policy makers may 
want to encourage the introduction of foreign cultural institutes to China since they 
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are expected to promote the culture integration and develop the economic 
cooperation as the CI does. On the other, the established cooperation with the non 
Belt-Road members should not be weighed less against the Belt-Road members and 
China should also maintain and deepen the cooperation with these partners. Equally 
importantly, with the rapid growth of the Belt-Road members, the issue of cultural 
and institutional difference should be improved and addressed to ensure the 
efficiency of cooperation under the Belt Road Initiative. 
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4.6 Appendix  
Table A4.1  The number of the CI branches and Chinese CMA events in both Belt-Road and 










Afghanistan Since 2013 1 0 0 
Albania Since 2015 1 0 0 
Angola No 1 1 1 
Argentina No 2 6 4 
Armenia Since 2015 1 0 0 
Australia No 14 121 70 
Austria No 2 6 5 
Azerbaijan Since 2015 2 0 0 
Bahamas No 1 0 0 
Bahrain No 1 0 0 
Bangladeshi Since 2014 2 0 0 
Barbados No 1 0 0 
Belarus Since 2014 4 0 0 
Belgium No 6 7 4 
Benin No 1 0 0 
Bhutan Since 2014 0 0 0 
Bolivia No 1 0 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Since 2015 2 0 0 
Botswana No 1 0 0 
Brazil No 10 27 15 
Brunei Since 2014 0 2 2 
Bulgaria Since 2015 2 2 1 
Burma Since 2014 0 0 0 
Burundi No 1 0 0 
Cambodia Since 2014 1 8 3 
Cameroon No 1 0 0 
Canada No 12 85 50 
Cape Verde No 1 0 0 
Chile No 2 4 1 
Colombia No 3 0 0 
Comoros No 0 0 0 
Costa Rica No 1 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire No 1 0 0 
Croatia Since 2015 1 2 1 
Cyprus Since 2015 1 2 1 
Czech Since 2015 1 3 2 
Denmark No 3 8 3 
East Timor Since 2014 0 0 0 
Ecuador No 1 1 1 
Egypt Since 2014 2 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea No 1 0 0 
Estonia Since 2015 1 0 0 
Ethiopia No 2 0 0 
Fiji No 1 0 0 
Finland No 1 11 4 
France No 17 34 20 
Gabon No 1 0 0 
Gambia No 1 0 0 
Georgia Since 2014 1 2 0 
Germany No 19 94 57 
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Table A4.1  The number of the CI branches and Chinese CMA events in both Belt-Road 










Ghana No 2 2 1 
Greece Since 2015 1 1 1 
Guinea No 1 0 0 
Guyana No 1 0 0 
Hungary Since 2015 4 5 2 
Iceland No 1 0 0 
India Since 2013 2 10 8 
Indonesia Since 2013 6 16 9 
Iran Since 2014 2 0 0 
Iraq Since 2014 0 1 0 
Ireland No 2 3 1 
Israel Since 2015 2 3 1 
Italy No 12 69 46 
Jamaica No 1 1 1 
Japan No 14 52 28 
Kazakhstan Since 2013 5 1 0 
Kenya No 4 0 0 
Kyrgyzstan Since 2013 4 1 0 
Laos Since 2014 1 2 0 
Latvia Since 2015 1 1 1 
Lebanon Since 2017 1 0 0 
Lesotho No 0 0 0 
Liberia No 1 1 1 
Lithuania Since 2015 1 0 0 
Luxembourg No 1 7 4 
Macedonia Since 2015 1 0 0 
Madagascar Since 2015 2 2 2 
Malawi No 1 0 0 
Malaysia Since 2014 2 4 1 
Maldives Since 2014 0 0 0 
Mali No 1 0 0 
Mauritius No 1 0 0 
Mexico No 5 7 5 
Moldova Since 2014 1 0 0 
Mongolia Since 2014 3 4 2 
Montenegro Since 2015 1 0 0 
Morocco Since 2017 3 0 0 
Mozambique No 1 0 0 
Namibia No 1 0 0 
Nepal Since 2014 1 1 0 
Netherlands No 3 28 13 
New Zealand Since 2017 3 13 5 
Nigeria No 2 1 0 
Norway No 1 3 2 
Pakistan Since 2014 4 4 1 
Palestine Since 2014 2 0 0 
Panama Since 2014 1 0 0 
Peru No 4 4 3 
Philippines Since 2014 4 1 1 
Poland Since 2015 5 6 6 
Portugal No 4 8 4 
Qatar Since 2014 0 0 0 
Republic of Congo No 1 0 0 
Romania Since 2015 4 2 1 
Russia Since 2014 17 26 13 
Rwanda No 1 0 0 
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Table A4.1  The number of the CI branches and Chinese CMA events in both Belt-Road 










Samoa No 1 1 0 
Saudi Arabia Since 2015 0 0 0 
Senegal No 1 0 0 
Serbia Since 2015 2 0 0 
Sierra Leone No 1 0 0 
Singapore Since 2014 1 65 38 
Slovakia Since 2015 2 0 0 
Slovenia Since 2015 1 2 1 
South Africa Since 2015 5 19 9 
South Korea Since 2014 23 52 25 
Spain No 8 23 10 
Sri Lanka Since 2014 2 0 0 
Sudan No 1 0 0 
Suriname No 1 0 0 
Sweden No 1 13 3 
Switzerland No 2 21 15 
Tajikistan Since 2014 2 2 1 
Tanzania No 2 0 0 
Thailand Since 2014 16 16 12 
Togo No 1 0 0 
Trinidad and Tobago No 1 1 1 
Tunisia No 1 0 0 
Turkey Since 2014 4 3 3 
Uganda No 1 0 0 
Ukraine Since 2013 5 1 1 
United Arab Emirates Since 2014 2 3 1 
United Kingdom No 29 89 44 
United States No 110 365 176 
Uruguay No 1 2 1 
Uzbekistan Since 2013 2 0 0 
Vanuatu No 0 0 0 
Vietnam Since 2014 1 10 5 
Yemen Since 2015 0 0 0 
Zambia No 1 0 0 
Zimbabwe No 1 1 1 





What stayers do? 




Traditionally, the development literature has seen the rural sector primarily as a 
source of cheap migrant labor facilitating incipient industrialization in urban areas 
(Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970), rather than being interesting in its own right. 
In this, China has been no exception (see Dekle & Vandenbroucke, 2012; Lei et al., 
2013; Wang et al., 2011; Zhang & Song, 2003). Since the economic reforms started 
in 1978, China has undergone tremendous changes. Between 1978 and 2014, it has 
grown on average by just under 10% per year (Lau, 2015). This was achieved by 
improving the productivity of rural agriculture so as to release workers into 
manufacturing in urban areas. Despite industrialization during the early Maoist period 
(in particular during the Great Leap Forward initiative of 1958-62), 82% of the 
Chinese population remained in rural areas in 1978.1 Under Maoism, rural 
households were organized in people’s communes (RenMinGongShe 人民公社 ) 
which shared both work responsibilities and fruits of their joint efforts. This resulted in 
poor incentives, low productivity and freeriding. In the early 1980s, the communes 
were disbanded and replaced by the Household Responsibility System 
(Jiatingzerenzhi 家庭责任制), which divided the commune’s resources (including land) 
and its output quota among the individual households. The households thus 
regained responsibility for their output, and were free to keep any surplus left after 
delivering their share of the quota (Lin, 1992). 
At the outset of reforms, in the early 1980s, the bulk of rural residents was therefore 
engaged in low-productivity agriculture on land controlled by their household. After 
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the relaxation of Hukou restrictions22, a migration from rural to urban areas started in 
the late 1980s, with rural migrants seeking better job opportunities (and sometimes 
also education and/or medical services) in urban centers. As with other emerging 
economies, there is a large body of research on this process, referred to in the 
literature as off-farm transitions (Shi et al., 2007;; Li et al., 2016; Tian et al., 2016; Liu 
& Xing, 2016; Xie et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2011; Dekle & 
Vandenbrouche, 2012; Lei et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2016). However, in contrast to 
the attention given to the transformation of urban areas and rural to urban migration, 
there has been much less work on studying the on-farm transitions, which can be 
defined as transfers of workers from low-productivity farming on farm plots held by 
the household to either formal agricultural employment or entrepreneurial activity in 
agriculture (as opposed to moving away from rural agriculture into manufacturing in 
the urban areas). The goal of this paper, therefore, is to explore the determinants of 
on-farm transitions so as to facilitate a better understanding on this rural livelihood 
strategy.  
We contribute to the literature by investigating what drives the on-farm transitions. 
The ability of rural households to undertake on-farm transitions is of crucial 
importance based on two primary reasons. On the one hand, on-farm transitions 
increase agricultural productivity (Haggblade et al., 2010; Levine, 2014; Zou et al., 
2018), which in turn both increases the wellbeing of those who stay in rural areas, 
and releases labor from agriculture which can move to urban areas and help sustain 
economic growth there. 23  On the other hand, on-farm transitions facilitate the 
promotion of rural livelihood diversity, which in turn improves the living standard of 
the rural residents and helps eliminate the rural poverty (Bebbeington, 1999; Ellis, 
                                            
22 ‘Hukou’ is a household registration system, which designates all individuals as either rural or urban 
residents. In the past, individuals were expected to remain in the area stated in their Hukou, and 
changing either one’s status (from rural to urban) or place of residence was difficult. Even at present, 
individuals with a rural Hukou have limited access to public goods and services in urban areas. See 
Chan & Zhang (1999) for a detailed explanation of the Hukou system. 
23 The importance of the transformation of rural areas has also been recognized by the Chinese 
government. In 2018, the government adopted the Rural Vitalization Strategy aimed at development 
of rural areas during the period 2018-20. See “China releases five-year plan on rural vitalization 
strategy”, Xinhua, 2018-09-26, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/26/c_137494476.htm. 
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1998; Ellis, 2000; Haggblade et al., 2010). We observe rural households in 2015, 
some 35 years after the reforms were initiated. Although we do not observe when 
the transitions happen, given that the vast majority of rural households shared the 
same initial situation in the early 1980s, our analysis captures the outcomes of any 
on-farm transitions that had happened since then.  
Our study is based on a large rural household survey dataset covering 9 provinces 
from East, Central and West China. We focus on households rather than individuals 
as the decision making in livelihood transitions is a profit maximizing and risk 
minimizing process of a household (Stark, 1984, Taylor, 1987). We focus especially 
on the role played by capital endowments in driving the on-farm transitions, with 
capital defined broadly to include not only financial but also human, natural, social 
and political capital. Capital endowments have been considered as key factors in 
determining the decisions of the household livelihood strategy (Bebbington, 1999; 
Bhandari, 2013; Wang et al., 2016; Tregear & Cooper, 2017; Inwood, 2017). 
Importantly, rural households often differ considerably in their capital endowments, 
reflecting different local circumstances, past effort, resources inherited from their 
elders, and even luck. We examine the effect of different capital endowments on the 
rural residents’ decisions in on-farm transitions. A novel contribution of our analysis 
is that we consider also social and political capital. The Guanxi (network relationship) 
matters enormously in the Chinese society, especially in rural areas (Zhang, Giles & 
Rozelle, 2012; Jin et al., 2014). Similarly, rural cadres are responsible for key 
political and administrative decisions affecting rural residents’ off-farm employment 
(Zhang, Guo & Li, 2003). 
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
review the existing literature on capital endowments, namely, human, financial, 
social, political and natural capital; and discuss their effects on on-farm transitions of 
the rural stayers. Section 5.3 provides information of the data and methodology in 
use. Section 5.4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Rural Transitions and Capital Endowments 
5.2.1 Rural and urban development in China 
The process of economic development of an emerging economy such as China is 
usually understood in the context of the interplay between rural and urban sectors 
(Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Economic transformation is set off by 
industrialization in the urban sector, which becomes the source of economic growth. 
The rural sector instead serves as a pool of abundant labor, with rural workers 
initially languishing in low-productivity subsistence agriculture. The plentiful supply of 
cheap rural labor supports the development of the urban sector: as manufacturing 
expands, rural workers move to the cities to take advantage of the higher wages 
there. This continuous influx of new workers keeps urban wage growth in check (in 
addition, if the urban wages are downward sticky, involuntary urban unemployment 
can arise as a consequence or rural to urban migration of labor). Eventually, the pool 
of labor in the rural sector becomes exhausted. When this happens, both rural and 
urban wages start growing rapidly: this phenomenon is referred to as the Lewis 
turning point. When the developing economy passes the turning point, the resulting 
wage growth restricts further expansion of manufacturing: to continue growing, 
productivity improvements become necessary.  
The jury is still out on the question whether China has reached or even passed the 
Lewis turning point. On the one hand, Liu (2015) observes that both rural wages and 
agricultural productivity started to increase sharply around 2002-04. He therefore 
argues that China reached the turning point around that time. In contrast, Das and 
N’Diaye (2013) point out that the supply of low-wage labor in rural areas of China still 
remains large. They therefore anticipate China to arrive at the turning point only by 
2020-2025.  
The models of development are thus primarily concerned with off-farm transitions, 
with productivity improvements confined to the urban sector. However, Ranis (2004) 
argues that some countries experienced industrialization accompanied by concurrent 
dramatic improvements agricultural productivity. He argues this was the case of 
England at the cusp of 18th century, Japan in late 19th and early 20th century and 
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Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s. Such productivity improvements helped release 
further labor from agriculture while keeping the agricultural wage at or close to the 
subsistence level. Therefore, successful on-farm rural transitions can restrain the 
wage-growth pressure and thus help facilitate further growth of urban manufacturing.  
At present, 41.5% of China's population live in the rural areas. The traditional 
sector’s share in the economy, however, is relatively low: agriculture accounts for 
27.7% of total employment but only 7.92% of GDP (NBSC, 2017). The disparity 
between the sector’s contributions to employment and output are consistent with the 
observation that large stock of excess labor still remains in rural areas (Das and 
N’Diaye, 2013). The rural residents who do not move to urban areas have three 
options: remaining in low-productivity subsistence farming (that is, continuing to work 
on the family farm), leaving the family farm by taking up formal employment in an 
agricultural firm, or setting up their own agricultural firm (Xia & Simmons, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2016). Which of these options they choose crucially depends on the 
resources at their disposal: savings and access to loans, skills and training, 
connections (both social and political), and the like. In other words, their choice 
depends on their endowments of various types of capital: financial, human, social, 
political, and natural. 
5.2.2 Capital endowments and on-farm transitions 
The endowments considered in this study include both tangible and intangible capital. 
Depending on their type, we can classify them into human capital; financial, natural, 
social, and political capital (Carney, 1998; Chambers, 2006; Li et al, 2012). Below, 
we briefly discuss these types of capital and what effects we expect them to have. 
We summarize our expectations on the effects of various capital endowments in 
Table 5.1. 
(1) Human capital 
Human capital corresponds to the “productive wealth embodied in labor, skills and 
knowledge” (Tan, 2014), with the skills and abilities being both innate and acquired 
(Bhandari, 2013; Inwood, 2015). As an important dimension of human capital, 
education plays a crucial role in decision making of rural households (Bhandari, 
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2013). Zhang et al. (2002) compare the effects of education in different periods and 
find that those who are more educated benefit from more off-farm opportunities. 
Similarly, Wang et al. (2016) argue that there is a strongly positive relationship 
between human capital investment and entrepreneurship as well as holding a 
managerial position. We expect human capital to have a similar impact on on-farm 
transitions: possessing formal education and having agricultural and/or 
entrepreneurial skills should help rural residents become agricultural entrepreneurs.  
With respect to gender, most studies (based on experimental evidence or observing 
investment behavior of men and women) tend to find that women are generally more 
risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; Eckel 
and Grossman, 2008; Sarin and Wieland, 2016). Becoming an owner of an 
agricultural business is associated with more uncertainty and risk than formal 
employment (Ahn, 2010; Hvide and Panos, 2013; Skriabikova et al., 2014). 
Therefore, we expect that rural households with higher share of women will prefer 
formal on-farm employment a transition into on-farm entrepreneurship.  
Rural workers who migrated to urban areas in the past benefit from experiences and 
acquired skills that workers who never left the rural region lack. The migrant-worker 
experience can be helpful both with respect to finding formal on-farm employment as 
well as when it comes to setting up on-farm businesses. Thus, we expect household 
with former rural-to-urban migrants to be more likely to undertake either type of on-
farm transition.  
(2) Financial capital  
Financial capital includes monetary assets: current income, bank deposits, bonds 
and equity, and bank loans (Best, 2017). Financial capital is essential for firm growth 
(Fowowe, 2017). Lack of loan finance can hinder firm creation and stop firms, 
especially small ones, from growing (Lee and Stebunovs, 2016). Therefore, we 
expect rural on-farm transitions to be positively affected by the household’s stock of 
financial capital, especially so with respect to transitions into on-farm 
entrepreneurship. 
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(3) Natural capital 
Natural capital includes all natural resources, of which farmland is the most the most 
crucial one in rural agrarian society (Kimhi & Bollman, 1999; Goetz & Debertin, 2001; 
Bhandari, 2013; Li et al., 2016). By investigating the trend of farmland fragmentation, 
Su et al., (2014) conclude that the quality, quantity and the fragmentation of farmland 
have significant relations with migration decisions. We therefore expect the quantity 
of farmland to have positive impact on on-farm transitions into both employment and 
entrepreneurship. We anticipate the effects of quantity of farmland to be negative 
with respect to transition into employment: more land requires greater labor input 
from the household members. In contrast, households with more land should be in a 
better position to start an agricultural business (and hire labor external to the 
household to work on the land). Finally, the expected impact of farmland 
fragmentation is negative for both types of transitions: fragmented land requires 
more time and effort from the household members. 
(4) Social capital  
Social capital refers to networks created through social contacts that can be 
mobilized to facilitate transactions, reduce freeriding, influence goals and to expand 
access to better opportunities (Fidrmuc & Gërxhani, 2008; Bhandari, 2013; Moyes et 
al., 2015). In rural China, Guanxi traditionally plays an important role in cementing 
business ties and setting up new businesses (Zhang & Li, 2003; Moyes et al., 2015). 
We approximate Guanxi using the size of the network of relatives and acquaintances. 
Additionally, having a common surname can be a sign of kinship ties with other 
bearers of the same name.24 We expect social capital to boost the propensity to 
undergo on-farm transition into both on-farm employment and entrepreneurship. 
                                            
24 Unlike most other countries, China has a relatively few unique surnames, with 100 most common 
surnames accounting for 84.7% of the population of the country (see 公安部统计："王"成中国第一大
姓,有 9288 万人 (Public Security Bureau Statistics: 'Wang' Found China's #1 Surname, Includes 
92.88m People)." Available at: http://news.eastday.com/c/20070424/u1a2791347.html (accessed 28-
01-2018). The three most common surnames, Wang (王), Li (李), and Zhang (张) account for 7.3%, 
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(5) Political capital  
Political capital is similar to Guanxi or can be treated as a special form of Guanxi in 
its potential to improve business ties and open doors to new opportunities. It refers to 
networks which are built on political rather than social connections, such as being 
related to or friends with a village cadre.25 Some studies suggest that political capital 
is associated with higher income (Jin et al., 2014) and has a profound impact on 
rural residents’ labor market performance (Zhang et al, 2012; Wang et al, 2016). 
Their explanation rests on the observations that cadres have better information 
about jobs and business opportunities and are therefore able to help their household 
members. When attempting to start an on-farm business, the access to market 
information is of crucial importance. The cadres can thus open door to success as 
entrepreneurs (Zhang et al., 2012). We therefore expect political capital to be 
particularly important in facilitating on-farm transition into entrepreneurship.   
Table 5.1  Expected effects of capital endowments. 
Capital Endowment On-farm Employment On-farm Entrepreneurship 
Human Capital   
  Education + + 
  Training  + + 
  Share of females + − 
  Former rural-to-urban migrants 0 + 
Financial Capital   
  Income 0 + 
  Bank deposits 0 ++ 
  Bank loans 0 ++ 
Natural Capital   
  Quality of farmland + ++ 
  Quantity of farmland − + 
  Land fragmentation −− −− 
Social Capital   
  Friends and relatives + ++ 
  Popular surname + ++ 
Political Capital   
  Household member as cadre + ++ 
  Friends/relative as cadre + ++ 
  Household member in CPS + ++ 
                                                                                                                                       
7.2% and 6.8%, respectively, of the Chinese population (92.9mn, 92.1mn and 87.5mn in absolute 
numbers). However, there are important regional differences in the popularity of surnames. For the 
purposes of our survey, respondents were asked only whether their name was popular in the village. 
25 “Cadres (XiangCunGanBu), who may be political or administrative leaders, hold most important 
political positions in China’s rural communities” (Zhang & Li, 2003; Zhang et al., 2012). 
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Notes: ++ and -- stand for expected strongly positive/negative effect. + and - stands for (weakly) 
positive/negative effect. +/- stands for ambiguous effect, and 0 stands for no effect.. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data  
Our data is based on the “Cultivation and Reform of Land and Relevant Factors in 
Rural China” survey collected in 2015.26 The survey sampling locations have been 
selected as follows. The 31 provinces (including municipalities and autonomous 
regions) in China were first divided into 3 groups based on a cluster analysis of 
population, per capita GDP, agricultural acreage, proportion of agricultural acreage, 
proportion of agricultural population and proportion of agricultural production. 27 
Geographically, China is usually divided into three broad regions: “Western”, “Central” 
and “astern”. Therefore, combining socio-economic and geographical dimensions 
yields 9 groups. The provinces included in the survey were selected randomly from 
each group. Those 9 selected provinces are Guangdong, Guizhou, Henan, Jiangsu, 
Jiangxi, Liaoning, Ningxia, Shanxi and Sichuan.  
By using the same method, the counties in each province were divided according to 
their population; per capita GDP; agricultural acreage; proportion of agricultural 
acreage; proportion of agricultural population and proportion of agricultural 
production into 3 groups. Then, 1 county was randomly selected from each group. 
Within each selected county, townships and then villages were chosen following the 
same procedure as county selection.28 Finally, households were selected randomly 
according to the roster of each village, to obtain 240 households in each sampled 
province. In order to enhance the comparability of provinces, the sample sizes in 
Guangdong and Jiangxi were increased to 600. To ensure the quality of collected 
data, the final questionnaire has been developed on the basis of a pilot survey. 
                                            
26 National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.71333004) led by Team Prof. Biliang Luo, South 
China Agriculture University   
27 For the cluster analysis basis, see the Appendix A. 
28 Chinese provinces are further subdivided, hierarchically, into prefectures, counties, townships, and 
villages. 
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Households have been surveyed by means of face-to-face interviews. As a result, a 
total of 2880 households have been interviewed for the survey. Eliminating invalid 
questionnaires (those with incomplete or inconsistent responses), the final sample 
contains 2704 households with valid questionnaires. Sampling locations and sample 
sizes are shown in Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.1. 
Table 5.2  Provincial samples 
Class Eastern China Central China Western China 
Class1 
Beijing; Guangdong; 
Shandong; Tianjin; Shanghai 
Heilongjiang; Henan; 
Hainan 
Ningxia; Qinghai; Tibet 
Class2 Zhejiang; Jiangsu; Fujian 
Inner Mongolia; Jiangxi; 




Class3 Liaoning Shanxi; Jilin; Guangxi 
Shaanxi; Guizhou; Gansu; 
Xinjiang 
Sample Sizes 
 Guangdong Guizhou Henan Jiangsu Jiangxi Liaoning Ningxia Shanxi Sichuan 
Sample 600 240 240 240 600 240 240 240 240 
Valid N 547 239 230 239 587 221 226 201 214 
 
 





















5.3.2 Dependent variables 
Our main aim is to explore how capital endowments effect on-farm transitions, 
defined as rural workers abandoning low-productivity subsistence farming on the 
family farm to move either into formal agricultural employment or to set up their own 
agricultural business. Therefore, the dependent variable, Y, captures the decisions of 
household with respect to such transitions (we observe only actions of the household, 
not have the behavior of individual household members). Y takes four values. When 
no household members are either in formal on-farm employment or own an 
agribusiness, Y equals 0. When one or more household members become on-farm 
workers (and none are business owners), Y equals 1. When one or more household 
members become entrepreneurs (and none are in formal employment), Y equals 2. 
Finally, when household has some members who move into on-farm employment 
and others who concurrently become agribusiness owners, Y equals 3. Table 5.3 
summarizes the data on on-farm transitions. 
Table 5.3  Dependent Variables for On-farm Transitions. 
Variables Obs. % Mean S. D. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 2704 100 0.2726 0.5960 0 3 
 No household member is on-farm worker or 
agribusiness owner 
2147 79.40     
 Household member is on-farm worker 409 15.13     
 Household member is agribusiness owner 116 4.29     
 Household members are both on-farm worker 
and  agribusiness owner 
32 1.18     
5.3.3 Independent variables 
Table 5.4 shows the measures human capital, financial capital, natural capital, social 
capital and political capital used in our analysis, as discussed in section 5.2. Note 
that the survey only collects information about the household, not about individual 
household members (with the exception of the household head).  
Human capital is measured by the number of economically active household 
members, their gender distribution, average educational attainment, history of 
training, and experience of rural-to-urban migration. Households with more workers 
and more educated and trained members are believed to have higher human capital 
endowments (Schultz, 1961; Wang et al., 2016; Muchomba, 2017). Specifically, we 
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set the length of compulsory education in China, nine years, as the threshold level of 
education, and distinguish between households whose average education level is 9 
or less and those with greater values. As for training, the Chinese government has 
funded non-profit organizations to offer training programs, which the farmers can 
receive for free (Pan et al, 2017). We therefore include a measure whether members 
of household have received such training. 
We use a relatively broad concept of financial capital which encompasses income, 
savings and access to bank credit. Specifically, we include the household’s total 
income, relative comparison of present income with the past and with other 
households, and having savings and/or bank loans.  
Natural capital is measured by household’s contracted farmland, actual farmland 
used, land quality, and the relative size of land holdings. Farmland and land quality 
are indicators of the condition of the natural capital base. However, due to the limited 
farmland and the implementation of Household Responsibility System29 in the late 
1970s and early 1980s that followed the principle of equality (according to household 
size, the number of active members in a household, or both) in farmland allocation, 
farming operations in rural China are small and fragmented (Qing Tian et al, 2016). 
Therefore, we use the farmland fragmentation as an additional measure of the 
condition of farmland.  
Social capital is measured by the amount of relatives or friends and whether the 
households’ surname is popular in the respondent’s village. In rural China, due to the 
small scale of villages, the fact that people share the same surname may mean that 
they are (clan) relatives. They may be more willing to help each other as a result. 
Moreover, the authorities in the village are more likely to come from the most popular 
surnames, so that social capital can be also closely related with political capital.  
                                            
29 Household Responsibility System (Jia Ting Lian Chan Cheng Bao Ze Ren Zhi) was a practice in 
China, first adopted in agriculture in 1979. In the traditional Maoist organization of the rural economy, 
farmers were given a quota by the government specifying the quantity of goods to produce. They 
received a reward for meeting the quota. Going beyond the quota rarely produced a further economic 
reward. 
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Political capital is measured as household members being one of the village cadres, 
and membership of household members in the Communist Party of China (CPC). 
The rural on-farm transition can take place both within the village and outside. 
Therefore, both in-village cadre status and outside cadre status are taken into 
accounts. Being a CPC member may enable people to have better access to political 
connections which can in turn translate into economic gains. We report descriptive 
statistics on capital endowments in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4  Independent variables (N=2704) 
Description 
Values 
Mean S. D. 
0 1 2 
Human capital      
Number of active members of household / / / 3.1368 1.3019 









Household active members’ 
average education (of years) 
≤9 ≥10 / 0.2892 0.4535 
Training of agricultural technology none yes / 0.1553 0.3623 
Entrepreneurial training none yes / 0.1036 0.3047 
Household members was migrant 
worker  
none yes / 0.6601 0.4738 
Financial capital      
Household total income(yuan) <30,000 
30,000-
50,000 
>50,000 0.7385 0.8170 
Income level compared with 2013 lower 
about the 
same 
higher 0.1712 0.6459 





higher 0.9689 0.5970 






/ 0.3706 0.4830 
Natural capital      









Land quality poor average good 1.2822 0.6673 
Land fragmentation <average ≥average / 0.4475 0.4973 
Productivity poor average good 0.8277 0.5915 
Social capital      
Popular surname in the village not popular average popular 1.2955 0.7862 
Amount of relatives or friends few average many 1.4013 0.5940 
Political capital      
Family members is/was village cadre none yes / 0.2237 0.4168 
Relatives or friends is village cadre none yes / 0.2977 0.4573 
Family members is cadre outside 
the village 
none yes / 0.0492 0.2163 
Relatives or friends is cadre 
outside the village 
none yes / 0.2141 0.4103 
Family members join the CPC none yes / 0.1805 0.3847 
Note: See the Appendix for the Table A5.2 reporting the number of samples and percentages of 
respondents in each category. 
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5.3.4 Additional control variables  
The only member of household for whom individual information is available is the 
household head. We include four characteristics of the household head: age, gender, 
educational level and migrant work experience. Furthermore, we also include 
measures of traffic condition and distance from home to the center of township. 
These additional variables are used to check the robustness of our results as 
discussed below. The descriptive statistics of these variables are reported in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.5  Additional household characteristics (N=2704) 
Description 
Values 
Mean S. D. 
0 1 2 
Age of the household head / / / 43.4576 15.1398 
Gender of the household head male female / 0.3628 0.4809 
Educational level of the household head ≤9 ≥10 / 0.2785 0.4483 
Household head’s migrant work experience no yes / 0.5910 0.4917 
Traffic condition in the village poor average good 1.2241 0.7036 
Distance from home to town center (km) / / / 5.6989 6.0312 
5.3.5 Methodology 
On-farm transition is essentially a set of decisions on occupational choice with 
multiple options. We follow the studies on occupational choice and adopt the 
Multinomial Logit Model, which has proven to be one of the most suitable 
methodologies to deal with the occupational choice (Greene, 2007; Schmidt & 
Strauss, 1975; Barkley, 1990; Wang et al., 2016; Zou et al., 2018). The utility 
function for household occupational choice can be expressed as: 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = α + G𝑋𝑖
′ + 𝑖𝑗  (5.1) 
Where 𝑈𝑖𝑗  is the utility of household i associated with choice j. 𝑋𝑖
′  is a vector of 
household characteristics and G  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The 
probability that option 𝑗 is chosen by 𝑖 for a multinomial logit model for household 
occupational choice can be written as: 










Note that we set decision j = 0 as denoting those household with no members as 
either on-farm worker or agribusiness owner as the base category; j = 1 if at least 
one household member is on-farm worker (and none are agribusiness owners); j = 2 
when at least one household member is local agribusiness owner (and none are 
formally employed in agriculture); and j = 3 when at least one household member is 
on-farm worker and at least one is agribusiness owner.30  
The analysis proceeds in two steps. We first only include the capital endowments. 
Then, we also include the additional variables (household head characteristics and 
local infrastructure) as well as province fixed effects. Including province fixed effects 
is potentially important as these should capture the effects of local-level factors that 
also affect rural on-farm transitions and whose effects are the same for all 
households in the same sampling location: policies put in place by the local 
government (and the extent to which implementation of national policies differs 
across regions), local-level institutions, and access to markets. 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
In the tables below, we report the marginal effects of estimating the multinomial logit 
with the probability of the household undergoing on-farm transition.  Note that we 
include all types of capital in the same regression. For the sake of exposition, 
however, we divide regression results into several tables according to the types of 
explanatory variables. We thus report results of two multinomial logit regressions, 
Model 1 and Model 2, divided into Tables 5.6 to 5.11. 
5.4.1 Human capital and on-farm transitions 
The results for human capital shown in Table 5.6 suggest that having more active 
household members increases the probability of transitioning into on-farm 
                                            
30 Only 32 households fall into this category. Therefore, we take the results for this group with a grain 
of salt and focus in our discussion on households for which j equals 1 or 2. 
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employment. Note that we control for the amount of land that the household can use 
(see below): holding the area of farmland constant, larger households are more likely 
to have surplus labor that can move into formal employment elsewhere. In contrast, 
the number of active members of household has no influence on agribusiness 
transition. Training plays an important role, as expected: entrepreneurial training 
exerts significantly positive influence on on-farm transition into both employment and 
entrepreneurship while agricultural training fosters only moving into on-farm 
entrepreneurship. Migrant work experience of a household member has positive 
influence on employment transition, while it has no impact on transition into 
entrepreneurship: former migrant workers probably have history of urban 
employment, and are likely to have acquired human capital that makes them more 
productive in rural employment as well. As expected, the number of household 
members employed off-farm has negative effect on transitioning to on-farm worker 
status: with more household members working off-farm, there are fewer members 
available to work on-farm. Off-farm employment does not, however, have significant 
influence on on-farm entrepreneurship. Household members owning off-farm 
business has no significant effect on either type of on-farm transition. Finally, gender 
balance of the household and education of household members do not significantly 
contribute to either type of transition, contrary to our expectations. 
Table 5.6  Human Capital Effect on the Transition of Rural Residents: Marginal Effect, 
Multinomial Logit 
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Off-farm self-employment -0.017 -0.032 -0.148 -0.017 -0.031 -0.148 
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of household members (1.533) (0.783) (6.713) (3.326) (1.499) (12.395) 
Additional control variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check with additional control 
variables shown in Table 5.11; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
5.4.2 Financial capital and on-farm transitions 
The effects of financial capital on on-farm transition are reported in Table 5.7. The 
higher the income of a household, the more likely it is to transition into on-farm 
employment. This is likely to reflect reverse causality: being employed outside the 
household brings in additional earnings, resulting in an overall increase in the 
household’s income. This interpretation is consistent also with the finding that 
household with employed members are less likely to report falling earnings 
compared with the previous year. Current income does not have a direct impact on 
on-farm entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, households with higher than average 
incomes are likely to have members who are agribusiness owners. Having savings 
makes formal employment less likely; contrary to our expectations, savings do not 
affect the transition into entrepreneurship. Bank loans have the opposite effect, being 
positively correlated with on-farm employment but not with being an agribusiness 
owner. The lack of effect of bank loans on entrepreneurship is somewhat surprising: 
it suggests that agricultural business owners rely little on external finance, or find it 
difficult to obtain it, unlike those in formal employment who can borrow from banks 
against future earnings from employment. 
Table 5.7  Financial Capital Effect on the Transition of Rural Residents: Marginal Effect, 
Multinomial Logit. 
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higher -0.005 0.031*** 0.000 -0.007 0.032*** -0.002 
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Additional control variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check with additional control 
variables shown in Table 5.11; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
5.4.3 Natural capital and on-farm transitions 
In Table 5.8, we assess how natural capital contributes to on-farm transitions. 
Households with larger than average amount of farmland are more likely to transition 
into on-farm employment. Having access to more land than contracted, in turn, is 
associated with greater probability of entrepreneurship: this may be an effect of 
transitioning into entrepreneurial activity rather than a driver of it, as agribusiness 
owners may seek to acquire additional land. On the other hand, households with 
land of better-than-average quality and with better than average productivity tend to 
have members transitioning into formal employment (after controlling for the amount 
of land). Land of better quality should be easier to work on, and this should help 
release some household members to seek employment elsewhere. Likewise, higher 
productivity of land means that less labor and other inputs are required to work on 
given quantity of land, again helping release surplus labor into formal employment. 
Table 5.8  Natural Capital Effect on the Transition of Rural Residents: Marginal Effect, 
Multinomial Logit. 
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Additional control variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check with additional control 
variables shown in Table 5.11; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
5.4.4 Social capital and on-farm transitions 
The results in Table 5.9 indicate that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between social capital and transitioning into formal employment. Both having a 
popular and unpopular surname is associated with lower probability of on-farm 
employment transition than having a surname of average popularity. Similarly, those 
with few and many friends are less likely to transition into on-farm employment than 
those with average number of friends. This implies that transition into formal 
agricultural employment is more likely for those with a surname that is neither 
popular nor rare, and those with an intermediate number of friends. A popular 
surname probably means that many residents in the village share the same surname: 
this may imply weaker ties among those with the same surname. In contrast, having 
an unpopular surname means that there are few kinsmen in the village. Interestingly, 
the effects of the two types of social capital on on-farm agribusiness transition are 
different: those with popular surnames are (weakly) more likely to move into rural 
entrepreneurship while having more than average number of friends has no effect on 
this type of transition. 
Table 5.9  Social Capital Effect on the Transition of Rural Residents: Marginal Effect, 
Multinomial Logit. 
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Additional control variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
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Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check with additional control 
variables shown in Table 5.11; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
5.4.5 Political capital and on-farm transitions 
In terms of political capital, having a family member who is a village cadre has a 
positive effect on the probability of both types of on-farm transitions, as shown in 
Table 5.10. Such cadres could potentially help their family members in a variety of 
ways. For instance, rural cadres can use their position to help family members gain 
better access to higher-level bureaucrats, potential business partners and employers, 
credit sources, market information or technical expertise (Oi, 1999; Zhang et al, 2012, 
Jin et al., 2014). Indeed, this only applies when a household member is a village 
cadre: having (more distant) relatives or friends as village cadres, or having a family 
member as a cadre outside the village, have no significant influence on on-farm 
transition. This finding is consistent with Zhang and Li (2003) who also find that 
having family members as cadre has significant effect on non farm employment 
while the impact of having ties outside the village is insignificant. This is captured 
also in a Chinese proverb: “Distant water will not quench a fire nearby 
(YuanShuiJiuBuLeJinHuo 远水救不了近火). Hence, the depth of political capital is 
much more important than its breadth. 
Table 5.10  Political Capital Effect on the Transition of Rural Residents: Marginal Effect, 
Multinomial Logit. 
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Additional control variables NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check with additional control 
variables shown in Table 5.11; Standard errors are in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 
***p<0.01. 
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It is also interesting that having household members in the Communist Party of 
China has a weakly negative effect on the likelihood of on-farm employment and no 
significant effect on on-farm entrepreneurship: this may either mean that CPC 
members receive few benefits, or that the Party membership helps them move out of 
agriculture into off-farm employment or career in the civil service. 
5.4.6 Additional control variables and on-farm transitions 
The effects of additional control factors are presented in Table 5.11. We find that the 
age of the household head has a positive effect on the decision to transition as on-
farm worker. Gender or education level of the household head, somewhat 
surprisingly, have no effect. Finally, poor traffic conditions in the village discourage 
on-farm transition into employment. 
Table 5.11  Effect of Additional Control Variables on the Transition of Rural Residents: 
Marginal Effect, Multinomial Logit. 
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Province Fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Notes: Model 1 is benchmark model and Model 2 serves as a robustness check; Standard errors are 
in parentheses; Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
5.4.7 Summary of expectations and findings 
In Table 5.12, we reproduce the expectations as listed in Table 5.1 and compare 
them with our findings. Our expectations have been broadly confirmed with respect 
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to human and natural capital, and also, though less firmly, for social and political 
capital. Rather surprisingly, the results of our analysis suggest that financial capital 
plays a limited role as a catalyst of rural on-farm transitions. 
Table 5.12  Expected effects of capital endowments vs empirical results. 
Capital Endowment On-farm Employment On-farm Entrepreneurship 
 Expectation Finding Expectation Finding 
Human Capital     
  Education + 0 + 0 
  Training  + + + ++ 
  Share of females + 0 − 0 
  Former rural-to-urban  migrants 0 + + 0 
Financial Capital     
  Income 0 + + + 
  Bank deposits 0 − ++ 0 
  Bank loans 0 + ++ 0 
Natural Capital     
  Quality of farmland + ++ ++ + 
  Quantity of farmland − ++ + + 
  Land fragmentation −− − −− 0 
Social Capital     
  Friends and relatives + +/− ++ 0 
  Popular surname + +/− ++ ++ 
Political Capital     
  Household member cadre + ++ ++ ++ 
  Friends/relative cadre + 0 ++ 0 
  Household member in CPS + 0 ++ 0 
Notes: ++ and -- stand for expected strongly positive/negative effect. + and - stands for (weakly) 
positive/negative effect. +/- stands for non-linear effect, and 0 stands for no effect. 
5.5 Conclusions 
By using a recent targeted survey of rural households, our study investigates the 
effects of household endowments of human, financial, natural, social, and political 
capital on rural transitions from subsistence farming into either formal on-farm 
employment or on-farm entrepreneurship. Our research confirms that capital 
endowments are important determinants of rural households’ livelihood strategies. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the role of financial capital, such as savings and access to 
bank loans, is limited. Instead, our results highlight the importance of natural, human, 
social and political capital. Specifically, investing in human capital, in the form of 
receiving training in either agricultural technology or entrepreneurial skills, increases 
the likelihood of transitioning into on-farm employment and entrepreneurship. Former 
migrant workers, who have returned to their home village, are more likely to find 
formal employment, suggesting that the experience of rural-to-urban migration 
improves the employability of rural workers even in the rural labor market. Both the 
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quality and quantity of farmland are important for on-farm transitions, by helping 
release surplus labor into formal employment. Social capital has non-linear impact 
on on-farm employment, with intermediate values being more supportive of on-farm 
employment than either high or low values. Political capital such as local rural cadre 
status in the village also exerts positive influence on on-farm transition. However, 
only local political connections seem to matter, whereas political capital outside of 
the village is less influential. Finally, poor road infrastructure poses a barrier to 
transition into on-farm employment.  
Our findings add credence to the point put forward by Ranis (2004) that reaching the 
Lewis turning point can be postponed if the rural sector experiences productivity 
improvements in parallel with the growth in the urban sector. Specifically, rising 
productivity in the rural helps release more labor from agriculture and keep rural 
wages low. Therefore, successful and on-going on-farm transitions can help maintain 
high rate of economic growth in China in the years to come.  
The results of our analysis also help identify factors that facilitate on-farm transitions: 
acquisition of human capital, both in the shape of formal education and further 
practical training, facilitating the return of rural-to-urban migrants who bring new skills 
(and social capital) with them back to rural areas, and improvements in the quality of 
road infrastructure. By focusing on these improvements, policy makers can should 
encourage on-farm transitions. 
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5.6 Appendix 
Table A5.1  Index of 31 provinces in China in 2012 for the cluster analysis 



















Beijing 2069 8.64 231.7 13.79 13.8 0.93 
Tianjin 1413 9.12 441.1 39.03 18.45 1.52 
Hebei 7288 3.65 6317.3 33.66 53.2 11.65 
Shanxi 3611 3.35 4055.8 25.95 48.74 7.00 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2490 6.38 7147.2 6.04 42.26 7.38 
Liaoning 4389 5.66 4085.3 28.00 34.35 6.20 
Jilin 2750 4.34 5534.6 29.52 46.3 9.77 
Heilongjiang 3834 3.57 11830.1 26.01 43.1 16.91 
Shanghai 2380 8.48 244.0 38.72 10.7 0.85 
Jiangsu 7920 6.83 4763.8 46.43 37 5.49 
Zhejiang 5477 6.33 1920.9 18.83 36.8 3.55 
Anhui 5988 2.87 5730.2 41.02 53.5 10.85 
Fujian 3748 5.26 1330.1 10.97 40.4 6.41 
Jiangxi 4504 2.88 2827.1 16.93 52.49 7.75 
Shandong 9685 5.16 7515.3 48.86 47.57 7.92 
Henan 9406 3.15 7926.4 47.46 57.57 13.38 
Hubei 5779 3.85 4664.1 25.09 46.5 11.18 
Hunan 6639 3.34 3789.4 17.89 53.35 11.97 
Guangdong 10594 5.39 2830.7 15.73 32.6 3.91 
Guangxi 4682 2.78 4217.5 17.87 56.47 13.23 
Hainan 887 3.22 727.5 21.40 48.4 16.13 
Chongqing 2945 3.87 2235.9 27.17 43.02 7.38 
Sichuan 8076 2.96 5947.4 12.35 56.47 11.58 
Guizhou 3484 1.97 4485.3 25.48 63.59 12.62 
Yunnan 4659 2.21 6072.1 15.84 60.69 13.56 
Tibet 308 2.28 361.6 0.29 77.25 7.62 
Shaanxi 3753 3.85 4050.3 19.70 49.98 10.56 
Gansu 2578 2.19 4658.8 10.25 61.25 17.42 
Qinghai 573 3.30 542.7 0.75 52.56 6.18 
Ningxia 647 3.62 1107.1 16.67 49.33 10.27 
Xinjiang 2233 3.36 4124.6 2.48 56.02 22.32 
Data sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2013 
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Table A5.2  Variables description reported with number of sample sizes and proportion 
Variables Obs. % Variables Obs. % 
Human 
capital 
The number of active members of household 2704 100 Natural 
capital 
Contracted farmland <average 1475 54.55 
Gender distribution of 
household active members 
female>male 419 15.50  ≥average 1229 45.45 
female=male 1367 50.55 Actual Farmland <contracted farmland 907 33.54 
female<male 918 33.95  =contracted farmland 1502 55.55 
Household active members’ 
average education (of years) 
≤9 1922 71.08  >contracted farmland 295 10.91 
≥10 782 28.92 Land quality poor 328 12.13 
Training of agricultural 
technology 
none 2284 84.47  average 1285 47.52 
yes 420 15.53  good 1091 40.34 
Entrepreneurial training none 2424 89.64 Land fragmentation <average 1494 55.25 
yes 280 10.36  ≥average 1210 44.75 
Household members was 
migrate worker 
none 2284 84.47 Productivity poor 746 27.59 
yes 420 15.53  average 1678 62.06 
Off-farm employment of 
household members 
none 522 19.30  good 280 10.36 
yes 2182 80.70 Political 
capital 
Family members is or 
was village cadre 
none 2039 75.41 
Off-farm self-employment 
of household members 
none 2509 92.79 yes 665 24.59 
yes 195 7.21 Relatives or friends is 
village cadre 





<30,000 1348 49.85 yes 1068 39.50 
30,000-50,000 715 26.44 Family members is cadre 
outside the village 
none 2571 95.08 
>50,000 641 23.71 yes 133 4.92 
Income level compared 
with 2013 
lower 372 13.76 Relatives or friends is 
cadre outside the village 
none 2125 78.59 
about the same 1497 55.36 yes 579 21.41 
higher 835 30.88 Family members join the 
CPC 
none 2216 81.95 
Income level compared 
with other households 
lower 525 19.41 yes 488 18.05 
about the same 1738 64.28 Additional 
control 
variables 
Age of the household head 2704 100 
higher 441 16.31 Gender of the 
household head 
male 1723 63.72 
Savings no 653 24.15 female 981 36.28 
yes 2051 75.85 Educational level of the 
household head (of years) 
≤9 1951 72.15 
Bank loan hard to obtain 1702 62.94 ≥10 753 27.85 
easy to obtain 1002 37.06 Household head’s 
migrant work experience 
no 1106 40.90 
Social 
capital 
Popular surname in the 
village 
not popular 554 20.49 yes 1598 59.10 
average 797 29.47 Traffic condition in the 
village 
poor 434 16.05 
popular 1353 50.04 average 1230 45.49 
Amount of relatives or 
friends 
few 152 5.62 good 1040 38.46 
average 1315 48.63 Distance from home to town center (km) 2704 100 
many 1237 45.75      
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Table A5.3  Whole table of multinomial logit regressions reporting marginal effect (N=2704) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 
Human capital          
The number of active members of household          
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Financial capital          
Household total income(yuan)          













































































































































/ / / 
Natural capital          
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Social capital          
Popular surname in the village          









































































Political capital          
Family members is or was village cadre 0.039** 0.026*** 0.001 0.042*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.042*** 0.025*** 0.001 
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(0.016) (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.009) (0.005) (0.016) (0.009) (0.005) 
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Control variable          
Province fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age of the household head 









































Educational level of the household head 













Migrate working experience of the household 
head 













Traffic condition in the village / / /       
poor 



























Distance from home to town 













Note: Model 1 is original model and Model 2 and Model 3 serve as robustness checks with additional control variables; Dependent variable: Y=1: Household 
member is an on-farm worker; Y=2: Household member is an agribusiness owner; Y=3: Household members are both on-farm workers and agribusiness 




Table A5.4  Whole table of multinomial logit regressions reporting relative-risk ratio outcomes (N=2704) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 Y=1 Y=2 Y=3 
Human capital          




















Gender distribution of active 
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Financial capital          
Household total income(yuan)          









































































Income level compared with other 
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Natural capital          


















  Actual farmland          
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Social capital          
Popular surname in the village          









































































Political capital          
Family members is or was village 1.491*** 2.171*** 1.355 1.555*** 2.092*** 1.311 1.571*** 2.132*** 1.414 
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cadre (0.222) (0.508) (0.624) (0.237) (0.501) (0.669) (0.237) (0.507) (0.702) 
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Relatives or friends is cadre 













/ / / 


















Control variable          
Province fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 




































Educational level of the 
household head 












Migrate working experience of the 
household head 












Traffic condition in the village          






















































Pseudo R2 0.1595 0.2037 0.2004 
LR chi2 566.38*** 722.98*** 711.26*** 
Log likelihood -1491.7946 -1413.4946 -1419.3526 
Note: Model 1 is original model and Model 2 and Model 3 serve as robustness checks with additional control variables; Dependent variable: Y=1: Household 
member is an on-farm worker; Y=2: Household member is an agribusiness owner; Y=3: Household members are both on-farm workers and agribusiness 
owners. Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
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Table A5.5 Correlation matrix of all the variables in use (N=2704) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Y 1.00                                
2 The number of active members of household 0.04  1.00                              
3 Gender distribution of active members of household 0.01  0.08  1.00                            
4 Household active members’ education level 0.02  0.09  0.01  1.00                          
5 Training in agricultural technology 0.15  0.01  0.00  0.10  1.00                        
6 Entrepreneurial training 0.18  0.02  -0.01  0.08  0.25  1.00                      
7 Household members was migrate worker 0.03  0.34  0.07  0.07  -0.03  0.05  1.00                    
8 Off-farm employment of household members -0.11  0.25  0.06  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.52  1.00                  
9 Off-farm self-employment of household members -0.06  0.01  -0.01  0.06  -0.02  0.11  0.06  0.05  1.00                
10 Household total income(yuan) 0.11  0.12  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.12  0.07  0.05  1.00              
11 Income level compared with 2013 0.02  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.21  1.00            
12 Income level compared with other households 0.07  0.02  -0.03  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.35  0.36  1.00          
13 Savings 0.01  0.05  -0.02  0.07  0.11  0.08  0.11  0.13  0.06  0.12  0.12  0.12  1.00        
14 Bank loan 0.05  0.01  -0.03  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.05  0.01  0.01  0.06  0.02  1.00      
15 Contracted farmland 0.06  0.09  0.00  -0.01  0.04  -0.02  -0.06  -0.07  -0.06  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.01  1.00    
16 Actual farmland 0.08  0.02  -0.01  -0.02  0.07  0.02  -0.13  -0.09  -0.11  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  0.02  -0.01  1.00  
17 Land quality 0.11  0.03  -0.04  0.03  0.15  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.11  0.07  0.18  0.04  -0.01  -0.02  
18 Land fragmentation 0.02  -0.06  -0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.09  -0.08  -0.01  -0.04  -0.01  0.03  -0.06  0.02  0.49  0.06  
19 Productivity 0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.12  -0.06  -0.09  -0.09  -0.10  -0.13  -0.11  -0.01  0.00  0.15  
20 Popular surname in the village -0.03  0.07  0.03  -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.02  -0.04  0.01  -0.03  0.04  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  
21 Amount of relatives or friends 0.01  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.04  -0.03  0.04  -0.04  
22 Family members is or was village cadre 0.12  0.11  0.00  0.07  0.17  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.01  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.01  
23 Relatives or friends is village cadre 0.06  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.08  0.02  0.00  -0.07  
24 Family members is cadre outside the village 0.04  0.04  -0.04  0.07  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.00  
25 Relatives or friends is cadre outside the village 0.06  -0.02  -0.05  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.02  -0.01  0.09  0.00  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.06  -0.06  
26 Family members join the CPC 0.03  0.10  -0.01  0.14  0.10  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.02  -0.02  -0.04  
27 Age of the household head -0.04  0.03  0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.07  -0.04  -0.11  0.01  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.04  
28 Age square -0.04  0.05  0.02  -0.04  -0.02  -0.07  -0.04  -0.12  0.00  -0.06  -0.06  -0.06  -0.07  -0.03  0.00  0.03  
29 Gender -0.04  -0.05  -0.19  0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.05  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.06  -0.06  
30 Educational level of the household head -0.01  0.01  0.00  0.32  0.06  0.10  0.09  0.08  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.02  -0.01  -0.07  
31 Migrate working experience of the household head 0.05  -0.01  0.05  0.00  -0.04  -0.01  0.07  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.02  -0.01  0.02  -0.05  -0.05  
32 Traffic condition in the village 0.08  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.07  0.09  0.01  0.03  0.07  -0.03  0.00  -0.03  




  17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
17 Land quality 1.00                                
18 Land fragmentation 0.00  1.00                              
19 Productivity -0.14  -0.05  1.00                            
20 Popular surname in the village -0.03  -0.07  0.06  1.00                          
21 Amount of relatives or friends 0.06  -0.04  -0.01  0.29  1.00                        
22 Family members is or was village cadre 0.06  -0.02  -0.02  0.04  0.11  1.00                      
23 Relatives or friends is village cadre 0.06  -0.04  -0.03  0.09  0.19  0.15  1.00                    
24 Family members is cadre outside the village 0.02  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.18  0.09  1.00                  
25 Relatives or friends is cadre outside the village 0.06  0.06  -0.03  0.03  0.16  0.13  0.28  0.18  1.00                
26 Family members join the CPC 0.11  -0.05  -0.04  0.02  0.09  0.37  0.11  0.14  0.12  1.00              
27 Age of the household head 0.03  -0.02  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.08  -0.03  0.02  -0.04  0.08  1.00            
28 Age square 0.03  -0.03  0.04  0.03  0.01  0.08  -0.03  0.03  -0.04  0.08  0.98  1.00          
29 Gender 0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.06  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  -0.03  -0.04  1.00        
30 Educational level of the household head 0.03  0.02  -0.07  -0.06  0.00  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.07  0.11  -0.46  -0.40  -0.05  1.00      
31 Migrate working experience of the household head 0.03  -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.03  -0.04  0.04  -0.01  0.04  -0.06  -0.17  -0.20  -0.11  -0.03  1.00    
32 Traffic condition in the village 0.24  0.01  -0.07  -0.01  0.05  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  





Grandparental caregiving, Quality of Life and 
Life Satisfaction: Evidence from China 
6.1 Introduction 
Many societies have seen grandparental caregiving as a common and important 
household activity in recent years. For instance, the provision of childcare by 
grandparents is widespread in Europe (Di Gessa et al., 2016a) with more than 50% 
of grandmothers providing grandchild care (Hank & Buber, 2009). In the United 
States, the number of grandparents playing a role in grandchild care has increased 
steadily from 1990s onwards (Pebley & Rudkin, 1999; Mutchler & Baker, 2004) with 
over 60% grandparents providing grandchild care for at least ten years and more 
than 70% for at least 2 years (Luo et al., 2012). In Asia, a comparative study reports 
that 58% of Chinese grandparents are grandchild caregivers whereas this proportion 
is much lower in South Korea, only 6% (Ko & Hank, 2014).  
The literature has explicitly recognized the beneficial effect of grandparental 
caregiving on the health and well-being of the grandparents. For example, 
grandparenting has been shown to be positively related to both subjective and 
objective well-being (Di Gessa et al., 2016a; Di Gessa et al., 2016b; Xu et al., 2017), 
cognitive functioning (Aprino & Bordone, 2014; Ahn & Choi, 2019), lower risk of 
depression (Grundy et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2016), lower mortality rate (Hilbrand et 
al, 2017a; Hilbrand et al, 2017b; Danielsbacka et al., 2019) and higher level of life 
satisfaction (Liu et al., 2019; Xu 2019; Danielsbacka et al., 2019). An emerging 
strand of literature, however, suggests that the relationship between grandparenting 
and the financial condition of grandparents should not be neglected (Winefield & Air, 
2010; Lee et al., 2016), especially in countries like China, where elders depend 
heavily on their children for financial support (Zimmer & Kwong, 2003; Gils & Mu, 
2007; Cong & Silverstein, 2008; Cong & Silverstein, 2011).  
Merging these two strands of the literature so as to provide a fuller understanding on 
the relationship between grandparenting and elders’ quality of life, we study how 
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grandparenting affects the grandparents’ quality of life and life satisfaction in China, 
a country in which the phenomenon of grandparenting is very common. We expand 
the growing research in the following ways. First, we measure the caregivers’ quality 
of life in a broader sense, including not only their physical and mental health but also 
their financial condition. Second, existing studies based on Chinese grandparenting 
are limited in generalizability because they are based on regional samples (Cong & 
Silverstein, 2008; Cong & Silverstein, 2011; Liu et al., 2019). Our empirical strategy 
is based on the national longitudinal representative dataset of China, which provides 
greater generalizability and replicability. Third, unlike most previous studies that only 
include a binary indicator to measure grandparenting, we define grandparenting 
more broadly not only as whether grandparents are caregivers but also as their total 
caring hours spent and total number of grandchildren cared for. Fourth, this paper 
also highlights the importance of rural-urban difference and role of gender in 
understanding the grandparental caregiving in China. In particular, we distinguish the 
grandparental caregiving from village to non-village areas and from grandmothers’ 
involvements in grandchild care to grandfathers’.   
Furthermore, it can naturally be argued that the beneficial effect of grandparenting 
on quality of life in terms of health and financial condition mediates the beneficial 
impact of grandparenting on life satisfaction. However, previous studies have 
investigated grandparenting and its direct effects on health and life satisfaction 
without testing the mediating effect. In this article, therefore, we fill this gap by 
examining the direct and indirect channels between grandparenting, quality of life 
and life satisfaction.  
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a 
literature review. Section 6.3 includes the data description and outlines the 
methodology in use. Section 6.4 presents the estimation results. Section 6.5 
discusses the results and concludes. 
6.2 Theoretical Framework 
There is thus far a large body of research focusing on the relationship between 
grandparenting and grandparents’ health and wellbeing. A number of studies show 
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that grandparenting is associated with better well-being and health of grandparents 
(for example, see Aprino & Bordone, 2014; Di Gessa et al., 2016a; Di Gessa et al., 
2016b on Europe; Ahn & Choi, 2019 on South Korea; Tang et al., 2016 on America; 
Ku et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2013on Taiwan). However, grandparenting does not 
always exert a positive health impact. If the obligations of the grandchild caregiver 
role exceed the maximum resources that the caregivers can physically and 
psychologically afford, which is known as the role strain theory (Goode, 1960), 
grandparenting can impair the health of grandparents, especially for those involved 
in intense and custodial grandchild caregiving (Hayslip & Shore, 2000; Ku et al, 2013; 
Musil et al., 2017; Yalcina et al., 2018).  
Research has also emerged on the impact of grandparenting in China. Earlier 
studies on Chinese grandparenting start from the financial benefits as financial 
support from adult children has been considered to be one of the most important 
sources for the elders in China to maintain their livelihood in old age, especially in 
rural area (Cai et al., 2012). Using longitudinal data set derived from a village in 
Anhui Province, Cong & Silverstein (2011) study the intergenerational exchange 
between elders and their migrant and non-migrant sons in China. They find that the 
grandparenting has a positive effect on the financial support the elders receive from 
their sons. The financial support from migrant sons is higher as the intensity of care 
increases compared to non-migrant sons. In their earlier study (Cong & Silverstein, 
2008) based on the same dataset, they find that financial support the elders receive 
as a reward of intensive grandchild care from their children has a significant effect on 
reducing symptoms that are associated with depression. These studies corroborate 
Short et al (2001) who argue that high intensity of grandchild caregiving is not a 
culturally scripted responsibility of grandparents in China and it requires a fair 
financial compensation.  
In addition to financial benefits, there is some evidence on the interplay between 
grandparenting and grandparents’ health in China. Using data from China Health 
and Nutrition Survey, Chen and Liu (2012) find that light intensity of grandchild care 
is positively associated with self-rated health while high intensity of grandchild care 
has a negative impact. Based on data from China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study, Xu (2019) studies the impact of taking care of grandchildren on 
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mental health and physical health of grandparents. They find that grandparents who 
cared for both grandchildren and great-grandparents are associated with fewer 
depressive symptoms, reduced hypertension and greater life satisfaction compared 
to the non-caregivers. Both financial condition and health are equally important for 
elders’ quality of life. Yet most work investigating grandparental caregiving has 
focused on either health or financial wealth of grandparents but not both.  
While much research has explored the impact on grandparents’ quality of life when 
investigating grandparental caregiving, studies have not focused on life satisfaction 
until recently. Using SHARE data on 11 European countries from 2004 to 2015 to 
investigate the within-individual effect of grandparenting, Danielsbacka et al. (2019) 
report a positive relationship between grandparenting and grandparents’ life 
satisfaction. Liu et al. (2019) conduct a city-case study to explore the relationship 
between elders’ contributory behaviours and their life satisfaction based on a survey 
data set of 809 older adults in Jianghan, a small town in Wuhan province. They find 
that frequently taking care of grandchildren is positively related to grandparent’s life 
satisfaction, which is in accord with findings from an earlier study (Chyi and Mao, 
2012). Based on the 2005 wave of Chinese General Social Survey data, Chyi and 
Mao (2012) investigate the association between elders’ living arrangement and their 
level of happiness and find that the elders who live with their grandchildren report 
higher level of happiness than their counterparts.  
The explanations of such direct effect of grandparenting on grandparents’ life 
satisfaction are mainly rooted in two different frameworks. Evolutionary theories such 
as the grandmother hypothesis have been built and expanded to explain the 
beneficial effects of grandparenting on the elders (Hawkes et al., 1998; Hilbrand et 
al., 2017b). Grandparenting is a behavior of evolutionary nature that contributes to 
human longevity (Hawkes, 2004; Hilbrand et al., 2017a; Tanskanen & Danielsbacka, 
2019; Danielsbacka et al., 2019). The positive effects of grandparenting on the 
caregivers’ life satisfaction can be seen as an intrinsic reflection of the caregiving 
system (Brown et al., 2011). From the view of psychological theories such as role 
enhancement theory (Sieber, 1974) and its follow-up studies (Di Gessa et al., 2016b; 
Liu et al., 2019; Yalcin et al., 2018), the role of grandchild caregivers can strengthen 
the elders’ relationship with the family and provide them with not only the emotional 
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gratification but also a sense of personality enrichment and life competence, thereby 
leading to greater life satisfaction. Most of the work on grandparental caregiving has 
investigated the grandparenting and its direct effects on health, financial wealth and 
life satisfaction, while the health and financial condition can potentially mediate the 
effect of grandparenting on life satisfaction. Building on the happiness theory of 
Layard (2005), a number of studies find that health and financial condition are 
among several other factors in determining the elders’ happiness in China (Appleton 
& Song, 2008; Knight et al., 2009). 
6.3 Data Methodology 
6.3.1 Data 
Our analysis is based on the 2015 wave of the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) dataset, which is a biennial survey conducted by 
Peking University that aims to record and examine the main health and economic 
outcomes related to the rapidly ageing population in China. It was designed on the 
basis of a series of prior surveys on population ageing, namely the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), and the 
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 31  Table 6.1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics on the variables that we use in our analysis.   
The dependent variable is life satisfaction, measured as the responses to the survey 
questions: “Please think about your life as a whole. How satisfied are you with it? Are 
you completely satisfied, very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not 
at all satisfied?” Answers are from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to “not at all satisfied”, 
and 5 assigned to “completely satisfied”. 
We construct three different variables to capture the intensity of grandparental 
caregiving: not only a binary indicator of taking care for grandchildren, but also 
aggregate hours of grandchild care, and number of grandchildren cared. Note that 
the independent variables are temporally lagged. For example, the respondents 
                                            
31 For more details of the CHARLS survey, see charls.pku.edu.cn/. 
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were asked whether they have provided grandchild care last year; how many hours 
they have provided care to each grandchild last year and how many grandchildren 
they provided care for last year. The issue of reverse causality can be mitigated in 
this sense (Ku et al., 2013). 
The mediators between grandparenting and life satisfaction, as discussed, are 
physical health captured by “self-rated health”, “self-rated health change” and 
“suffering body pains”, mental health captured by “risk of depression”, and financial 
support measured by the amount of money transfers the elders receive from their 
children. The descriptions and values of each variable are shown in Table 6.3. The 
assessment of depression is based on 10-item list from the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), which has been widely used to measure the 
level of depression symptoms. Each item is rated on a 4-point Likert scale, we value 
them from 0 to 3, with higher values corresponding to higher risk of depression. By 
adding up those 10 items we obtain the depression degree, which ranges from 0 to 
30. The larger the number, the higher level of depression risk. We follow Kilbourne et 
al. (2002) and Othieno et al. (2014) and use a cut-off point of 10. Those with scores 
equal to or higher than 11 in the survey are considered to suffer from risk of 
depression. Accordingly, we construct a binary variable, with a value of 1 assigned to 
those with score of 11 or higher, and 0 for the rest.  
We control the grandparents’ socio-economic characteristics including gender, 
marriage, age, address, retirement status, self-care ability, and insurance scheme 
status, etc. Also, we control the household structure of grandparents such as the 
number of children, the number of grandchildren over 16, the number of 
grandchildren under 16 and the number of siblings, etc. 
6.3.2 Empirical strategy 
Aiming at not only studying the effect of grandparenting on quality of life but also its 
direct and indirect effect on life satisfaction, our empirical strategy takes two steps as 
presented in Fig. 6.1. In the first step, we first investigate the effect of grandparenting 
on the grandparents’ quality of life and life satisfaction. Hence, we estimate 
equations (1) to (4). 
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Table 6.1  Definition of variables and descriptive statistics. (N=7045). 
Variables Value Observations Mean SD 
Dependent variables     
Life satisfaction 
Not at all satisfied=1 175 (2.48%)   
Not very satisfied=2 543 (7.71%)   
Somewhat satisfied=3 3409 (48.39%) 3.34 0.81 
Very satisfied=4 2343 (33.26%)   
Completely satisfied=5 469 (6.66%)   
Mediators/Dependent variables     
Self-rated health 
Bad=0 2047 (29.06%) 0.93 0.71 
Fair=1 3388 (48.09%)   
Good=2 1610 (22.85%)   
Self-rated health change compared 
with last interview 
Worse=0 3218 (45.68%) 0.65 0.64 
Same=1 3126 (44.37%)   
Better=2 701 (9.95%)   
Suffering body pains 
None=0 4783 (67.89%) 0.46 0.32 
Yes=1 2262 (32.11%)   
Depression 
no=0 4344 (61.66%) 0.46 0.32 
yes=1 2048 (29.07%)   
Financial transfers from children (1000 yuan) Actual value  7045 (100%) 13.51 83.42 
Independent variables     
Provide grandchild care in the last year 
No = 0  4901 (66.18%) 0.31 0.46 
Yes = 1 2144 (30.42%) 10.63 26.68 
Caring time in the last year (1000 
hours) 
Actual value 7045 (100%)   
Number of grandchildren cared in the 
last year 
Actual value 7045 (100%) 0.37 0.64 
Yes=1 4813 (68.32%)   
Age Actual value 7045 (100%) 60.21 11.10 
Living place 
Village=0 4989 (71.11%) 0.43 0.73 
County/town=1 988 (14.08%)   
City=2 1039 (14.81%)   
Retired 
No=0 6328 (89.82%) 0.10 0.30 
Yes=1 717 (10.18%)   
Number of children Actual value 7045 (100%) 2.60 1.55 
Number of grandchildren over 16 Actual value 7045 (100%) 1.74 3.07 
Number of grandchildren under 16 Actual value 7045 (100%) 1.74 1.95 
Number of siblings Actual value 7045 (100%) 0.30 1.05 
Great grandparents can take care of themselves No=0 6724 (95.44%) 
0.04 0.20 
 Yes=1 321 (4.56%) 
Enrolled in pension program 
No=0 6143 (87.20%) 
0.12 0.33 
Yes=1 902 (12.80%) 
Enrolled in health insurance  
No=0 711 (10.09%) 
0.89 0.30 
Yes=1 6334 (89.91%) 
Have social activities in the last mouth None=0 3026 (42.95%) 
0.57 0.49 
 Yes=1 4019 (57.05%) 
Contact with non-coresident children ≥ 
monthly  
No=0 2671 (37.91%) 
0.62 0.48 
Yes=1 4374 (62.09%) 
See non-coresident children ≥ monthly  
No=0 2738 (38.86%) 0.61 0.48 
Yes=1 4307 (61.14%)   
Saving (1000 yuan) Actual value 7045 (100%) 13.45 10.95 
Loan (1000 yuan) Actual value 7045 (100%) 5.39 57.57 
Own a house 
No=0 1189 (16.88%) 
0.83 0.37 
Yes=1 5856 (83.12) 
Value of the houses (1000 yuan) Actual value 7045 (100%) 2.29 98.80 
Own land 
No=0 3043 (43.19%) 
0.56 0.49 
Yes=1 4002 (56.81%) 
Note: Caring time are calculated as the sum of hours for taking care of each grandchild. 
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𝑃𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇1𝑖 (6.1) 
𝑀𝐻𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇2𝑖 (6.2) 
𝐹𝑇𝑖 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇3𝑖 (6.3) 
𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝜏2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇4𝑖 (6.4) 
 𝐿𝑆𝑖 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐺𝑃𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑃𝐻𝑖 + 𝜃3𝑀𝐻𝑖 + 𝜃4𝐹𝐶𝑖 + 𝜃5𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇5𝑖  (6.5) 
where 𝑃𝐻𝑖 , 𝑀𝐻𝑖  and 𝐹𝑇𝑖  is a vector of measures of physical health, mental health 
and financial transfers of individual 𝑖 , respectively; and 𝐿𝑆𝑖  is the level of life 
satisfaction of individual 𝑖; 𝐺𝑃𝑖 is a vector of grandparental caregiving indicators; and 
𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables including the socio-economics characteristics of 
individual 𝑖. Equation (4) shows that the effect of grandparenting on life satisfaction is 
estimated directly without the quality of life as the mediators in the first step. In the 
second step, equation (5) takes account of the mediating effects of grandparenting 
on life satisfaction. In this sense, 𝜏1  in equation (4) represents the total effect of 
caring for grandchildren on grandparents’ life satisfaction while the difference 
between the parameter 𝜏1 and 𝜃1 in equation (5), is the indirect effect after adding 
the mediators into the model. We also adopt a Karlson-Holm-Breen (KHB) 
decomposition analysis to isolate the indirect effect from total effect as a robustness 
test. This method has been proved to be one of the most suitable methodologies to 
deal with the multiple mediator variables and indirect effect based on a cross-
sectional survey data set (Breen et al., 2013; Grollman, 2018; Shahriar, 2018; Bosick 
& Fomby, 2018). 
 
















6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Grandparenting and quality of life 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 report the results of providing care, caring time and number 
of grandchildren cared, respectively, on grandparents’ quality of life. These tables 
report coefficients while the marginal effects are reported in Tables A6.1, A6.2 and 
A6.3. The results of control variables are only reported in Table 6.2 to save space.32 
In Table 6.2, we control for grandparental caregiving with a binary indicator. In Table 
6.3, we add continuous indicators of time spent looking after grandchildren and the 
number of grandchildren cared for.  
To start with, model 1 in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show that the coefficient of 
providing care is statistically significant and positive at 10% level, which suggests an 
overall  positive relationship between providing grandchild care and grandparents’ 
self-rated health.33 The coefficient of number of grandchildren cared is positive at 5% 
significance level shown in Table 6.3, indicating  that each additional grandchild in 
care is also associated with better self-rated health. 34  In model 2 and 3, the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant, which means that self-rated health change 
and suffering body pains are unrelated with grandparenting. The results of model 4 
of table 6.4 shows a negative relationship between providing grandchild and 
depression, which indicates that grandparents’ mental health is positively related to 
their providing care for grandchildren.35 This effect is further shown to be proportional 
to the number of grandchildren in care and the time spent looking after them (see 
Table A6.2 and A6.3 for marginal effects). The results of model 5 shows that the 
effect of financial transfers from children on providing grandchild care is also positive 
                                            
32 The coefficient estimates are omitted in the further tables as they are very similar to those in Table 
6.2. The full regression results are available upon request.  
33 Those caring for grandchildren are 1.8% less likely to report poor health and 1.5% more likely to be 
in good health (as shown in Table A6.1). 
34 Each grandchild increases the probability of good health (decreases the probability of poor health) 
by 1.3% (1.6%). 
35 Grandparents who look after their grandchildren are 2.9% less likely to report symptoms associated 
with depression (see Table A6.1 for the marginal effect). 
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and statistically significant at 1%36 In a similar vein, this effect is also significantly 
related to the caring time and number of grandchildren in care. 
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Contact with non-coresident children 









































































Observations 7,045 7,045 7,045 6,392 7,045 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Model 1 and 2 
are ordered logistic regressions, Model 4 and 5 are logistic regression and Model 5 is OLS; 4. 
Marginal effects and results of control variables are reported in appendix. 
 
                                            
36 Looking after grandchildren approximately doubles the amount of support that grandparents receive 
from their children (with every additional grandchild increasing the amount of support by 
approximately 60%). Given that the financial support is in logs, the effect of providing care 
corresponds is exp (0.753) = 2.12. 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,045 7,045 7,045 6,392 7,045 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Model 1 and 2 
are ordered logistic regressions, Model 3 and 4 are logistic regression and Model 5 is OLS; 4. 
Marginal effects and results of control variables are reported in appendix. 
 (1) Rural vs urban areas 
Table 6.4 compares the effect of grandparental caregiving on the grandparents’ 
quality of life in rural (village) and urban (town or city) areas. Model 1 to 3 shows that 
there is in general no significant relationship between grandparenting and physical 
health in either village or non-village areas. In model 4, depression is significantly 
and negatively associated with all the variables measuring grandparenting only in 
villages but not in non-village areas, which indicates that the effect of grandparenting 
on financial support received from children is somewhat stronger in the non-village 
area although this may simply reflect the greater earning power of urban residents 
and higher cost of living in towns and cities. 
Table 6.4  Estimations for provide grandchild care on quality of life: Village vs non-village. 








from children  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 


































Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,989 4,989 4,989 4,484 4,989 
























Non Village × Number 











Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,056 2,056 2,056 1,908 2,056 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3.The results of 
the control variables are similar with Table 6.6 and not reported for space saving; 4. Marginal effects 
can be reported upon request. 
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 (2) Grandmother vs grandfather 
Table 6.5 investigates how grandparenting affects grandparents’ quality of life in 
regard to their gender. The coefficients of all the grandparenting variables are all 
statistically insignificant in model 1 to 3, which suggests that the effect of 
grandparenting does not depend on gender. In model 4, depression is significantly 
and negatively associated with providing care to grandchildren, time spent on 
grandchild care and number of grandchildren cared for grandfather whereas this 
relationship is insignificant for grandmothers. The results in model 5 show that the 
financial transfers from children are all significantly and positively related to 
grandparenting. Yet, this positive effect is greater for grandfathers than 
grandmothers, which means that grandfathers’ caregiving elicits more financial 
transfers from children than grandmothers’ care. 
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Grandfather × Caring 























Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,313 3,313 3,313 3,079 3,313 
























Grandmother × Number 











Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,732 3,732 3,732 3,313 3,732 
Notes: 1.Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3.The results of 
the control variables are similar with Table 6.6 and not reported for space saving; 4. Marginal effects 
can be reported upon request. 
6.4.2 Grandparenting and life satisfaction: the direct effect and 
indirect effect (mediating effect) 
Results in Table 6.6 show that caring for grandchildren has a positive effect on the 
grandparents’ life satisfaction in model 1 and 2. As before, the positive effect of 
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grandparenting is proportional to caring time as shown in model 3 and 4. Model 5 
and 6 show that life satisfaction is positively related to number of grandchildren 
cared but negatively related to its square term, so that the relationship displays an 
inverse U shape. This means that the life satisfaction initially increases with the 
number of grandchildren cared but decreases as the number of grandchildren grows, 
with the optimal number being between 2 and 3. (Life satisfaction peaks at 2.4 in 
model 5 and 2.6 in model 6). 
Table 6.6  Ordered logistic regressions: Grandparenting, quality of life and satisfaction: full 
sample.   
Variables 
Life satisfaction 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
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cared 
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cared 2 
















































Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,939 6,361 6,939 6,361 6,939 6,361 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Marginal effects 
and results of control variables are reported in appendix Table A6.4, Table A6.5 and Table A6.6. 
As previously discussed, grandparent caregiving can not only affect grandparents’ 
life satisfaction directly but also indirectly through quality of life as the mediating 
effect. Quality of life is a major channel connecting grandparenting with grandparents’ 
life satisfaction. Yet, the results in full sample suggest that the mediating effect is 
negligible: the coefficient of grandparent care is essentially the same when it is 
included on its own in model 1 and alongside the potential mediators in model 2. 
Considering the marginal effects presented in Table A6.4, the full effect of 
grandparenting increases in the probability of being very satisfied with life by 3.2% 
146 
and 1.1% increase in the probability of being completely satisfied. When controlling 
for mediators, the corresponding effects are 2.7% and 1.1%, respectively. The 
patterns obtained with caring time and the number of grandchildren is very similar: 
adding the quality of life mediators has little changes on the effect of grandparenting. 
(1) Village vs non village 
Table 6.7 examines the direct and indirect effect of grandparenting on the 
grandparents’ life satisfaction in village and non-village area. Results show that 
providing grandchild care, caring time and number of grandchildren cared all have a 
positive effect on the grandparents’ life satisfaction for the grandparents living in the 
village areas but not for those living in towns and cities. The indirect effect of 
grandparenting on life satisfaction via quality of life is small, similar with the results 
from full sample. 
(2) Grandmother vs grandfather 
The effect of grandparenting and quality of life on the grandparents’ life satisfaction 
with respect to genders is shown in Table 6.8. The effects of grandparent care and 
caring time are significant for both genders but are somewhat stronger for 
grandfathers. In contrast, the inverted U-shaped effect of the number of 
grandchildren is only significant for females; grandmothers life satisfaction peaks 
when caring for 2 grandchildren. As before, the effect of grandparenting changes 
little after we consider the mediators. 
6.4.3 Robustness check for the mediating effect: The KHB analysis 
We adopt the Karlson-Holm-Breen (KHB) decomposition analysis as a robustness 
check for the mediating effect. This method also decomposes the total effect into 
direct and indirect effects. It further allows for the calculation of the mediated 
percentage, which is interpreted as the percentage of the main association that can 
be explained by the mediator. The mediated percentage is only considered 
significant when the total and indirect effects are significant (Karlson & Holm, 2011; 
Santini et al., 2016). The result of KHB test is shown in Table 6.9. The total effect of 
all mediators is statistically significant and positive, which indicates that taking care 
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of grandchildren has a positive effect on life satisfaction as a whole. However, the 
indirect effect, only the coefficients of depression and financial supports from 
children are significant yet minuscule, broadly consistent with the previous results. 
For example, the mediating effect of providing grandchild care via depression and 
financial supports from children accounts for 3.68% and 1.25%, respectively; the 
mediating effect of caring time via depression and financial supports from children 
accounts for 0.45% and 0.17%, respectively and the mediating effect of number of 
















Table 6.7 Ordered logistic regressions for Grandparenting on life satisfaction, village vs non-village. 
Variables 
Life satisfaction 
Village Non village Village Non village Village Non village 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,911 4,461 2,028 1,900 4,911 4,461 2,028 1,900 4,911 4,461 2,028 1,900 





Table 6.8  Ordered logistic regressions for Grandparenting on life satisfaction: marginal effect, grandmothers vs grandfathers. 
Variables 
Life satisfaction 
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Model 
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Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,276 3,068 3,663 3,293 3,276 3,068 3,663 3,293 3,276 3,068 3,663 3,293 




Table 6.9  The KHB decomposition analysis.  
Variables 

















Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Self-rated health  0.1959*** 0.1780*** 0.0179 0.0244*** 0.0231*** 0.0014 0.1244*** 0.1079*** 0.0164* 
 (3.63) (3.30) (1.35) (3.43) (3.24) (0.79) (3.25) (2.82) (1.75) 
Self-rated health change 0.1939*** 0.1960*** -0.0020 0.0240*** 0.0250*** -0.0010 0.1230*** 0.1206*** 0.0025 
 (3.61) (3.65) (-0.23) (3.39) (3.53) (-0.84) (3.20) (3.13) (0.39) 
Suffer body pains 0.1889*** 0.1866*** 0.0022 0.0235*** 0.0235*** -0.0000 0.1192*** 0.1148*** 0.0044 
 (3.52) (3.48) (0.25) (3.32) (3.31) (-0.01) (3.11) (2.99) (0.69) 
Depression 0.2116*** 0.1748*** 0.0368** 0.0260*** 0.0214*** 0.0045** 0.1415*** 0.1162*** 0.0253** 
 (3.78) (3.12) (2.32) (3.51) (2.90) (2.16) (3.52) (2.89) (2.23) 
Financial transfers from 
children 
0.1842*** 0.1717*** 0.0125** 0.0229*** 0.0211*** 0.0017** 
0.1150*** 0.1069*** 0.0081** 
 (3.44) (3.20) (2.52) (3.24) (2.98) (2.53) (3.00) (2.78) (2.53) 
Mediators group 1 0.2250*** 0.1710*** 0.0540** 0.0276*** 0.0218*** 0.0058** 0.1508*** 0.1103*** 0.0405*** 
 (3.99) (3.01) (2.55) (3.72) (2.91) (2.06) (3.76) (2.73) (2.73) 
Mediators group 2 0.2121*** 0.1622*** 0.0500*** 0.0261*** 0.0197*** 0.0064*** 0.1418*** 0.1081*** 0.0337*** 
 (3.79) (2.88) (2.97) (3.52) (2.65) (2.84) (3.53) (2.68) (2.84) 
Observations 7045 7045 7045 7045 7045 7045 7045 7045 7045 
Notes: 1. z-values are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Mediators group 1 contains Self-rated health, Self-rated health change, Depression, 
Financial transfers from children and Mediators group 2 contains Depression and Financial transfers from children. 
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6.5 Discussion 
Based on information on 7405 observations from the CHARLS data set, we study the 
effect of grandparental caregiving on life quality and life satisfaction of grandparents. 
In particular, we examine whether the quality of life mediates the effect of 
grandparenting on life satisfaction. There are several main findings from our analysis. 
First, grandparent caregiving has an overall significant and positive effect on 
grandparents’ quality of life: it leads to improvements in mental health and financial 
condition. Likewise, we do not find any evidence that taking care of grandchildren 
makes the grandparents’ physical or mental health deteriorate. Second, when we 
capture the intensity of grandparenting by the number of grandchildren cared for, we 
find that grandparents’ life satisfaction depends on grandparenting in a non-linear 
(inverted U-shaped) manner, with looking after an intermediate number of 
grandchildren associated with greatest life satisfaction. Third, contrary to our 
expectation of both direct and indirect effects of grandparent caregiving on life 
satisfaction, we find that the positive relationship between grandparenting and life 
satisfaction is mainly driven by the direct effect. The mediating effect of quality of life 
on life satisfaction is, somewhat surprisingly, negligible and mostly insignificant.  
Our findings contribute to the grandparenting-health literature. We find that there is 
no significant relationship between grandparenting and the grandparents’ physical 
health of grandparents, which indicates that grandparenting does not accelerate 
physical health decline. This contrasts with the previous literature, which tends to 
find that grandparenting, especially if intensive, has an adverse effect on the elders’ 
physical health (see Jendrek, 1993; Hayslip & Shore, 2000; Chen & Liu, 2012; Musil 
et al., 2017; Yalcin et al., 2018). One possible explanation is that the net effect of 
grandparenting on physical health is neutral in the short term whereas in the long run, 
the negative impact of grandparenting on grandparents’ physical condition can be 
more salient (Ku et al., 2013; Liu, et al. 2019).  
Our results show that the incidence of depression, as measured by the score of 
CES-D indicators, is negatively associated with grandparenting, which is line with 
previous findings of Grundy et al., (2012), Tang et al., (2016) and Tsai et al. (2013). 
They show that elders who are grandchild caregivers are less likely to report being 
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lonely and less likely to suffer from depressive symptoms. Furthermore, when 
differentiating rural from urban grandparents, we find that this positive 
grandparenting-mental health relationship is only significant for the grandparents in 
village (rural) areas, in line with Tsai et al. (2013) and Burnett et al. (2013). Intuitively, 
our understanding is straight forward: a large number of rural workers migrated to 
urban areas during the past few decades (Wang et al., 2018). The parents leave 
their children with the grandparents in the rural area wherethe grandchildren 
constitute an important emotional connection between the grandparents and their 
adult children. This effect is significant for grandfathers yet is insignificant for 
grandmothers. The role of grandfathers in grandparenting tends to be 
complementary instead of primary or custodial (Di Gessa et al., 2016a) whereas the 
involvements of grandmothers in grandchild care is more psychologically demanding 
and can lead to more mental strain (Blustein et al., 2004; Xu, 2019).  
Our findings also contribute to the intergenerational exchange literature. We find that 
among all the life quality variables, the financial situation of grandparents is the most 
significantly and positively associated with grandparenting. The grandchild 
caregivers who live in village (rural) area receive less financial support from their 
children than those who live in urban area, which is in accord with the findings of 
Cong and Silverstein (2011). They show that financial returns to grandparents of 
providing grandchild care and financial assistance are greater from migrant sons 
than from non-migrant sons in rural China. Also, we find that grandfathers receive 
more financial transfers than grandmothers from their children when they provide 
grandchild care, as expected.  
We also contribute to the literature by examining how quality of life (in terms of 
physical health, mental health and financial condition) mediates the impact of 
grandparenting on life satisfaction. The direct effect of grandparenting on 
grandparents’ life satisfaction is statistically significant and positive, broadly 
consistent with the life satisfaction literature (Danielsbacka et al., 2019; Liu et al., 
2019; Xu, 2019; Chyi & Mao, 2012). Building on these studies, we find that this 
positive association is only pronounced in village areas. Intuitively, grandparents in 
rural areas are more likely to take custodial role in grandchild care and achieve 
stronger grandparents-grandchildren relationship than grandparents in urban areas. 
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Also, grandparenting can be more emotionally rewarding in rural area where the 
traditional norms and cultural values are better presevered than in urban areas. 
Further, as Coall & Hertwig (2010) who report a non-linear relationship between the 
intensity of grandparenting and wellbeing, we detect an inverse U shaped 
relationship between grandparents’ life satisfaction and the number of grandchildren 
cared for. The life satisfaction increases as the number of grandchildren cared 
increases but decreases when grandparents care for more than 2 to 3 grandchildren. 
We find, however, that the indirect effect of grandparenting via quality of life 
accounts for a tiny portion of the total effect on grandparents’ life satisfaction. The 
interpretation of these results is straightforward. Although health and financial 
situation play  significant roles in determining grandparents’ level of happiness 
(Appleton & Song, 2008; Knight et al., 2009; Chyi & Mao, 2012), the effect of 
grandparenting on life satisfaction is mainly driven by the direct effect as argued by 
the role enhancement studies with emphasis on the role performance and family 
solidarity (Sieber , 1974; Chen et al., 2011; Di Gessa et al., 2016a; Yaclcin et al., 
2018; Liu et al., 2019). Alternatively, this improved life satisfaction of grandchild 
caregivers can be seen as an intrinsic reflection of the caregiving system that 
encourages investments towards grandchildren from evolutionary studies (Brown et 
al., 2011; Hilbrand et al., 2017a; Hilbrand et al., 2017b; Danielsbacka et al., 2019).  
As a social phenomenon of growing importance in a country suffering population 
aging, grandparenting should attract more attentions in China. Our findings have 
intriguing implications. On the one hand, our analysis suggests that only rural 
grandparents derive benefits in terms of their mental health and life satisfaction 
stemming from looking after their grandchildren. However, rural elders often see their 
children moving to urban areas for work. Grandparents looking after grandchildren in 
such situations would imply that the grandchildren spend considerable time 
separated from their parents. We do not measure the quality of life or life satisfaction 
of parents and grandchildren, but such separation is unlikely to be good for either of 
them. In contrast, if the grandparents move to the urban areas to live with their 
children and grandchildren, the positive effects of grandparenting vanish, possibly 
because they are counterbalanced by the stress of moving to a new location and/or 
of living in an urban area. The decision between rural and urban grandparenting thus 
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Table A6.1 Estimation for providing grandchild care on quality of life: full sample.  
Variables 
Physical Psychological Financial 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health Health change Body pains Depression Ln Support 
from children 
Living with 
children Bad Fair Good Worse About the same Better 
Providing care -0.018* 0.003* 0.015* 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.029** 0.753*** 0.106*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.103) (0.012) 
Male -0.039*** 0.006*** 0.033*** -0.021* 0.013* 0.008* -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.655*** -0.035*** 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.092) (0.011) 
Married -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.010 -0.007 -0.004 -0.017 -0.073*** -0.167 -0.051*** 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.108) (0.013) 
Age 0.027*** -0.004*** -0.023*** 0.013** -0.008** -0.005** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.459*** -0.047*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.045) (0.005) 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000* 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Live in village 0.017 -0.003 -0.014 0.027 -0.017 -0.010 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.186 -0.029* 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.135) (0.017) 
Live in city -0.036** 0.006** 0.030** 0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.043* -0.004 -0.032 0.042** 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.172) (0.021) 
Retired 0.012 -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 0.011 0.006 -0.014 -0.032 -0.619*** -0.018 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024) (0.025) (0.178) (0.022) 
Number of children 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.009* -0.005 0.493*** 0.064*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) 
Number of 
grandchildren over 16 
0.005* -0.001* -0.004* -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.039 -0.008** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) 
Number of 
grandchildren under 16 
0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.009** 0.098*** 0.004 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.029) (0.004) 
Number of sibling 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.092** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
0.040* -0.006* -0.034* 0.107*** -0.068*** -0.039*** 0.050** 0.021 -0.340 0.025 
(0.022) (0.003) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.211) (0.025) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
-0.059*** 0.009*** 0.050*** -0.029 0.019 0.011 -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.485*** -0.009 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.165) (0.020) 
Enrolled in health 
insurance 
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.021 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.051*** 0.195 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.148) (0.018) 
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Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
-0.031*** 0.005*** 0.026*** -0.019 0.012 0.007 -0.012 -0.027** 0.313*** -0.005 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.091) (0.011) 
Contact with non-
coresident children monthly 
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 1.300*** -0.256*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.095) (0.010) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.036*** 0.006*** 0.031*** -0.022* 0.014* 0.008* -0.022* -0.032*** -0.001 -0.130*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.097) (0.012) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.003 -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.003* -0.000* -0.003* 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.004* 0.005** -0.014 0.001 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) 
Own a house 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 -0.027* -0.006 -0.174 0.121*** 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.128) (0.017) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.013*** 0.002*** 0.011*** -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.017*** 0.147*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003) 
Own land 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.019 -0.012 -0.007 0.013 0.005 0.275*** 0.020 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.103) (0.013) 
Observations 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 6,392 7,045 7,045 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Model 1 and 2 are ordered logistic regressions reported with marginal 
effects, Model 3 and 4 are logistic regressions reported with marginal effects and Model 5 is OLS. 
 
Table A6.2 Estimation for caring time on quality of life: full sample. 
Variables 
Physical Psychological Financial 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health Health change Body pains Depression Ln Support 
from children 
Living with 
children Bad Fair Good Worse About the same Better 
Caring time (logarithm) -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.004** 0.103*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) (0.002) 
Male -0.039*** 0.006*** 0.033*** -0.020* 0.013* 0.007* -0.139*** -0.127*** -0.644*** -0.034*** 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.093) (0.011) 
Married -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.010 -0.006 -0.004 -0.017 -0.072*** -0.176 -0.052*** 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.108) (0.013) 
Age 0.027*** -0.004*** -0.023*** 0.012** -0.008** -0.004** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.460*** -0.046*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.045) (0.005) 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Live in village 0.017 -0.003 -0.015 0.028 -0.018 -0.010 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.189 -0.029* 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.135) (0.017) 
Live in city -0.036** 0.006** 0.030** 0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.043* -0.004 -0.033 0.042** 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.172) (0.021) 
Retired 0.012 -0.002 -0.010 -0.018 0.011 0.006 -0.014 -0.032 -0.623*** -0.018 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024) (0.025) (0.177) (0.022) 
Number of children 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.009* -0.005 0.493*** 0.064*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) 
Number of 
grandchildren over 16 
0.005* -0.001* -0.004* -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.038 -0.008*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) 
Number of 
grandchildren under 16 
0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.009** 0.094*** 0.004 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004) 
Number of sibling 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.091** -0.002 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
0.040* -0.006* -0.034* 0.107*** -0.068*** -0.039*** 0.050** 0.021 -0.341 0.025 
(0.022) (0.003) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.211) (0.025) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
-0.059*** 0.009*** 0.050*** -0.029 0.018 0.011 -0.073*** -0.087*** -0.485*** -0.010 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.165) (0.020) 
Enrolled in health 
insurance  
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.021 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.051*** 0.195 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.148) (0.018) 
Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
-0.031*** 0.005*** 0.026*** -0.019* 0.012* 0.007* -0.012 -0.027** 0.313*** -0.005 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.091) (0.011) 
Contact with non-
coresident children monthly 
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 1.304*** -0.256*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.095) (0.010) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.037*** 0.006*** 0.031*** -0.022* 0.014* 0.008* -0.023* -0.033*** 0.011 -0.128*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.097) (0.012) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.003 -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.003* -0.000* -0.003* 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.004* 0.005** -0.013 0.001 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) 
Own a house 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 -0.027* -0.006 -0.174 0.121*** 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.128) (0.017) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.013*** 0.002*** 0.011*** -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.017*** 0.147*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003) 
Own land 0.009 -0.001 -0.008 0.019 -0.012 -0.007 0.013 0.005 0.274*** 0.020 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.103) (0.013) 
Observations 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 6,392 7,045 7,045 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Model 1 and 2 are ordered logistic regressions reported with marginal 
effects, Model 3 and 4 are logistic regressions reported with marginal effects and Model 5 is OLS. 
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Table A6.3  Estimation for the number of grandchildren cared on quality of life: full sample.   
Variables 
Physical Psychological Financial 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Health Health change Body pains Depression Ln Support 
from children 
Living with 
children Bad Fair Good Worse About the same Better 
Number of 
grandchildren cared 
-0.016** 0.002** 0.013** -0.005 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.020** 0.481*** 0.071*** 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.074) (0.009) 
Male -0.039*** 0.006*** 0.033*** -0.021* 0.014* 0.008* -0.140*** -0.126*** -0.669*** -0.037*** 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.092) (0.011) 
Married -0.003 0.000 0.003 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.073*** -0.155 -0.050*** 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.108) (0.013) 
Age 0.027*** -0.004*** -0.023*** 0.013** -0.008** -0.005** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.470*** -0.045*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.045) (0.005) 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* 0.000* 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Live in village 0.017 -0.003 -0.014 0.027 -0.017 -0.010 0.045*** 0.065*** 0.185 -0.029* 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.018) (0.135) (0.017) 
Live in city -0.036** 0.006** 0.030** 0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.043* -0.003 -0.037 0.041* 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.172) (0.021) 
Retired 0.012 -0.002 -0.010 -0.017 0.011 0.006 -0.014 -0.032 -0.602*** -0.015 
(0.018) (0.003) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024) (0.025) (0.178) (0.022) 
Number of children 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.009* -0.004 0.483*** 0.063*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.045) (0.006) 
Number of 
grandchildren over 16 
0.005* -0.001* -0.004* -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.007** 0.037 -0.008*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.025) (0.003) 
Number of 
grandchildren under 16 
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.009** 0.103*** 0.005 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.030) (0.004) 
Number of sibling 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.090** -0.003 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
0.040* -0.006* -0.034* 0.107*** -0.068*** -0.039*** 0.050** 0.020 -0.336 0.025 
(0.022) (0.003) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.212) (0.025) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
-0.059*** 0.009*** 0.050*** -0.030 0.019 0.011 -0.074*** -0.087*** -0.492*** -0.010 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.008) (0.023) (0.024) (0.165) (0.020) 
Enrolled in health 
insurance  
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.021 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.051*** 0.194 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.019) (0.148) (0.018) 
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Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
-0.030*** 0.005*** 0.026*** -0.019 0.012 0.007 -0.012 -0.027** 0.315*** -0.005 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.091) (0.011) 
Contact with non-
coresident children monthly 
0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.015 1.301*** -0.256*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.096) (0.010) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.036*** 0.006*** 0.031*** -0.022* 0.014* 0.008* -0.022* -0.032*** 0.002 -0.129*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.097) (0.012) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 0.003 -0.003** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.003* -0.000* -0.003* 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.004* 0.005** -0.013 0.001 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) 
Own a house 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.011 -0.007 -0.004 -0.027* -0.007 -0.166 0.123*** 
(0.013) (0.002) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.128) (0.017) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.013*** 0.002*** 0.011*** -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 0.148*** 0.030*** 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.003) 
Own land 0.010 -0.001 -0.008 0.020 -0.012 -0.007 0.013 0.005 0.278*** 0.020 
(0.011) (0.002) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.103) (0.013) 
Observations 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 7,045 6,392 7,045 7,045 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01; 3. Model 1 and 2 are ordered logistic regressions reported with marginal 
effects, Model 3 and 4 are logistic regressions reported with marginal effects and Model 5 is OLS. 
 

























Providing care for 
grandchildren (yes) 
-0.005*** -0.012*** -0.026*** 0.032*** 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.023*** 0.027*** 0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health (poor)      0.005*** 0.014*** 0.027*** -0.033*** -0.013*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
Health (good)      -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.080*** 0.097*** 0.039*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (worse)      0.003* 0.008* 0.015* -0.018* -0.007* 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (better)      0.007*** 0.018*** 0.036*** -0.043*** -0.017*** 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
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Body pains (yes)      -0.004* -0.010* -0.020* 0.024* 0.010* 
     (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Depression      0.022*** 0.061*** 0.119*** -0.145*** -0.058*** 
     (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Supports from children 
(logarithm) 
     -0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
live with children (yes)      -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.003 
     (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Male -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.009 0.003 0.002** 0.007** 0.013** -0.016** -0.006** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Married -0.005*** -0.015*** -0.031*** 0.038*** 0.014*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.025*** 0.031*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Age 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.013*** -0.016*** -0.006*** 0.001* 0.003* 0.006* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Live in village 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) 
Live in city 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.011 -0.013 -0.005 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) 
Retired 0.004 0.010 0.021 -0.025 -0.009 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.008 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) 
Number of children -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of grandchildren 
over 16 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of grandchildren 
under 16 
0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Number of sibling 0.001 0.002 0.005* -0.006* -0.002 0.001* 0.003* 0.005* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 -0.018 0.022 0.009 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.007) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.014 -0.016 -0.007 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) 
Enrolled in health 
insurance  
-0.003* -0.009* -0.020* 0.024* 0.009* -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 0.018 0.007 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.002* 0.006* 0.012* -0.014* -0.006* 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Contact with non-coresident -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 0.008 0.003 
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children monthly (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.002* -0.006* -0.014* 0.016* 0.006* -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.000* 0.001* 0.002* -0.003* -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Own a house 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.002*** -0.005*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Own land -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.002 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Observations 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01. 
    

























Caring time (logarithm) -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Health (poor)      0.005*** 0.014*** 0.028*** -0.034*** -0.013*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
Health (good)      -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.080*** 0.097*** 0.039*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (worse)      0.003* 0.008* 0.015* -0.018* -0.007* 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (better)      0.007*** 0.018*** 0.036*** -0.043*** -0.017*** 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Body pains (yes)      -0.004* -0.010* -0.020* 0.024* 0.010* 
     (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Depression      0.022*** 0.061*** 0.119*** -0.145*** -0.058*** 
     (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
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Supports from children 
(logarithm) 
     -0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
live with children (yes)      -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.003 
     (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Male -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.009 0.003 0.002* 0.007** 0.013** -0.016** -0.006** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Married -0.005*** -0.015*** -0.031*** 0.038*** 0.014*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.025*** 0.030*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Age 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.013*** -0.015*** -0.006*** 0.001* 0.003* 0.006* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Live in village 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) 
Live in city 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.011 -0.013 -0.005 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) 
Retired 0.004 0.010 0.021 -0.025 -0.009 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.008 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) 
Number of children -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of grandchildren 
over 16 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of grandchildren 
under 16 
0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Number of sibling 0.001 0.002* 0.005* -0.006* -0.002* 0.001* 0.003* 0.005* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.018 0.022 0.009 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.007) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.014 -0.017 -0.007 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) 
Enrolled in health 
insuranc 
-0.003* -0.009* -0.020* 0.024* 0.009* -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 0.018 0.007 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.002* 0.006* 0.012* -0.014* -0.006* 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Contact with non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 0.009 0.003 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.002* -0.007* -0.014* 0.017* 0.006* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.000* 0.001* 0.002* -0.003* -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Own a house 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.002*** -0.005*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Own land -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.002 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Observations 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; 2. Significant level: *p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
 



























-0.005*** -0.015*** -0.031*** 0.037*** 0.013*** -0.005*** -0.014*** -0.027*** 0.032*** 0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
Squared number of 
grandchildren cared  
0.001** 0.003** 0.006** -0.008** -0.003** 0.001* 0.003* 0.005* -0.006* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Health (poor)      0.005*** 0.014*** 0.027*** -0.033*** -0.013*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) 
Health (good)      -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.080*** 0.097*** 0.039*** 
     (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (worse)      0.003* 0.008* 0.015* -0.018* -0.007* 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Health change (better)      0.007*** 0.019*** 0.036*** -0.044*** -0.017*** 
     (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Body pains (yes)      -0.004* -0.010* -0.020* 0.024* 0.009* 
     (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Depression      0.022*** 0.061*** 0.119*** -0.145*** -0.058*** 
     (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Supports from children 
(logarithm) 
     -0.000** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
164 
live with children (yes)      -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 0.003 
     (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Male -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.008 0.003 0.002** 0.007** 0.013** -0.016** -0.006** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Married -0.005*** -0.015*** -0.031*** 0.038*** 0.014*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.025*** 0.030*** 0.012*** 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
Age 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.013*** -0.016*** -0.006*** 0.001* 0.003* 0.006* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Live in village 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) 
Live in city 0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.003 0.002 0.005 0.011 -0.013 -0.005 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) 
Retired 0.003 0.010 0.020 -0.025 -0.009 0.003 0.008 0.016 -0.020 -0.008 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) 
Number of children -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Number of grandchildren 
over 16 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of grandchildren 
under 16 
0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Number of sibling 0.001 0.002* 0.005* -0.006* -0.002* 0.001* 0.003* 0.005* -0.007* -0.003* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Parents can take care of 
themselves 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 -0.018 0.022 0.009 
(0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.019) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) (0.007) 
Enrolled in pension 
program 
0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.013 -0.016 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) 
Enrolled in health 
insurance 
-0.003* -0.009* -0.020* 0.024* 0.009* -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 0.018 0.007 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.005) 
Have social activities in 
the last mouth 
0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.006 -0.002 0.002* 0.006* 0.012* -0.014* -0.006* 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) 
Contact with non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 0.009 0.003 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) 
See non-coresident 
children monthly 
-0.002* -0.006* -0.013* 0.016* 0.006* -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) 
Saving (logarithm) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Loan (logarithm) 0.000* 0.001* 0.002* -0.003* -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
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(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Own a house 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) 
Value of the houses 
(logarithm) 
-0.002*** -0.005*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Own land -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 0.006 0.002 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) 
Observations 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,939 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 6,361 




After the economic reform in 1978, China has achieved great success in economic 
development and become the 2nd largest economy in the world. Inward FDI has 
contributed extensively to the rapid development of economic development in China 
for several reasons. For example, the entry of foreign capital has caused know-how 
spillovers and promoted the productivity of domestic markets. Also, the multinational 
enterprises can offer more job opportunities to the labour market. However, the 
allocation of the FDI differs hugely with the largest potion in the coastal regions and 
the least in the western regions. As a number of regions were colonized by different 
countries in the Chinese modern history, the long lasting institutional effect (as 
suggested by Acemoglu et al., 2001; Becker et al., 2016) can lead to different 
attitudes and trust towards the foreign capital (Che et al, 2015), which can lead to 
different impact of FDI on the labour market. Also, it has long been argued that the 
FDI and the uneven regional distribution of FDI aggravate inequality in China. Inward 
FDI, therefore, has remained an important issue to study. Indeed, not only the inward 
FDI but also the outward FDI concerns the Chinese economy since after the going 
out policy, the Belt Road Initiative encourages more Chinese outward investment. 
Admittedly, both inward and outward FDI are two important external factors for the 
Chinese economy. China also faces several internal challenges such as lagging rural 
development and aging population. Aiming at study these issues, this thesis consists 
of three research articles on inward FDI and its impact on employment in labour 
market and rural urban inequality after several decades of economic reform and the 
determinant of outward FDI under the Belt Road Initiative.  In further two articles, we 
investigate the rural labour transfer and older people’s life quality and life satisfaction.  
In Chapter 2 we investigate the inward FDI and the labour market in China from a 
historical perspective. As different colonial powers may have left behind different 
types of institutions, we separate two colonial legacies due to different colonial 
purposes, the western colonization with the intention to trade with China and the 
Japanese colonization with the intention of territorial expansion. Accordingly, we then 
construct two types of colonization indices and show that the different legacies of 
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colonization shape the impact of FDI on employment differently. We find that the 
influence of western colonization strengthens the positive relationship between 
inward FDI and employment while that of Japanese colonization weakens and even 
overturns such effect. We attempt to compare service sector and manufacturing 
sector in the first place yet the research suffers from severe missing data issue in 
manufacturing sector. As such, we turn to a comparison between the service sector 
and the whole economy. Based on the comparison, the development of service 
sector is still in a preliminary stage from our results. First, the impact of FDI on 
employment in service sector is less than that for the whole economy. Second, the 
effect of human capital is insignificant, indicating that it is not in a deep demand 
compared to the whole economy where the effect of human capital is statistically 
significant. 
In Chapter 3, we then turn to investigate whether inward FDI in China has impacts 
on the inequality as argued in the literature from the angle of rural-urban wage 
inequality. Based on a provincial level panel data set from 2000 to 2016, we show 
that different types of inward FDI in terms of ownerships (CJV, EJV, WFOE) and 
sectors (primary FDI, secondary FDI and Tertiary FDI) have had different influences 
on the income inequality measured by the rural urban disparity in the host regions 
and adjacent regions by adopting the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM). From the findings 
we mainly argue that the inward FDI should not be blamed for the aggravation of 
rural urban wage inequality in China. Moreover, we detect a negative (favourable) 
inward FDI-inequality relationship if the inward FDI flows into primary sector. Yet, the 
primary sector has the least portion of the aggregate inward FDI.  
In Chapter 4 we explore CI as a determinant of Chinese outward FDI under the Belt 
Road Initiative by comparing 75 non Belt Road countries and 66 Belt Road countries. 
We also compare the effect of establishment of Confucius Institutes in the Chinese 
outward FDI in host countries before and after the Chinese recent well-known global 
strategy, Belt-Road Initiative initiated. The results show that the establishment of 
Confucius Institute has had a positive effect on Chinese firms’ cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions in non-Belt Road countries rather than Belt Road countries. 
However, the positive effect of CI has been strengthened after the Belt-Road 
initiative in Belt Road countries.  
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In Chapter 5, we use a city level survey from Professor Luo’s team covering 9 cities 
in eastern, central and western China and show that several types of capital, namely, 
human capital, financial capital, natural capital, social capital and political capital, are 
major or minor driving forces to release the rural potential labour into the labour 
market. We name this as the on-farm transition so as to make it consistent with the 
term in the literature, off-farm transition.  
In chapter 6, we study how grandparenting affects the life quality and life satisfaction 
of older people on the basis of CHARLS data set in 2015 covering 7045 household 
observations. The results show that when grandparents look after their grandchildren, 
they are 2.9% less likely to report symptoms of depression, the amount of support 
that they receive from their children approximately doubles, and are 2.7% (1.1%) 
more likely to report being very satisfied (completely satisfied). In short, 
grandparenting has a positive effect on grandparents’ life quality in terms of better 
mental health and more financial support and life satisfaction. The favourable effect 
on life satisfaction on is shown to be direct rather than through a better life quality 
induced by grandchild caregiving.  
Future research can explore extensively in the following aspects. Firstly, studies may 
focus on clarifing the specific channels that the different institutions and can affect 
both the inward FDI and outward FDI and the labour market in different sectors by 
using microdata sets when they are available. Second, further research should both 
theoretically and empirically to answer whether Chinese government should 
reallocate the inward FDI into less developed regions such as Central and west 
China to boost the economic growth or to reallocate the labour force in these regions 
by entirely cancelling the Hukou restriction so as to lower the rural urban income 
inequality. Third, how member countries benefit from Belt Road Initiative should have 
drawn more attentions by examining not only the FDI in one direction but also the 
bilateral FDI and trade. More importantly, through what channels the Belt Road 
Initiative brings sizable benefits to the world economy needs to be addressed.  
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